U.S. citizens were declared enemies of the U.S. by F.D.R. by Executive Order No. 2040 and ratified by Congress on March 9, 1933, 48 Stat. 1

FDR changed the meaning of The Trading with the Enemy Act of December 6, 1917 by changing the word "without" to citizens "within" the United States

REMEDY AND RECOURSE

Every system of civilized law must have two characteristics: Remedy and Recourse. Remedy is a way to get out from under that law. The Recourse is if you have been damaged under the law, you can recover your loss. The Common Law, the Law of Merchants, and even the Uniform Commercial Code all have remedy and recourse, but for a long time we could not find it. If you go to a law library and ask to see the Uniform Commercial Code, they will show you a shelf of books completely filled with the Uniform Commercial Code. When you pick up one volume and start to read it, it will seem to have been intentionally written to be confusing. It took us a long time to discover where the Remedy and Recourse are found in the UCC. They are found right in the first volume, at 1-207 and 1-103.

REMEDY

The making of a valid Reservation of Rights preserves whatever rights the person then possesses, and prevents the loss of such rights by application of concepts of waiver or estoppel. (UCC 1-207.7) It is important to remember when we go into a court, that we are in a commercial, international jurisdiction. If we go into court and say, "I DEMAND MY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS," the judge will most likely say, "You mention the Constitution again, and I'll find you in contempt of court!" Then we don't understand how he can do that. Hasn't he sworn to uphold the Constitution? The rule here is: you cannot be charged under one jurisdiction, and defend under another. For example, if the French government came to you and asked where you filed your French income tax in a certain year, do you go to the French government and say, "I demand my Constitutional Rights?" No. The proper answer is: THE LAW DOESN'T APPLY TO ME--I'M NOT A FRENCHMAN. You must make your reservation of rights under the jurisdiction in which you are charged--not under some other jurisdiction. So in a UCC court, you must claim your reservation of rights under the U.C.C. 1-207. UCC 1-207 goes on to say: When a waivable right or claim is involved, the failure to make a reservation thereof, causes a loss of the right, and bars its assertion at a later date. (UCC 1-207.9) You have to make your claim known early. Further, it says: The Sufficiency of the Reservation--Any expression indicating an intention to reserve rights, is sufficient, such as "without prejudice". (UCC 1-207.4) Whenever you sign any legal paper that deals with Federal Reserve Notes--in any way, shape or manner--under your signature write: Without Prejudice UCC 1-207. This reserves your rights. You can show, at 1-207.4, that you have sufficiently reserved your rights. It is very important to understand just what this means. For example, one man who used this in regard to a traffic ticket was asked by the judge just what he meant by writing -without prejudice UCC 1-207' on his statement to the court. He had not tried to understand the concepts involved. He only wanted to use it to get out of the ticket. He did not know what it meant. When the judge asked him what he meant by signing in that way, he told the judge that he was not prejudiced against anyone.... The judge knew that the man had no idea what it meant, and he lost the case. You must know what it means.

WITHOUT PREJUDICE UCC 1-207

When you use -without prejudice' UCC 1-207 in connection with your signature, you are saying: -I reserve my right not to be compelled to perform under any contract or commercial agreement that I did not enter knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally. And furthermore, I do not accept the liability of the compelled benefit of any unrevealed contract or commercial agreement.' What is the compelled performance of an unrevealed commercial agreement? When you use Federal Reserve Notes instead of silver dollars, is it voluntary? No. There is no lawful money, so you have to use Federal Reserve Notes--you have to accept the benefit. The government has given you the benefit to discharge your debts with limited liability, and you don't have to pay your debts. How nice they are! But if you did not reserve your rights under 1-207.7, you are compelled to accept the benefit, and are therefore obligated to obey every statute, ordinance and regulation of the government, at all levels of government--federal, state and local. If you understand this, you will be able to explain it to the judge when he asks. And he will ask, so be prepared to explain it to the court. You will also need to understand UCC 1-103--the argument and recourse. If you want to understand this fully, go to a law library and photocopy these two sections from the UCC. It is important to get the Anderson edition. Some of the law libraries will only have the West Publishing version, and it is very difficult to understand. In Anderson, it is broken down with decimals into ten parts and, most importantly, it is written in plain English.

Roman Law

In the following article this subject is briefly treated under the two heads of; I. Principles; II. History. Of these two divisions, I is subdivided into: A. Persons; B. Things; C. Actions. The subdivisions of II are: A. Development of the Roman Law (again divided into periods) and B. Subsequent Influence.
I. PRINCIPLES

The characteristic of the earlier Roman law was its extreme formalism. From its first secret administration as the law of the privileged classes it expanded until it became the basis of all civilized legal systems. The Roman law in its maturity recognized a definite natural-law theory as the ultimate test of the reasonableness of positive law, and repudiated the concept that justice is the creature of positive law. Cicero (De leg., I, v) tells us "Nos ad justitiam esse natos, neque opinione sed natura constitutum esse jus" (i.e. Justice is natural, not the effect of opinion). Justice was conformity with perfect laws and jurisprudence was the appreciation of things human and divine — the science of the just and the unjust, but always the science of law with its just application to practical cases. Law was natural or positive (man-made); it was natural strictly speaking (instinctive), or it was natural under the Roman concept of the jus gentium (law of nations) — natural in itself or so universally recognized by all men that a presumption arose by reason of universality. The Romans attributed slavery to the jus gentium because it was universally practised, and therefore implied the consent of all men, yet the definition of slavery expressly states that it is contra naturam, "against nature". The precepts of the law were these: to live honestly; not to injure another; to give unto each one his due. Positive law was the jus civile, or municipal law, of a particular state.

A. Persons

Man and person were not equivalent terms. A slave was not a person, but a thing; a person was a human being endowed with civil status. In other than human beings personality might exist by a fiction. Status was natural or civil. Natural status existed by reason of natural incidents, such as posthumous or already born (jam nati), sane and insane, male and female, infancy and majority. Civil status had to do with liberty, citizenship, and family. If one had no civil status whatever, he had no personality and was a mere thing. Men were either free or slaves: if free they were either free born or freedmen. Slaves were born such or became slaves either by the law of nations or by civil law. By the law of nations they became slaves by reason of captivity; by civil law, by the status of their parents or in the occasional case where they permitted themselves to be sold in order to participate in the price, if they were over twenty years of age. An ungrateful freedman, again, might become a slave, as might one condemned to involuntary servitude in punishment for crime. Freeborn, in the later law, were such as were born of a mother who was free at conception, at birth, or at any time between conception and birth. Freedmen were former slaves who had been emancipated under one of several forms. They owed obsequium — i.e., respect and reverence — to their former masters. The Lex Ælia Sentia placed restrictions on emancipation by minors and in fraud of creditors. The Lex Fusia Caninia restricted the right of manumission proportionately to the number of slaves owned.

Men were either citizens or foreigners (peregrini), perhaps more accurately "denizens". Assuming that one had civil status, he might be either sui juris (his own master) or alieni juris (subject to another). The power to which he was subject was termed a potestas: slaves were under the dominical power, and children were under the patria potestas exercised by a male ascendant; the marital power was termed manus (i.e., "the hand", signifying force).

Slaves were at first insecure in their lives, but later the master's power of life and death was taken away. They were in commerce and might be sold, donated, bequeathed by legacy, alienated by testament, or manumitted. They had nothing of their own, and whatever was acquired through them accrued to the masters. Only very rarely could they bring their masters intolegal relations with third persons.

The paternal power over children (descendants) was a close patriarchal relationship, dating from remote antiquity and at first extending to life and death. Between paterfamilias and filius familias (father and son), no obligation was legally enforceable (see Prejudicial action below). During his lifetime the paterfamilias was the owner of accessions made by the filius familias. The later law, however, recognized a quasi-partnership of blood and conceded an inchoate ownership in the paternal goods, which was given expression in the system of successions. A child under power might have the administration of separate goods called his peculium. The paterfamilias did not part with the ownership. The military and quasi-military peculium became a distinct, separate property. Even the slave at his master's sufferance might enjoy a peculium. The paternal power was stripped of the power of life and death, the right of punishment was moderated, and the sale of children was restricted to cases of extreme necessity. In the earlier law, it had been permitted to the father to give over his child (as he might give over a slave) to some person injured through the act of the child, and thus escape liability. With the growth of humane sentiment, the noxal action in the case of children was abolished. Between parents and children, only affirmative or negative actions on the question of filiation or the existence of the paternal power were permitted. The paternal power was held only by males, and extended indefinitely downward during the lifetime of the patriarch: i.e., father and son were under the patria potestas of the grandfather. The potestas was in no wise influenced by infancy or majority. In the case given, upon the death of the grandfather the paternal power would fall upon the father. The patria potestas was acquired over children born in lawful wedlock, by legitimation, and by adoption.

Marriage (nuptiœ or connubium) was the association or community of life between man and woman, for the procreation and rearing of offspring, validly entered into between Roman citizens. It was wont to be preceded by sponsalia (betrothal), defined as an agreement of future marriage. Sponsalia might be verbally entered into, and required no solemnities. The mutual consent of the spouses was requisite, and the object of marriage was kept in mind so that marriage with an impotent person (castratus) was invalid: the parties must have attained puberty, and there could be but one husband and one wife. It is true that more or less continuous extra-matrimonial relations between the same man and woman in the absence of any other marriage were considered as a kind of marriage, under the jus gentium, by the jurists of the second and third centuries. The connubium, or Roman marriage, was for Roman citizens: matrimonium existed among other free persons, and contubernium was the marital relation of slaves. The latter was a status of fact, not a juridical status. Marriage might be incest, indecorous, or noxal: incest, e.g., between blood relations or persons between whom affinity existed; indecorous, e.g., between a freeman and a lewd woman or actress; noxal, e.g., between Christian and Jew, tutor or curator and ward, etc.
Cognation or blood relationship is indicated by degrees and lines; the degree measures the distance between cognates, and the line shows the series, either direct (ascending or descending) or collateral; the collateral line is either equal or unequal in the descent from the commonancestor. In the direct line, in both civil and canon law, there are as many degrees as there are generations. In the collateral line there is a difference: by civil law, brother and sister are in the second degree, although each is only one degree removed from the common ancestor, the father; by canon law, they are in the first degree. The civil law counts each degree up to the common ancestor and then down to the other collateral. The canon law measures the cognation of collaterals by the distance in degrees of the collateral farthest removed from the common ancestor. Uncle and niece are three degrees distant by civil law; by canon law they are only two degrees removed. Affinity is the artificial relationship which exists between one spouse and the cognates of the other. Affinity has no degrees. By Roman law, marriage in the direct line was prohibited; in the collateral line it was prohibited in the second degree.

Marriage was usually accompanied by the dowry, created on behalf of the wife, and by donations propter nuptias, on behalf of the husband. The dowry (dos) was what the wife brought or what some other person on her behalf supplied towards the expenses of the married state. Property of the wife in excess of the dowry was called her paraphernalia. The dowry was profective, if it came from the father; adventitious, if from the wife or from any other source. The husband enjoyed its administration and control, and all of its fruits accrued to him. Upon the dissolution of themarriage the profective dowry might be reclaimed by the wife's father, and the adventitious by the wife or her heirs. Special actions existed for the enforcement of dotal agreements.

The offspring of incest or adultery could not be legitimated. Adoption, which imitates nature, was a means of acquiring the paternal power. Only such persons as in nature might have been parents could adopt, and hence a difference of eighteen years was necessary in the ages of the parties. Adoption was of a minor, and could not be for a time only. Similar to adoption was adrogation, whereby one sui juris subjected himself to the patria potestas of another. The paternal power was dissolved by the death of the ancestor, in which case each descendant in the first degree became sui juris; those in remoter degrees fell under the paternal power of the next ascendant: Upon the death of the grandfather, his children became sui juris, and the grandchildren came under the power of their respective fathers. Loss of status (capitis diminutio, media or maxima), involving loss of liberty or citizenship, destroyed the paternal power. Emancipation and adoption had a similar effect. One might be sui juris and yet subject to tutorship or curatorship. Pupillary tutorship was a personal public office consisting in the education and in the administration of the goods of a person sui juris, but who had not yet attained puberty. Tutorship was testamentary, statutory, or dative: testamentary when validly exercised in the will of the paterfamilias with respect to a child about to become sui juris, but under puberty. A testamentary tutor could not be appointed by the mother nor by a maternal ascendant. The agnates, who were an important class of kinsmen, in the early Roman law were cognates connected through males either by blood relationship or by the artificial tie of agnation. Statutory tutorship was that which the law immediately conferred, as the tutorship of agnates, of patrons, etc. The first statutory tutors were the agnates and gentiles called to tutorship by the Twelve Tables. Justinian abolished the distinction in this respect between agnates and cognates, and called them promiscuously to the statutory tutorship.