Russia announces enormous finds of radioactive waste and nuclear reactors in Arctic seas

Eh, I'll still eat fish....as long as somebody goes there to decon all that waste....
Now that I think about it, I wonder how long it was take for the clean up? an what tools they would use, sounds like a large task at hand, assuming there going to clean house....

reply to post by error500


It might be worth it if I could grow another arm or two. Get my work done quicker.

Originally posted by starviego
I used to work at the downtown YMCA in San Diego in the mid '70s. I met one sailor who told me the Navy had one of their big aircraft carriers that had a nuclear reactor that had become totally contaminated. Their solution? The towed the ship out to the open ocean and just dumped the entire reactor overboard. So it's not just the Russians doing this.

I used to be a reactor operator in the Navy, and this is not correct. While I was in, I heard stories about the Enterprise having a room or two that were highly contaminated and that the crew was not allowed to access, but nothing else.

The Navy is very good when it comes to teaching you about all the major mistakes made in nuclear power. There is a T manual that everyone crosses paths with in Prototype (at the earliest) that discusses all of these. Never do they talk about dumping an "overly contaminated" reactor from a carrier -- and they mention some pretty embarrassing stuff.

I also have many friends who have served as reactor operators aboard the Enterprise (as well as every other nuclear carrier and several submarines), and if that had ever happened, again, we would have been told. The nuclear Navy never passes up a chance to talk about incidences.

And lastly, this could not be done logistically. Roughly every 25 years (the cycle may actually be different for the Enterprise), reactors are refueled. To do this, they have to go into the shipyards, and it takes a pretty long time. You can't just go out to sea and press a "core ejection" button. It's a very involved process.

reply to post by litterbaux


Doomed with or without us friend! That's the thing you fail to consider! Should we go the way of the Dino's?

If we made a waste of the whole earth we will have only created a window for new diversity! 98% of all species that have ever existed are now extinct due to events that make the entire history of humankind seems trivial!

It is not by the principals of humanity that man lives or is able to preserve himself above the animal world, but rather by means of the most brutal struggle!

Your save the whales attitude is suicidal for humankind, If you cannot find reason in that then you might as well have never lived at all!

Mankind will likely not endure the test of time, but if we do it will not be by betting our future on fragile and doomed ecosystems! It will instead be because we have mastered these systems!

A Zoo is a great place for all those species that must give way. At least this way they will not suffer compete extinction as they would without our intervention.

Only a fool sees the world as perpetually unchanging! The mess as you say we are in should be met with the technology to fix it, not with any retardation of human progress.

The only mess in the world today is inaction! We just sit here and allow whatever. Fraudulent elections, destruction of ecosystems etc.. etc.. etc... If Humankind did survive I would hope that a love of nature would survive as well, and so even if we had a planet wide city wild areas may still be found on this planet.

A completely managed ecosystem could be of benefit to all life forms, but currently there is no study in this field that I am aware.

It would be interesting to see if cancer rates correlate with the advent of nuclear power, bombs, waste,
if so it could be that certain cancerous causing activities like smoking, maybe fairly safe and it's
all the Nuclear stuff floating , sitting around which is the culprit.

Originally posted by Uneedhlp247
reply to post by ModernAcademia

 

Of course the Russians dumped their waste in the worlds ocean! Why wouldn't they? You can't expect all nations to treat their waste as the U.S. does.

At least the Russians have been able to restrain them selves to NOT use a nuclear weapon in war.
The US used one not once, but twice, on the people of Japan.

The US continues to use depleted uranium munitions(and armor on their tanks), causing untold birth defects on the civilian populations.

The US goes to war in a region, drops thousands of tonnes of depleted uranium, and it's just a coincidence that the temperatures in those regions go up.

When the US bombed Serbia the first time, I was in Greece around that time. Just a coincidence that the snow started melting shortly after...in the middle of winter..

Lot's of coincidences...ehh?

Take a look at how American corporations treat the environment around the world.
And we all know that American oil/energy companies are directly linked to American foreign policy.
They destroy the environment where ever they go, particularly in third world and under developed countries.

And then look at your other corporations which have opened up dirty, heavy polluting factories and industry in the third world, like China. It's not only about escaping taxes and high wage costs, it's also about escaping tighter regulations and protocols, which means less expenses which means bigger profits.

So before you go around pointing your finger at others and how they treat the environment, take a look at your own damn country and the damage it has done and continues to do to our planet.

Your damage isn't even limited to the planet, you've polluted outer space too.
Considering the US is the biggest space power, the majority of the space junk floating around the earth would belong to America.

i posted this in another thread but think its relevant here too.

if you think thats bad news check this link gives you a rough idea of the size of the problem the world faces this list is only of the amount caught or known to be missing so whats really worrying is the amount tha has got threw maybe none or maybe its like drugs and people smuggling where for everyone thats caught 4 times that gets threw?? www.terrorismanalysts.com... /article/view/schmid-illicit-radiological/html
www.terrorismanalysts.com... /article/view/schmid-illicit-radiological/html

below is the list i copy and pasted from the link


1990, February / Azerbaijan / N: Azerbaijani rebels unsuccessfully attacked a Soviet military depot dear Baku where nuclear weapons are stored; Soviet troops were sent to secure the base (www.johnstonarchive.net...).

1991 / Kazakhstan / Iran / N: According to unconfirmed reports, Kazakhstan sold Iran three tactical nuclear warheads for between $130 million and $150million (Rensselaer W. Lee: ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 124).

1991 / Russian Federation / N: Islamic Jihad purportedly approached one of Russian Federation's closed cities, Arzamas-16, offering to buy a nuclear weapon.

1992 / USA / N: Last US explosive test. Former Russian test site Semipalatinsk is closed by newly independent Kazakhstan.

1992, January / Iran / N: An Egyptian newspaper claimed Iran had bought three Soviet nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan for $150 million; Kazakhstan denied the report. In April, Russian intelligence reported Iran had obtained at least two warheads from Kazakhstan; in July a Kazakh official said the 3 reportedly missing warheads were in test shafts a the Kazakh test site; in September a U.S. congressional task force alleged Iran had obtained 4 Soviet warheads (including two operational): two 40 kt SRBM warheads, one 50 kt NGB, and one 0.1 kt AFAP. By 1994, Russia said the warheads were accounted for; Israeli officials suggest the warheads were borrowed for disassembly and reverse engineering (www.johnstonsarchive.net...).

1992, March / Commonwealth of Independent States / R: Reportedly, a box of radioactive material stolen from Pridniestroviye, Transdnestr; thieves threatened to blow up the material if fighting in Moldova was not stopped (www.johnstonsarchive.net...).

1992, May–October / Russian Federation, Luch Scientific Production Association / N: This incident involved a chemical engineer, Yuri Smirnov and long-time employee of the State Research Institute, Scientific Production Association (also known as Luch) which is located 22 miles from Moscow. Beginning in May 1992, over a 5-month period, the individual smuggled out of the institute small quantities of 90% HEU, totalling 1.5 kg. In October 1992, the engineer was arrested because police suspected him of stealing equipment from the Luch faculty. Once in custody, the police discovered the nuclear material that he had stolen. The individual did not have a specific buyer in mind, but was trying to determinate whether there was a market for the stolen nuclear material. He was tried before a Russian court and received 3 years’ probation. The material had been seized in October, 1994, in Podolsk, Russian Federation (Frank Barnaby: ‘Instruments of Terror’, 1996, p.154; and Rensselaer W. Lee: ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 110).

1992 / Kazakhstan/Iran / R/N: Iranian agents allegedly contacted officials at nuclear facilities in Kazakhstan on several occasions, attempting to acquire nuclear-related materials. In the same year, Iran had allegedly unsuccessfully approached the Ulba Metallurgical Plant to obtain enriched Uranium.

1992, May–October / Ukraine / R/N: Apparently 100 kg of Uranium was stolen from the Chepetsk Mechanical Factory (Ukraine?); 80 kg could be recovered later. The material was apparently destined for the Middle East.

1992, 30 March–6 April / Russian Federation/North Korea / N: 56 kg of Plutonium was said to have been smuggled by train, hidden among scrap metals, to North Korea from Russian Federation in early 1992, according to Kommsersant.

1992, October / Russian Federation: Yuri Smirnov, an engineer at the Lunch Scientific Production Association in Podolsk, Russian Federation was accused of stealing 3.7 pounds of HEU (90% enriched U-235). He was caught when leaving for Moscow to find a buyer

1992, October 28 / Bulgaria/Iraq / N: A consignment of 44 kg of Pu-239, possibly destined for Iraq, was found in the Sheraton hotel in Sofia, according to a report of Komosomolskaya Pravda (11.11.1992). However, Bulgarian officials ultimately identified the perpetrator as a British journalist claiming to research the activities of a gang who had offered to deliver 80 kg of Pu to Iraq. The journalist had managed to insinuate himself as intermediaries in the transaction and passed the first box of Pu (worth $378,000) to the Bulgarian authorities. The ‘Plutonium’ turned out to be a box of metal screws with a total content of 200 millig of Pu. (Rensselaer W. Lee: ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 75, 87).

1992, December / Kazakhstan/Iran / N: a phone conversation between two Iranian officials, intercepted by a European security service, allegedly recorded a discussion on the purchase of four nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan. Apparently the warheads had already been paid for but there was a ‘transportation problem’.

1993 / Russian Federation / R/N: 165 kg of Uranium were reportedly confiscated in Izjezk, 900 km from Moscow.

1993 / Turkey/Iran / R/N: Three Iranians believed to have had connections to Iran’s intelligence service, were arrested in Turkey while seeking to acquire nuclear material from smugglers from the former Soviet Union.

1993 / Ukraine / Palestine / N: According to unconfirmed reports, Ukrainians sold the Palestine Liberation Organisation two nuclear warheads for $10 million (Rensselaer W. Lee: ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 125).

1993 / Russian Federation / N: The director of the nuclear research centre in Arzamas-16 was, according to his own testimony, offered $ 2 billion for a warhead by Iraqi representatives (Rensselaer Lee, as quoted in CSIS, The Nuclear Black Market, op. Cit., p. 15).

1993 / Russian Federation / R/N: A Volgograd businessman offered 2.5 kg of HEU to a criminal gang based in the Central Volge region to pay off a debt he owed to them. The gang refused the material as payment for the debt because it could not find any buyers (Gavin Cameron: ‘Nuclear Terrorism’, 1998, p. 9).

1993, January / Russian Federation / R/N: Several persons where arrested in the ‘closed’ city of Arzamas-16 in the Russian Federation after 10 kg of Uranium were found in their possession.

1993, March / Chechnya / R/N: Chechens were reported to have obtained enriched Uranium from Kazakhstan and from Russian Army deports.

1993, March / Turkey / R/N: Turkish intelligence sources reported that six kg of enriched Uranium was smuggled into Turkey through the Aralik border gate in Kars province in eastern Turkey. The material was reportedly brought in from Tashkent, Uzbekistan, to Grozny, Chechnya, and via Georgia to Nachichevan, before it was intercepted in Istanbul.

1993, April / Ukraine / R: 80 tons of nuclear fuel were discovered by the Ukrainian customs service on its way from Russian Federation to Varna, Bulgaria, where is was thought to be shipped to Libya.

1993, April / Lithuania / R/N: Uranium and Strontium were reported to have disappeared from a nuclear power plant in north-east Lithuania.

1993, April / Russian Federation / R/N: 75 g of Plutonium were seized in Orel, Russian Federation, in April, 1993. The material was reportedly stolen from the Orel Branch of the Moscow Instrumentation Research and Development Institute (Rensselaer W. Lee: ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 107).1993, May / Glazov, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 11 kg Natural Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1993, May 24 / Vilnius, Lithuania / R/N: In May 1993, Lithuanian authorities recovered 4.4 tons of Beryllium in a smuggling investigation. Beryllium is a metal that is used in the production of, among others things, x-ray tubes, lasers, computers, aircraft parts, nuclear reactors, and nuclear weapons. When Lithuanian authorities seized the material, they discovered that some of the Beryllium (141 kg) was contaminated with approximately 0.1 kg of HEU (50% enriched U-235) . There was no evidence that the individuals involved were aware that the Beryllium contained the enriched Uranium. Some reports indicated that the Beryllium originated in the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering in the Russian Federation. This institute was involved in the research and development of nuclear power reactors and employed about 5,000 people. It was said to possesses several tons of weapons-usable materials.

1993, June / Orenburg region, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1993, June / Electrostal company, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 2.5 kg natural Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1993, July / Andreeva Guba, Murmansk, Russian Federation / R/N: In July 1993, two Russian naval enlisted personnel stole two fresh fuel rods from a storage facility in Murmansk, Russian Federation. These rods were for Russian naval propulsion reactors that power submarines and contained 36% enriched Uranium. The amount of materials totalled about 1.8 kg of HEU. Russian security officers discovered the missing materials and apprehended the individuals before the material left the Murmank area. One of the individuals arrested was a guard at the facility and was suspected by authorities after the material was missing. The two enlisted personnel who were caught implicated two Russian naval officers in the plant. However, at the ensuing trial only the two enlisted personnel were convicted and sentenced to prison terms of four and five years. (F Steinhaeussler and L Zaitseva. Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials, with a focus on nuclear and radiological terrorism. Paper prepared for Courmayeur, ISPAC Conference, 6-8 December 2002, p. 5).

1993, August / Murmansk region, Russian Federation / R: reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1993, September / Novgorod region, Russian Federation / R: reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1993, September / Sarov, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 9.1 kg Natural Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1993, September / Grodno, Belarus / N: Reported trafficking of depleted U-238 (Comprehensive List).

1993, October / Primorsk region, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1993, October 5 / Turkey / R/N: Istanbul police seized 2.49 kg of natural Uranium and arrested four Turkish businessmen and four suspected agents of Iran's secret service. The material was of Russian origin and allegedly transported to Istanbul from the Hartenholm airfield (allegedly a privately owned airfield used by Iranian arms dealers) near Hamburg by a private Cessna aircraft. The purchasing price was said to be $ 825 million.

1993, November / Moscow, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 3.5 kg Depleted Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1993, November / Russian Federation / N: Workers allegedly removed two nuclear warheads from the Zlatoust-36 Instrument-Building Plant facility near Chelyabinsk, Russian Federation. The warheads were recovered from a garage in a nearby residential site (Rensselaer W. Lee: ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 124).

1993, November / Russian Federation / N/R: In November 1993, approximately 4.5 kg of 20% enriched Uranium, intended for use in submarine propulsion reactor, was stolen from a fuel storage facility in the Sevmorput shipyard near Murmansk, Russian Federation. Three individuals were arrested in connection with the theft, including two naval officers. The group stored the fuel rods in a garage for several months while they were looking for a prospective buyer. The three individuals were arrested and two of the men received 3-1/2-year sentences; the third person was acquitted. (F Steinhaeusler and L Zaitseva. Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials, with a focus on nuclear and radiological terrorism. Paper prepared for Courmayeur, ISPAC Conference, 6-8 December 2002).

1993, November / Russian Federation / R : In a case stemming from an incident in November 1993 in which a Russian naval officer stole 4 kg of 20 percent enriched U-235 nuclear fuel rods from a poorly guarded area at Severomorsk, a Russian court found the officer guilty but gave him a suspended sentence because he admitted the act. Two accomplices were sentenced to three years at a labor camp (www.fas.org...).

1993, November / Italy / Russian Federation / R/N: It was reported that in the previous two years 234.42 kg of Uranium-235 'pills' had been stolen by Moldovans, Romanians, Hungarians and a Syrian from the Nuclear Reactors Institute in Pitesti. Another 208 kg, stolen from a plant in Braslov, could be recovered.

1993, Border Poland-Ukraine, Poland / R: Reported trafficking of Strontium-90 (7 mCi) (Comprehensive List).

1993, November 27 / Turkey / N/R: Three Georgian nationals arrested at Bursa, Turkey, were found in possession of 4.5 kg of Uranium.

1993, November 29 / Russian Federation / N/R: Lt-Col. Tikhomirov of the Russian Navy, and Alyak Beranov, deputy administrator of the Polyarnyy submarine base, entered a naval fuel store at the Sevmorput shipyard near Murmansk, Russian Federation, through a hole in the perimeter fence and stole three fuel rods of Uranium, containing 4.34 kg of HEU (20% enriched U-235). They intended to sell the Uranium for $ 50,000. The fuel was kept in Beranov's garage for seven months, until Tikhomirov got drunk and boasted of the theft to fellow officers. Both were arrested (Rensselaer W. Lee: ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 117).

1993, December / Kazan, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1994 / Russian Federation / Chechnya / N: Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev reportedly warned the US government in the summer of 1994 that it had two tactical nuclear weapons and that he would transfer them to Libya if the United States did not recognise Chechnya's independence. The USA allegedly sent, with Russian Federation acquiescence, a team to inspect the weapons, which, however, did not exist (Andrew Cockburn and Leslie Cockburn. One Point Safe. Washington, D.C. Doubleday, 1997, pp. 101-103; cit. Scott Parrish, op. cit, p.10).

1994 / Russian Federation / R/N: The Russian Federation Newspaper Moskovskiy Komsomolets reported in mid-1994, that the Russian Federation Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) allegedly arrested one of its own captains and a former FSK warrant officer for possession of about 2 kg of Uranium. The FSK denied the incident (Rensselaer W. Lee, ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998).

1994, January / Electrostal company, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 3 kg LEU (3.6% enriched) fuel pellets (Comprehensive List).

1994, February / Ekatarinburg, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 30 kg depleted Uranium in a protective container (Comprehensive List).

1994, March / Russian Federation / N: 11 out of 60 nuclear warheads and their missiles, en route from the Ukraine to the Russian Federation to be scrapped, reportedly disappeared, according to the German BND (This was not confirmed by the CIA. John M. Deutch, in testimony of 20 March 1996:"We have received well over a hundred reports alleging the division of nuclear warhead or component during the last few years. The Intelligence Community checks out all reporting of warhead theft and will continue to do so. But to date much of the reporting has been sporadic, unsubstantiated, and unreliable”). It was suspected that Iran was an interested potential buyer.

1994, March / Krasnoyarsk region, Russian Federation / R: reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List)

1994, March / Sarov, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 3.71 kg Natural Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1994, March / Sneginsk, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 5.5 kg Natural Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1994, March-April / Russian Federation / R/N: A worker at ‘Elektrostal’ and his cousin stole 1.76 kg of Uranium from the plant. They were arrested, together with two other persons, when they tried to sell the material to an agent of the Russian Federal Security Service (Rensselaer W. Lee, ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998).

1994, March 4 / St. Petersburg, Russian Federation / N: Trafficking of 2.972 kg HEU Dioxide (90% enriched) that was likely to be from the Elektrostal company. Three people attempting to sell the HEU were arrested by Russian agents in St. Petersburg (Comprehensive List and the Christian Science Monitor).

1994, April / Sochi, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 3 kg Natural Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1994, April / Yackutiya region, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1994, April / Lenengrad region, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1994, May / Leningrad region, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1994, May 10 / Tengen-Wiechs (Baden-Wuerttemberg) Germany / R/N: In the small town of Tengen-Wiechs, Germany, a 5.6 g of very pure (99.75% enriched) Plutonium-239 was found in the garage of businessman Adolf Jaekle, mixed with Red Mercury. The most likely origin of the material was a Russian weapons laboratory, possibly the Arzamas-16 laboratory near Moscow (Rensselaer W. Lee, ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 93).

1994, June / Nignegorod region, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1994, June / Sevmorput shipyard, Russia / N: A naval office at the Sevmorput Shipyard notified authorities after a fellow officer asked about potential customers for nuclear material. The tip leads to the piecing together of a case involving two other officers and 4.5 kg HEU that had been stolen from the shipyard in 1993 (Compilation by The Christian Science Monitor, 2001).

1994, June / Russian Federation / R/N: 3.05 kg of HEU (50-90% enriched U-235) were seized in St. Petersburg in June, 1994. The material was reportedly stolen from the ‘Elektrostal’ Machine Building plant in February, 1994 (Rensselaer W. Lee, ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 107).

1994, June 13 / Landshut (Bavaria), Germany / R/N: Gustav Illich, a Slovak national, was arrested by German police in Landshut after he had offered HEU to an undercover agent and after he had delivered an Uranium sample containing 800 millig of HEU. Illich had reportedly obtained the material from Jaroslav Vagner, a Czech national, and had told the police agent that several kg of HEU were secretly stored in Prague. The Uranium shipment reportedly consisted of about 3-6 kg and was smuggled from the Russian Federation to Prague in May or June 1994. The origin of the HEU sample was the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering in Obninsk, Russian Federation. Chemical identical HEU was found in Prague on December 14, 1994, and in June, 1995 (Rensselaer W. Lee, ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 79, 98-101).

1994, July / Turkey / R/N: Turkish police confiscated 12 kg of possible weapons-grade Uranium coming from Azerbaijan to Istanbul; they arrested seven Turks.

1994, July / Romania / R: According to a 2 November press report, police in Timisoara, Romania, had arrested five Romanians trying to sell 2.6 kg of Russian Uranium (www.fas.org...).

1994, July / Russian Federation / R/N: Four businessmen from Severodvinsk, Russian Federation, were reportedly arrested in July, 1994, for stealing 3.5 kg of Uranium dioxide (20-40% enriched U-235) from the Severodvinsk Sevmash nuclear submarine construction plant. They allegedly had links to Sevmash plant workers (Rensselaer W. Lee, ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 119).

1994, July / Russian Federation / R: According to 6 July press reporting, Russian authorities in Shezninks discovered 5.5 kg of U-238 previously stolen from the Chelyabinsk-65 nuclear facility (www.fas.org...).

1994, July 19 / Istanbul, Turkey / N: Reported trafficking of 12.38 kg Depleted Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1994, August / Kaliningrad, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 30 kg natural Uranium in a protective container (Comprehensive List).

1994, August / Sarov, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 8.94 kg Natural Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1994, August / Vladimir region, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1994, August 3 / Brest, Belarus / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (2Ci) (Comprehensive List).

1994, August 4 / Timis, Romania / N: Reported trafficking of 2.6 kg LEU (Comprehensive List).

1994, August 10 / Munich, Germany / R/N: One Colombian and two Spaniards were arrested at Munich airport, arriving by Lufthansa from Moscow. In their possession were 560 g LEU and 363.4 g of Pu-239 (pu-240 10.78% enriched). German BND agents offering them $ 276 million to procure 4 kg of Russian plutonium and convey it to Munich had lured them into this sting operation (Rensselaer W. Lee, ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 93). The smugglers displayed all characteristics of amateurs. However, the German magazine Focus reported that the planned sale was a private deal by high-ranking officers of the Illegals Directorate of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Agency (Focus report Feb. 1997, quoted in: Rensselaer W. Lee, p. 75).

1994, August 12 / Russian Federation / N: Press reports indicated that St. Petersburg police arrested three men trying to sell 60 kg of unidentified nuclear material (www.fas.org...).

1994, August 20 or 24 / Russian Federation / R/N: Three unemployed youth entered through a hole in the fence the All-Russia Research Institute in the 'closed' city of Arzamas-16 and walked away with 9.5 kg of Uranium-238. (www.fas.org...).

1994, August 30 / Hungary / R: Hungarian police seized two kg (4.4 pounds) of what they believed were Uranium rods coming from Russian Federation. (www.infomanage.com...).

1994, August 31 / Russian Federation / R: “Unidentified thieves stole radioactive Caesium from a chemical plant in southern Russian Federation. They stole the capsule containing the metal by breaking through a wall of the plant’s storehouse, said Karl Smolikov, a spokesman for the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situation. The theft occurred at the Ivarov chemical plant in the city of Tambov, about 250 miles south of Moscow. The Caesium capsule apparently was part of some industrial equipment, Smolikov said. According to the police, the device could emit lethal radiation if handled improperly, the ITAR-Tass news agency reported. The agency also quoted nuclear experts as saying the Caesium-137 was widely used in measuring devices applied in many fields of industry and medicine (www.infomanage.com/nonproliferation/smuggling/timeline.html).

1994, September / Sofia, Bulgaria / R: Trafficking of a Pu-239 source, one Natural Uranium source, Cs-137, Sr-90, TI-204, one Neutron source Pu/Be (low activity calibration sources) (Comprehensive List).

1994, September / Nignegorod, Russian Federation / R: Trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1994, September / Italy / R/N: A sample of Plutonium-239 (1 g) was found in the Turin home of former Bulgarian fencing champion Assen Djakovski. An Italian prosecutor indicted him and four others for trying to import 62 kg of Plutonium-239 and resell it to the Middle East.

1994, September 5 / Bulgaria / R: Press reports indicated Bulgarian authorities arrested six Bulgarians in connection and seized 19 containers of radioactive material (www.fas.org...).

1994, September 7 / Russian Federation / R: Press reports indicated Russian police arrested three people in Glazov trying to sell 100 kg of U-238 (www.fas.org...).

1994, September 28 / Snagov, Romania / N: Reported trafficking of 4.6 kg Natural Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1994, September 28 / Tallinn, Estonia / R: Trafficking of Cs-137 (66 GBq) (Comprehensive List). Press reporting indicates that a container with radioactive substances was found on a street in Tallinn (www.fas.org...).

1994, October / Russian Federation / R/N: Fuel rods for nuclear submarines were allegedly stolen from the Sevmash nuclear submarine construction plant in Severodvinsk, Russian Federation, in October, 1994 (Rensselaer W. Lee, ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 119).

1994, October / Russian Federation/ R: Press reporting dated 26 October indicates Russian authorities arrested three men trying to pass 67 kg of U-238 to unidentified individuals in the city of Pskov (www.fas.org...).

1994, October / Mordoviya region, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1994, October / Bulgaria / R: Bulgarian authorities seized four lead capsules suspected of containing radioactive material on a bus en route to Turkey.

1994, October 1 /Romania/N: Press reporting indicates Romanian police arrested four people trying to sell over 4 kg of U-235 and U-238 (www.fas.org...).

1994, October 10 / Moldova, Romania / R: Reported trafficking of Sr-90 (1 mCi) (Comprehensive List).

1994, October 10 / Romania / N: Press reporting indicates Romanian authorities arrested seven people and seized 7 kg of Uranium and an unidentified quantity of Sr or Cs (www.fas.org...).[4]

1994, October 19 / Istanbul, Turkey / R/N: 650 g LEU (U-238) were seized in Istanbul. The origin of the material, which was found in the possession of an Azerbaijani national, was Baku/Azerbaijan.

1994, November / Nignegorod, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1994, December / Orenburg region, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Ir-192 (Comprehensive List).

1994, December 14 / Prague, Czech Republic / R/N: 2.7 kg of 87.7 percent HEU (U-235 87.7% enriched) were seized in Prague by the Czech Security and Intelligence Service, and one Czech nuclear scientist, Jaroslav Vagner, and two former Soviet citizens were arrested. The market value of the radioactive material, which was professionally stored in two metal cylinders, complete with a Russian factory certificate, was many tens of millions of dollars. The seized Uranium was chemically identical to the HEU seized in Landshut, Germany, on June 13, 1994, and was apparently extracted from the same cache. The source of the material was the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering in Obninsk, Russian Federation. Vagner had already been involved in the Landshut incident (Rensselaer W. Lee, ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 98-101).

1994, December 15 / Kaunas, Lithuania / N: Reported trafficking of 8 kg LEU fuel pellets (2% enriched U-235) (Comprehensive List).

1995 / USA / Ukraine / R/N: Federal authorities arrested three employees of the New York company ‘Interglobal Manufacturing Enterprise’ for trying to sell some tons of Zirconium to undercover custom agents posing as arms buyers from Iran. The Zirconium was smuggled to the U.S. from the Ukraine (Rensselaer W. Lee, ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 120).

1995, January / St. Petersburg, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 1.5 kg LEU (3.6% enriched) fuel pellets (Comprehensive List).

1995, February / Kaliningrad region, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Sr-90 and Y-90 (Comprehensive List).

1995, March 8 / Italy / N: Italian police arrested one Nicola Todesco for murder in a Plutonium smuggling case gone awry when the murder victim did not have the money to pay for a quantity of Plutonium smuggled out of Bulgaria. Todesco claimed he threw 5g of plutonium into the Adige river, but no trace of it was found after an extensive search. (Comment: Although an official Italian spokesman believed the Plutonium was "enriched for military use," it had not been analyzed. This may have been another scam involving 'plutonium screws' from smoke detectors (www.fas.org...).

1995, April / Czech Republic / R/N: Czech authorities arrested nine people and confiscated more than 50 kg of Uranium which was found in a car travelling from the Ukraine to Slovakia (Frank Barnaby, “Instruments of Terror”, 1996, p.157).

1995, April 4 / Ukraine / N/R: Press reports that 6 kg of U-235, U-238, Radium, and Palladium were found in a Kiev apartment. Occupants were ex-army, a lieutenant colonel and a warrant officer, and material reportedly came from Russia (www.fas.org...).

1995, April 13/Slovakia/N: Slovak police culminated a long investigation with the discovery of 18.39 kg of nuclear materials, 17.5 kg of which apparently was U-238, in a car stopped near Poprad in eastern Slovakia. Altogether, three Hungarians, four Slovaks, and two Ukrainians were arrested. This gang was said to be connected to three other nuclear material smuggling incidents (www.fas.org...).

1995, April 29 / R: A container with 763 kg of Cs-137, Am-241 and Be, shipped in December 1993 from Amsterdam by a French company, was discovered at Baku airport.

1995, May / Electrostal company, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 11 kg LEU (3.6% enriched) fuel pellets (Comprehensive List).

1995, May-September / Russian Federation / N/R: An engineer removed 1.5 kg of weapons-grade Uranium from the Luch’ Scientific-Production Association in Podolsk in several separate diversions between May and September 1995. The man was later arrested in Moscow carrying the Uranium in search for a buyer (Rensselaer W. Lee: ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998).

1995, June / Electrostal company, Russian Federation: 1.7 kg of 21% enriched HEU U3O8 (F Steinhaeusler and L Zaitseva. Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials, with a focus on nuclear and radiological terrorism. Paper prepared for Courmayeur, ISPAC Conference, 6-8 December 2002).

1995, June 15 / Romania / N: Press reports indicated that so far in 1995 Romanian authorities had seized 24 kg of Uranium powder and tablets. In 1994 they had arrested 24 people for involvement in nuclear smuggling and seized 10.35 kg of Uranium powder and tablets. From 1989 to 1993, the Romanians reportedly broke up five gangs, arrested 50 people, and seized 230 kg of nuclear materials (www.fas.org...).

1995, July / St. Petersburg, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1995, July / Irkutsk region, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1995, September / Nignegorod region, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 2 kg Natural Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1995, September/Bulgaria/R/N: According to press reports, Bulgarian police had broken an international nuclear smuggling ring composed of Russians and Ukrainians. A police spokesmen declining to disclose details, saying only that the materials seized were of strategic value and included rare metals. The arrests were the culmination of a year-long undercover operation. Senior police officials commented that they were still investigating the final destination of the materials, some of which were radioactive (www.fas.org...).

1995, October 25/Russian Federation/R: The cleaning staff at Moscow's Sheremetyevo 2 airport found a small lead container packed with radioactive substances in the men's restrooms, according to press reports. Experts reportedly were attempting to determine the exact composition of the three sources of ionizing radiation found in the container. The speculation in the Russian press was that a nuclear smuggler lost his nerve and abandoned the material during an aborted smuggling attempt (www.fas.org...).

1995, November / Tchelyabinsk region, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1995, November 8 / Prudnik, Poland / R: Reported trafficking of Sr-90 of “very low activity” (Comprehensive List)

1995, November 23 / Russian Federation / Chechnya / R: Chechen separatists were reported to have placed a 30-pound container of radioactive Cs-137 near the entrance of Moscow's Izmailov Park as a demonstration of their capabilities. Shamil Basayev tipped off NTV television reporters as to where to find the radioactive package under the snow. It allegedly emitted 300 times the normal background radiation. The idea behind this incident was apparently to show the Chechen's ability to strike at the heart of Russian Federation. The material has possibly been stolen from the Budyonnovsk hospital, which Chechens had temporarily occupied in the spring of 1995. Shamil Basayev and other Chechen commanders also threatened to attack Russian nuclear power plants. Earlier S. Basayev had explicitly denied having nuclear weapons in a July 1995 interview with the Moscow daily Segodnya. The Izmailov incident remains contested (Rensselaer W. Lee, ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 135/136).

1995, November 29/ Russian Federation/R: Russian security officials recovered four containers with radioactive Caesium, stolen from an industrial plant in the Urals and arrested the thieves, according to press reports. Federal Security Service (FSB) officers found the 90 Kg containers in a shaft of an old mine, ITAR-Tass news agency reported. One of the alleged thieves, a Bakal mining plant’s electrical engineer, had initially kept them at his vegetable garden but moved them to a safer place after the theft had been discovered, according to claims by security officials. Two officials of a local penitentiary were said to be his accomplices. Each container held a capsule with Caesium-137, a radioactive isotope used in geological research, as well as in medicine. The containers were similar to the one allegedly planted by Chechen rebels in a Moscow park (www.fas.org...).

1995, December / St. Petersburg region, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1995, December / Kazakhstan / R/N: Police found 4.5 kg of Uranium in the back of a car they had stopped ( Frank Barnaby, “Instruments of Terror”, 1996, p.157).

1995, December 7 / Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan / N: Reported trafficking of 149.8 kg LEU (2.4% enriched) (Comprehensive List).

1995, December 28/ Novosibirsk, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 10 kg LEU (2.4% enriched) fuel pellets – According to press reports, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) arrested 9 members of a criminal organization in Novosibirsk and seized a quantity of radioactive material. The material was identified in press reports as “enriched” Uranium-235. The material had been transported to Novosibirsk by middlemen, possibly from Kazakhstan. The ultimate destination may have been South Korea, according to press reports. (www.fas.org... and Comprehensive List).

1995-1996 / Chechnya: Chechens had reportedly developed a detailed plan to hijack a Russian nuclear submarine from the Navy’s Pacific Fleet with the help of a former commander on Russian submarines (M. Bunn, Anthony Wier, John P. Holdren, op. cit., pp 219-219).

1996, January / Russian Federation / R/N: Three workers reportedly stole fuel rods containing at least 7 kg of HEU, reportedly from a Pacific Fleet base at Sovietskaya Gavan. Some of the material (2.5 kg) was later found at a facility of a metal trading firm in the Baltic city of Kaliningrad and 5 kg were seized at the Sovietskaya Gavan facility (Rensselaer W. Lee, ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 119).

1996, 17 January/ Dubai, UAE: A Palestinian in Dubai, UAE offered to sell 3 kg of reportedly Russian-origin red mercury to a Lebanese-American businessman, according to US diplomatic reporting (www.fas.org...).

1996, January 26 / Yalova, Turkey / n: Reported trafficking of 1121.2 g LEU (Comprehensive List).

1996, February / Switzerland / R/N: A Turkish citizen with dual Swiss citizenship was arrested in Switzerland for attempting to sell a sample of HEU. The suspect claimed that the sample belonged to a larger cache in Turkey. Turkish police, using information from their Swiss counterparts, subsequently arrested eight people and seized 1.128 kg of similar material, which is usually used in nuclear power plant fuel rods. Its origin was unclear. (www.fas.org...).

1996, February 23/Belarus/R: According to press reports, the Belarus Committee for State Security (KGB) seized five kg of Caesium-133. The radioactive metal was reportedly sealed in glass containers. Belarus authorities were investigating the incident, according to press reports. (www.fas.org... _appendixa_032796.html).

1996, March / Turkey / N/R: 20kg Uranium in the possession of five Turkish nationals were seized in Antalya, Turkey.

1996, March / Ukraine / R/N: 6 kg of Uranium (about 20% enriched U-235) were seized in Kiev, Ukraine, in March, 1996. The material was probably stolen from a Russian naval fuel storage facility (Rensselaer W. Lee, ‘Smuggling Armageddon’, New York, 1998, p. 107).

1996, March 6 / Timis, Romania / N: Reported trafficking of 82 kg natural Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1996, May 21 / Kocaeli, Turkey / N: Reported trafficking of 15 g LEU (Comprehensive List).

1996, June / Tatarstan region, Russian Federation / N: Reported trafficking of 50 g Natural Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1996, September 12 / Kocaeli, Turkey / N: Reported trafficking of 15.4 g LEU (Comprehensive List).

1996, December 14 / Bucuresti, Romania / N: Reported trafficking of 50 g Natural Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1997, February 14 / Edirne, Turkey / N: Reported trafficking of 15.4 g LEU (Comprehensive List).

1997, February 28 / Edirne, Turkey / N: Reported trafficking of 508.3 g LEU (Comprehensive List).

1997, March / Sofia, Bulgaria / R/N: Reported trafficking of Pu, Be, 23 mg (Comprehensive List).

1997, March / Turkey / R: Turkish police arrested three Turkish nationals, who offered them 2.5 g of Osmium, valued at US $ 3 million, for $ 500,000 (Osmium is extremely rigid and heat-resistant and is used with plutonium as coating for nuclear missile warheads).

1997, May 26 / Bursa, Turkey / N: Reported trafficking of 841 g LEU (Comprehensive List).

1997, June 17 / Brest, Belarus / N: Reported trafficking of 1.7 kg depleted Uranium in three cylindrical shaped pieces (Comprehensive List).

1997, September 11 / Sofia, Injproekt, Bulgaria / R: Reported trafficking of Am-241 (50 mCi activity) and Cs-137 (10 mCi activity) (Comprehensive List).

1997, September 13 / Kirovograd, Ukraine / R: Reported trafficking of Co-60 in four pieces of medical applications (Comprehensive List).

1997, October 31 / Russian Federation / N: Aleksey Yablokov, former advisor to President Jeltsin, threatened to release the technical details of the nuclear suitcase bombs if President Jeltsin does not reply to a letter Yablokov sent him on October 27. According to Yablokov, the letter warns that the Russian Federation had a whole class of nuclear weapons, which are not immediately controlled by the president (Interfax, 31 Oct. 1991. In: FBIS-TAC-97-304; cit. Scott Parrish, op. cit.12).

1997, November / Russian Federation / N: General Lebed claimed in an interview that of 132 Russian nuclear “suitcase bombs” (RA-115, 2 kilotons) only 48 had been accounted for (Jessica Stern: “The Ultimate Terrorists”, 1999, p. 90).[ This claim was distrusted by insiders].

1997, November 16 / Bucharest, Romania / N: Reported trafficking of Sr-90, Y-90 (Comprehensive List).

1997, November 20 / Bucharest, Romania / N: Reported trafficking of 13.3 ounces of Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1997, November 24 / Hunedoara, Romania / N: Reported trafficking of 17,35 g Natural Uranium fuel pellet scrap (Comprehensive List).

1997, November 24 / Bucharest, Romania / N: Reported trafficking of 16,83 g Natural Uranium fuel pellet scrap (Comprehensive List).

1997, December 16 / Istanbul-Esenler / R: Reported trafficking of mixed alpha sources (Comprehensive List).

1998 / Chechnya : A radioactive container attached to an explosive device was discovered near a rail line in Chechnya – apparently a foiled act of sabotage by Chechen militants. (ITAR-TASS, 29 Dec. 1998. (Cit. F Steinhaeussler and L Zaitseva. Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials, with a focus on nuclear and radiological terrorism. Paper prepared for Courmayeur, ISPAC Conference, 6-8 December 2002, p.8).

1998, March 18 / Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1998, March 31 / Smila, Cherkasy region, Ukraine / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1998, April 22 / Georgia / R/N: A plan to airlift enriched Uranium from a mothballed experimental nuclear reactor near Tbilisi, Georgia, to the British nuclear complex at Dounreay became public. It was part of a deal between President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair to take the fuel to the UK after France, Russian Federation and the US had declined to accept it.

1998, May 7 / Volgograd, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (200 R/h) (Comprehensive List).

1998, May 12 / Republic of Tuva, Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (70 mR/h) (Comprehensive List).

1998, June / Turkey / R: Three Turkish nationals were arrested and unspecified amounts of Antinomy, Bismuth and Scandium obtained from Azerbaijan were seized in Bursa, near Istanbul.

1998, June / Bulgaria / N/R: Bulgarian custom officials seized equipment of the kind commonly used in nuclear reactors in a Bulgarian truck at a border post on the Turco-Bulgarian frontier. The truck had reportedly picked up its consignment in France and was destined for Armenia. However, its log indicated that it was loaded in Austria and its destination was Iran.

1998, July 1 / Turkey / N/R: Turkish police arrested six suspects, one of them an Iranian national, the rest Turks, in Van, eastern Turkey, for smuggling 13 glass tubes suspected of containing nuclear material from Iran into Turkey (Caelsium, Tanium, Copper, Zinc, Lead, Iron Rubidium, Zirconium, Manganese and Sr (stable) isotopes). They had 13 cylinders, all marked UPAT UKA3 M8 and carrying stamps with three stars, containing an unidentified substance. The suspects claimed the cylinders contained only snake venom, but police suspected it might be nuclear material. The suspects confessed that they were going to deliver the tubes to Istanbul for a fee of $1,000 per tube.

1998, 3 September / Turkey / N/R: Acting on information from the Turkish National Intelligence Organisation (MIT), more than 4.5 kg of unprocessed Uranium and six gramms of Plutonium were seized in Istanbul. Nine suspects were arrested from possession of this material coming out of Russian Federation. The suspects had earlier asked an undercover officer for US $ 1 million for the contraband material, which was reportedly worth more than $ 3 million. The suspects were charged with felony smuggling, punishable by ten years in prison.

1998, October 16 / Kiev airport, Ukraine / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137, Am-241, Eu-155, Cs-134, Sb-125 (with a total activity of 4.3 plus/minus 0.3 kBq) (Comprehensive List).

1998, December 4 / Moldova / N/R: Customs officials and border guards detained two individuals attempting to smuggle a lead container with nuclear fuel materials into Moldova.

1998, December 17 / Chelyabinsk Oblast region, Russia / N: A Russian agency reports that it thwarted an attempt by workers at a nuclear facility to steal 18.5 kg of Uranium (Compilation by The Christian Science Monitor, 2001).

1998, December 19 / Russian Federation / N/R: The Russian Federal Security Service reports the termination of an attempt to embezzle 18.5 kg of radioactive materials, that ‘might have been used for production of components for nuclear weapons’ (PPNN Newsbrief, fourth quarter, 1998), from an enterprise in the Chelyabinsk department (Russian Story, Defence & Security, Jan 15, 1998, original source: Chelyabinsk Rabochy, Dec. 19, 1998).

1998, December 29 / Chechnya / N/R: A container emitting strong radioactivity was found near the Chechen town of Argun, east of Grozny. It was reportedly rigged with landmines (Le Temps, Dec. 30, 1998).

1999, January 7 / Edirne, Turkey / N: Reported trafficking of 0.1 g Natural Uranium (Comprehensive List).

1999, February 2 / Turkey / N/R: Turkish police seized 5 g of Uranium and arrested four people in the province of Istanbul. The Uranium was brought to Turkey from Azerbaijan (BBC, Feb. 3, 1999)

1999, February 5 / Turkey / R: A heavy block of lead and steel containing Cobalt-60 disappeared from a company in Ikitelli and was thought to be stolen. On January 13, 1999, 16 people in Ikitelli were injured when two scrap-iron dealers had found a similar block. The condition of the two men was critical (IAEA Daily Press Review, Feb. 5 1999, Turkish Daily News, Jan. 13/16, 1999).

1999, March 1 / Georgia / R: In Tiblisi, Georgian security officials arrested five persons for stealing from the premises of a firm which works closely with the Georgian Defence Ministry two containers with radioactive Caesium capsules valued at between $ 80,000 and $ 120,000. (BBC, March 2, 1999)

1999, March 25 / Liepaja port, Latvia / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (Comprehensive List).

1999, May 3 / Victoria (Brasov), Romania / N: Reported trafficking of 14.7 kg Depleted Uranium and Ir-192 (2.5 microCi) (Comprehensive List).

1999, May 14 / Kyrgyzstan / N/R: An Uzbek national was arrested at Bishkek airport in Kyrgyzstan while trying to smuggle Plutonium on a flight to the United Arab Emirates. The surface of the rubber container he was carrying showed a deadly level of radiation. The arrested man said he had received the Plutonium at the airport from a person he did not know, and that he was to take it to the United Arab Emirates for a fee of $16,000 (IAEA Daily Press Review, May 17, 1999, ITAR-TASS May 15, 1999).

1999, May 22 / Ukraine / N/R: Two Armenians trying to sell 20 kg enriched LEU U-235 ore and a buyer were arrested by Ukrainian law enforcement officials in the town of Berehovo. The two Armenians demanded $35,000 per kg for the Uranium. They received heavy radiation doses because they had handled the material with their bare hands and carried it in rubber bags. (BBC Monitoring, source: ‘Fakty i Kommentarii’, Kiev, May 22, 1999, IAEA Daily Press Review, May 25, 1999) According to one source, the material was enriched Uranium in white powder form stolen from a radioactive-materials recycling facility in Krasnoyarsk. Other sources said it was LEU metal suitable for making fuel for RBMK reactors (IAEA Daily Press Review, May 28, 1999).

1999, May 28 / Bulgaria / N/R: Bulgarian custom officers arrested a Turkish citizen smuggling a container with 10 g of Uranium-235 across Bulgaria’s checkpoint at Rousse (IAEA Daily Press Review, May 30, 1999). Bulgarian scientists concluded that the material was HEU. Although the source of the material is not certain, it is likely that it came from the Mayak Production Association in the Russian Federation.

1999, May 29 / Dunav Most, Bulgaria / N: Bulgarian customs officers discover 10 g of HEU hidden in a car crossing into Turkey. The driver said he obtained the material in Moldova although authorities have not determined the source (Compilation by The Christian Science Monitor, 2001).

1999, June 28 / Chechnya / N/R: A British journalist reported that a Chechen mafia salesman offered him Plutonium (The Express, London, June 28, 1999, IAEA Daily Press Review, June 29, 1999).

1999, July 1 / St. Petersburg (Murmansk), Russian Federation / R: Reported trafficking of Cf-252 (Comprehensive List).

1999, July 8 / Cherikov (Mogilev), Belarus / R: Reported trafficking of Ir-192 (1.85 x E 10 Bq) (Comprehensive List).

1999, July 22 / Kazakhstan / N/R: Kazakh custom officers detained a Russian officer trying to smuggle ‘radioactive substances’ into Uzbekistan (ITAR TASS, July 22, 1999; IAEA Daily Press Review, July 23, 1999).

1999, July 30 / Plant ‘Granit’, Mikashevichi (Brest), Belarus / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (2.8 x 10 E Bq or 0.0765 Ci) (Comprehensive List).

1999, August 5 / Istanbul, Turkey / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (1739 MBq) and Cs-137 (44 MBq) (Comprehensive List).

1999, August 6 / Almaty, Kazakhstan / R: 5 KG of LEU (3.5-4%) was intercepted through an intelligence operation. The material possibly originated from Ulba, Kazakhstan (The Nonproliferation Review, Monterey, CA.; Fall-Winter 2002).

1999, August 17 / Turkey / R: Turkish police arrested five people, among them foreign citizens, trying to sell 49 g of Caesium-137 in Istanbul after having smuggled it into Turkey from abroad (BBC Monitoring Service, Aug. 17, 1999, IAEA Daily Press Review, Aug. 18, 1999).

1999, August 25 / Hamburg, seaport, Germany / R: Reported trafficking of Ra-226 (approximately 36 MBq) (Comprehensive List).

1999, August 30 / Romania / R: Shim’on, Ion Menciu, and Ivan Busuioc were arrested as middlemen in an illegal operation to smuggle arms, explosive, and nuclear components through Romania to export-embargoed nations and possibly terrorist organizations. (CNS Monterey Institute)

1999, September / Georgia: 1 kg of reportedly U-235 was seized in Georgia (www.defenselink.mil...).

1999, September 20 / Batumi (Khelvachauri, Adzharia), Georgia / N: Reported trafficking of 998.87 g LEU (UO2, 3-3.3% enriched) (Comprehensive List).

1999, September 20 / Ukraine / R: During the week of 20 September, officials in Uzhgorod, Ukraine, confiscated two lead cylinders containing radioactive Strontium (according to early report) or Strontium-90 (according to later report) from a group of Russian and Ukrainian citizens during a routine passport check (CNS Monterey Institute).

1999, September 23 / Uzhhorod and Kiev, Ukraine / R: Reported trafficking of Sr-90 (Comprehensive List).

1999, September 23 / Mramor (Sofia region), Bulgaria / R: Reported trafficking of Cs-137 (740 GBq) and Co-60 (74 MBq) (Comprehensive List).

1999, October / Kyrgyztan / N: In October 1999, two persons were arrested in the act of selling a small metallic disk containing 0.0015 kg of Plutonium. The item was analyzed by the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Kazakhstan and the two individuals arrested were convicted and sentenced to prison.

1999, October 2 / Kara-Balta, Kyrgyzstan / N: Reported trafficking of 1,49 g Pu (Comprehensive List).

1999, October 13 / Russian Federation / N: Russian officials warned that Chechen terrorists were planning to attack Russian nuclear facilities. (CNN, Oct. 13, 1999) Chechen rebel leader Basayev told Agence France Press on Oct. 12, 1999, that he was prepared to launch a terrorist campaign inside Russian Federation (Süddeutsche Zeitung, Oct. 12, 1999).

1999, December / I.N. Vekua Physics and Technology Institute, Sukhumi, Georgia / N: A Russian inspection team visits the institute in Georgia which had been closed as a result of the Abkhazia-Georgia conflict. About 2 kg of HEU that have been registered in a 1992 inventory turned out to be missing. The material has not been recovered (Compilation by The Christian Science Monitor, 2001).

1999, December 2 / Russian Federation (Chechnya) / C/R: Environmental organizations in Georgia and Chechnya warned that indiscriminate Russian bombing and shelling of chemical plants, oil refineries and of a huge disposal site for radioactive waste in the Karakh mountains near Grozny could lead to an imminent environmental catastrophe. The disposal site, which was built for the Radon organization, had been in operation since 1965. It contains almost 1000 cubic meters of material, including Co-60, Pu, Be, Ra-226, Cs-137, Thulium-170, Ir-192, Am-241 and I-131. Environmental groups warned that powerful surface bombs could damage the burial shafts thus causing radioactive contamination of the environment. Scientists in Georgia, Chechnya and other regions in the Caucasus claimed that damage to the Radon site would have severe consequences for the whole region. Moreover various factories and enterprises in the Grozny region which were known to be storing many different forms of radiation were facing daily bombing. (UNIS Press Review, 12/2/99)

1999, December 3 / Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan / R: 1 kg of LEU was intercepted through an intelligence operation. The material originated from Ulba, Kazakhstan (The Nonproliferation Review, Monterey, CA.; Fall-Winter 2002)

1999, December 12 / Otopeni airport customs, Romania / R: Reported trafficking of Ir-192 (8.19 GBq) (Comprehensive List).

1999, December 24 / Mehedinti county, Romanai / N: Reported trafficking of 3 kg Natural Uranium (0.71% enriched U-235) (Comprehensive List).

2000 / Electrostal company, Russian Federation: Trafficking of 3.7 kg of 21% HEU (F. Steinhauser and L. Zaitseva. Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials. Conference Paper, Courmayeur, ISPAC conference, 6-8 Dec. 2002).

2000, January 10 / Almaty, Kazakhstan / N: Reported trafficking of 530 g LEU (Comprehensive List).

2000, January 14 / Bucharest, Romania / N: Reported trafficking of 1000 g Depleted Uranium (Comprehensive List).

2000, January 20 / Dupnitsa, highway, Bulgaria / N: Reported trafficking of 15 kg Depleted Uranium (Comprehensive List).

2000, February 5 / Romania / R: four persons were arrested by the police for stealing radioactive substances. Two of them, Liubovi Dasan (45) and her boyfriend, Anatolie Cojocaru (43), were said to be Moldovan nationals. The other two arrested, Ionel Bobeica (36)and Toader Ciuhan (45) were Romanians. They were arrested while found testing radioactive material in an underground laboratory in Bucharest, which they had apparently smuggled from a Russian military base in Tiraspol, Romania. They intended to sell the material, 1 kg of Uranium, for US$ 150,000. (WIJN News 2/8/00)

2000, February 23 / Ukraine / R: 28 containers with ampoules of Sr-90 and Y-90 were confiscated. According to preliminary estimates, the material taken off the five illegal traders in radioactive material would cost some 1.5 Million US$ on the black market. The material appeared to have been stolen from a military unit in the Donetsk region and was kept in a flat. In the 1990s, 81 radioactive objects had been stolen from enterprises in Donetsk, according to the Regional sanitary and epidemic station, of which only 56 had been found by early 2000 (Ukrainian Television Third Program cited by BBC, 25/2/2000).

2000, March 30 / Kazakhstan / Uzbekistan / N/R: Uzbek border controls stopped a truck, allegedly holding only scrap metal, at the border to Turkmenistan. The 10 lead boxes contained nearly a ton of highly radioactive material. The trucks journey started in Kazakhstan and headed for Pakistan via Iran. The material emitted about 1,200 milliroentgen per hour, enough to cause radiation sickness after 50 days of exposure (AP, Apr. 6, 2000). Former head of the Defence Technology Security Administration, Stephen Bryen, claimed that the material may have the markings of a “radiation bomb”, which could be used by Asian terrorists, and not a nuclear weapon. There have been signals that terrorists supported by Iran and Afghanistan, for which the weapon could be created in Pakistan, might threaten Uzbekistan. He stated that these nuclear smuggling operations are run by “well-disciplined intelligence services of Iran and Afghanistan and, “quite possibly”, Pakistan” (The Hindu, Apr. 12, 2000). However, Kazakhstan’s ambassador denied the allegations of a radioactive substance, but claimed that part of the scrap material had been contaminated by radioactivity (RFE/RL).

2000, April / Georgia / R: Georgian police arrested four persons in Batumi, Georgia, for unauthorized possession of 0.9 kg of HEU fuel pellets. According to one press report, the material may have been smuggled from Russian Federation. The pellets mass and shape, together with the reported enrichment level, suggest that the pellets were produced for use a commercial or experimental fast breeder reactor. Another report also stated that the smugglers were detected when they crossed the Russian border into Georgia, possibility by radiation monitoring equipment and were then trailed to the city of Batumi, where they were apprehended. It is believed that the individuals were trying to smuggle the material into Turkey.

2000, June 29 / Almaty, Kazakhstan / R: 4 Kg of LEU pellets (3.6%) were intercepted through an intelligence operation. The material originated from Ulba, Kazakhstan (The Nonproliferation Review, Monterey, CA.; Fall-Winter 2002).

2000, September / Tbilisi, Georgia / R: Three persons were arrested at Tbilisi airport for attempting to sell a small quantity of mixed powder containing about 0.0004 kg of Pu and 0.00008 kg of LEU. According to press reports, an official in the Georgian Ministry of State Security said that two individuals arrested were Georgians citizens, and the third was from Armenia. The individuals said they had brought the Uranium and Pu from the Russian Federation and Ukraine to sell it.

2000, October 6 / Turkey / R: 150g of LEU was intercepted through an intelligence operation. The material was from an unknown origin (The Nonproliferation Review, Monterey, CA.; Fall-Winter 2002).



2001, January 29/Russian Federation/N: Police in St. Petersburg reported on 29 January that thieves made off with 270 kg of Pu worth almost $5 million from a research institute there, AP reported. (WJIN News, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (www.wjin.net...).

2001, February 16 / Russian Federation /N/R: Kamchatka Region detectives arrested a group, headed by an army officer, that allegedly stole radioactive devices from Mi-8 helicopters in a military unit deployed on Kamchatka. Authorities believe they intended to sell the equipment to China. An expert from the radiological control service determined that the radiation level reached 25 micro-roentgen per hour one metre away from the device. The suspects could face up to 10 years in prison. (NTV, Moscow (BBC), 16/02/01)

2001, July 20 / Batumi (Adzhariya), Georgia / R: 1.8 kg of LEU (3.6%) was intercepted via an informant’s tip. The origin of the material was unknown (The Nonproliferation Review, Monterey, CA.; Fall-Winter 2002).

2001, October 15 / Tbilisi, Georgia / R: 23 containers of Pu were confiscated through an intelligence operation, its origin was unknown (The Nonproliferation Review, Monterey, CA.; Fall-Winter 2002).

2001, November 6 / Istanbul, Turkey / R: 1.15kg of LEU were intercepted in an intelligence operation, the material probably originated in the Russian Federation (The Nonproliferation Review, Monterey, CA.; Fall-Winter 2002).

2001, December 19 / Samtskhe-Javakheti region, Georgia / R: 300 g of LEU were intercepted in an intelligence operation, the origin of the material was most likely Armenia (The Nonproliferation Review, Monterey, CA.; Fall-Winter 2002).

2002, January / Belarus: In January 2002, in Minsk, Belarus, the Belarus State Committee arrested six international gang members for allegedly trying to sell Uranium metal rods (“Belarus police halt attempt to sell weapons-grade Uranium” DPA, 18 January 2002; and ”Belarus security services arrest 6, seize Uranium,” AFP, 17 January 2002)

2002, January 15 / Liya area, Georgia / R: Three woodcutters were hospitalized with radiation sickness after discovering two Sr-90 sources 27 km outside the village of Liya in Tsalenjikha District, Georgia in early December 2001, according to NTV. The radiation was emitted by two cylinders, six inches long and four inches in diameter, that contained Strontium-90 . They had been used in radiothermal generators installed in the area during the Soviet era and then abandoned. According to NTV and Interfax, the three men had broken through the lead, tungsten, concrete, and ferrous layers that shielded the Sr-90, while the New York Times reported that the men found the cylinders laying in the snow. According to the Los Angeles Times, the men took the cylinders to their campsite to use as heat sources and became sick within hours from the radiation exposure. (www.nti.org...)

2002, January 17 / Belarus / R: Agents of the Belarusian State Security Committee (KGB) arrested several members of an "international criminal group trying to arrange the illegal sale in Belarus of radioactive materials, Interfax reported on 17 January 2002. The report said that six suspects had been arrested in connection with the case, but did not provide any names or details about their citizenship, nor did it specify the date of the arrests. The KGB made the arrests as the result of a “sting” operation. The agency had been informed that some "enterprising citizens" were trying to sell Uranium. (www.nti.org...).

2002, January 27 / Avcilar, Turkey / R: Three grams of "Red Mercury" were seized from a house in Avcilar, Turkey, the Istanbul newspaper Aksam reported on 27 January 2002. Two suspects, Makhi Yeddinho and Irina Grische, both from Russia, were arrested by Turkish police. According to Aksam, the Russian mafia stole the substance from a nuclear plant in Russia. Aksam claimed that Red Mercury was "used in the construction of nuclear weapons," was a strategic metal, that trade "requires a special permit throughout the world," and that the three grams seized in Avcilar have a market value of $300,000 (www.aksam.com.tr... last visited 22/05/2003).

2002, February 14 / Verkhnedneprovsk (Smolensk Oblast), Russian Federation / R: Two radiation sources containing Krypton-85 gas were stolen from the Polimerplenka enterprise in Verkhnedneprovsk village, Smolensk Oblast, a spokesman for the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations reported on 14 February 2002. Each ampoule emits 230mCi, "which is enough for a person to get a lethal dose quickly," according to the spokesman. The Smolensk Oblast prosecutor's office, assisted by specialists from the Ministry of Emergency Situations, has initiated a criminal investigation of the theft (www.nti.org...).

2002, March 6 / Belarus / R: The Belarusian Prosecutor's Office arrested members of a gang based in the town of Kalinkavichy, Gomel Oblast. They had planned to plant radioactive materials in Internal Affairs Ministry offices in Kalinkavichy and Mazyr, Gomel Oblast, Belapan reported on 6 March 2002. Belarusian police seized four containers with radioactive material from gang members, as well as firearms, a grenade, and explosives. The report does not identify the radioactive material involved in the case. Investigation by the Prosecutor's Office has identified 20 gang members, and 17 have been arrested and charged. (www.nti.org...

2002, March 26 / Chkalovsk, Tajikistan / N: Authorities in Tajikistan arrested four men in the city of Chkalovsk and confiscated 2kg of stolen "non-concentrated uranium" [probably natural uranium], the Tajikistani newswire AP-Blitz reported o

Originally posted by boeserwolf
reply to post by Tardacus

 

There is currently no safe way to dispose of radioactive wastes. Scientists have developed an energy system with no anus in a world whose basic principle is recycling. Components of spent uranium remain dangerously radioactive for 4.5 billion years. We are not capable of building anything that will last 4.5 billion years.

Nuclear bombs seem to be the safest way to dispose of the #.

Originally posted by eriktheawful

It was a 7,000 pound nuclear bomb, dropped by a B-47 off the coast of Georgia, near Tybee Island. The bomb has never been found. While the US government is no longer official looking for it, other "unofficial" groups, including retired military veterans are:

That lost US nuke dropped into the mud off the coast was found. They decided they can't bring it back up and will leave it be in her mud tomb.


Due to the radiation levels they were getting thru many many feet of mud they didn't want the mess of bringing her out. People would die trying to get her out from radiation exposure.

The bible does state as do others the foods we should and shouldnt consume. Many thought of it as ridiculous well guess who is laughing now. God knows everything.
Hence why he said.
Because he knew that it was only a matter of time before we start ruining the seas following the land.

Really radioactive stuff are kept screened in a secure place, like underground, or under water.

A few feets of water stops all the radiation, so at nuclear power stations the spent fuel elements are typically temporarily stored in “swimming pool” tanks.

Now imagine with a few hundreds feets of water on top...

With the heavily discussed topic of Fukushima disaster and all the informations inside the multiples threads , no one have made the connection ?

Water stop radiations....

So forget about satellite detection of ocean nuclear wastelands...

.

reply to post by ModernAcademia


I love seafood, but I only eat from Local fish farms wayyy better than radioactive fish with 3 eyes ewhh. I guess we really are trying to depopulate the world, or we just stupid..

I went to talk given by Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas in about 1974. He said the Russians were just dumping their nuclear waste on the ground.

Well if this proclaimed statement has real validity to it, then that might have some explanation to the whole "global warming" debate? and why the earths ice caps are melting? Maybe it's not a polar shift at all? Maybe I'm way off, but that's the first thought that came to mind when I saw this topic.

Oh and this my first ever post/reply here on ats. Hello to all.

reply to post by Beckholliday


Welcome!

I suspect there really isn't enough in the way of nuclear waste to really affect the entire planetary ecology.... but given how much we don't know.. there may be aspects of this that are unaccounted for.

Glad you joined us! Keep posting.