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Originally posted by subz
Any nation who is willing to step up to the plate and piss on the chips of the New American Century has my support. The only thing worse than two aggressive military powers is one unchallenged aggressive military power.
28/05/2007 19:46 MOSCOW, May 28 (RIA Novosti) - A plane carrying Russian military observers will make a series of inspection flights over the United States under the Open Skies Treaty May 28-June 2, the Russian Defense Ministry said Monday.
"A Russian mission on board a Tu-154M surveillance plane will fly about 4,250 kilometers (2,700 miles) via a designated route over U.S. territory to monitor the observance of the provisions under the [Open Skies] treaty," the ministry said in a statement.
The Open Skies Treaty, signed in 1992 at the initiative of U.S. President George H.W. Bush, established a regime of unarmed aerial observation flights over the territories of its 26 member states to promote openness and the transparency of military forces and activities.
It entered into force January 1, 2002 after all the member countries' parliaments ratified it. The regime covers the national territories (land, islands, and internal and territorial waters) of all the treaty signatory states. It is an important element of the European security structure.
www.globalsecurity.org...
Quotas
Each State Party is obligated to receive observation flights per its passive quota allocation. Each State Party may conduct as many observation flights - its active quota - as its passive quota. During the first three years after EIF, each State will be obligated to accept no more than seventy-five percent of its passive quota. Since the overall annual passive quota for the United States is 42, this means that it will be obligated to accept no more than 31 observation flights a year during this three-year period. Only two flights were requested over the United States during 2005, by the Russian Federation and Republic of Belarus Group of States Parties (which functions as a single entity for quota allocation purposes). The United States is entitled to 8 of the 31 annual flights available over Russia/Belarus. Additionally, the United States is entitled to one flight over Ukraine, which is shared with Canada.
en.wikipedia.org...
The Russian Federation currently has two aircraft certified to execute missions pursuant to the Treaty on Open Skies. The TU-154 is the only aircraft the Russian Federation has used to perform missions over the United States. The AN-30 is used extensively for missions within Europe.
Similar to the Boeing 707, the Tu-154, a multi-engine jet aircraft with a range of approximately 2,485 miles, was originally designed as a medium range passenger aircraft and has been in service since the late 1960s. As previously noted, the Russian Federation has utilized the TU-154 to conduct all Open Skies observation flights over the United States since entry into force.
Optical: Panoramic, Framing, Video
* 30 cm Maximum Ground Resolution
* Weather and Light Dependent
Synthetic aperture Radar (SAR)
* 3 m Maximum Ground Resolution
* Weather and Light Independent
Infra-red (IR) Line Scanning
* 50 cm maximum ground resolution
* Not authorized within first 3 years unless otherwise agreed
* Weather and light independent
Q: What types of sensors are OS aircraft allowed to carry?
A: OS aircraft are allowed to carry any or all of the following types of sensors:
* Optical cameras (30cm ground resolution)
o one vertically mounted framing camera
o two obliquely mounted framing cameras
o one panoramic camera
o one video camera
* Infrared (IR) line-scanner (50cm ground resolution)
* Sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar (SAR) (3m ground resolution)
Q: How do the capabilities of OS sensors compare with other overhead imaging systems?
A: OS sensor capabilities exceed the 10-meter resolution of the French SPOT system and the 5-meter resolution of the Russian KFA 1000 or MK 6. OS IR and SAR capabilities far exceed those available from commercial sources.
Q: How large is the OS sensor swath?
A: The treaty permits sensors to collect data to a range of 50 kilometers (km) on either side of the flight path. Additionally, the OS aircraft is permitted to deviate up to 50 km on either side of the flight path while continuing sensor operation. Therefore, maximum area vulnerable to sensor data collection is a 200-km swath centered on the OS aircraft flight path.
Q: Are there restrictions on OS sensor operation?
A: OS sensors may operate from the beginning of the observation flight until the observation flight lands. Sensor operation must be secured if:
* Aircraft altitude is below the altitude approved for operation of the specific sensor
* The flight deviates more than 50 km from its planned flight path
* The aircraft is operating in a transit mode (the Treaty requires that covers be in place over sensors except during actual execution of the OS overflight)
* The aircraft is turning (could possibly exceed allowable slant range)
Q: Will OS overflights be escorted?
A: No. However, as with other treaties, personnel from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), which is a DOD agency charged with arms control treaty escort and inspection duties, will escort OS inspectors while they are in the United States. If the United States supplies the observation aircraft, it will be operated by a U.S. crew while DTRA personnel either 1) operate the sensors with Observing Party personnel watching or 2) monitor Observing Party personnel while they operate the sensors. If the Observing Party provides the aircraft, DTRA escorts will be on the aircraft at each sensor station, in the cockpit, and monitoring overall coordination to ensure that the overflight adheres to treaty parameters.
The examples above from unscripted naval exercise evolutions provide ample evidence of the vulnerability of US Navy carrier battle groups to attacks from diesel submarines, but of course there are other ways to sink a carrier, as the Russian Air Force knows well. In October 2000, the smart-looking aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk was “mugged” by Russian SU-24 and Su-27 aircraft, which were not detected until they were virtually on top of the carrier. The Russian aircraft buzzed the carrier’s flight deck and caught the ship completely unprepared. To add insult to injury, the Russians took very detailed photos of the Kitty Hawk’s flight deck, and very courteously, provided the pictures to the American skipper via e-mail. In a story in the December 7, 2000 edition of WorldNetDaily, one US sailor exclaimed, “The entire crew watched overhead as the Russians made a mockery of our feeble attempt of intercepting them.” Russia’s air force is now only a faint shadow of what it once was, but even now, they can demonstrate that they can, if necessary, do significant damage to the US Navy. It is little wonder then that a Russian newspaper gloated that “If these had been planes on a war mission, the aircraft carrier would definitely have been sunk.
Why also did the Kitty Hawk, 40 minutes later, finally launch aircraft to intercept the Russian planes that had already flown over, but did no physical harm to the ship? Why was it necessary to belatedly intercept the Russians if the US Navy was so confident that the Russians were no threat? And why did the Washington Times impart that the “Kitty Hawk commanders were so unnerved by the aerial penetration they rotated squadrons on 24-hour alert and had planes routinely meet or intercept various aircraft?” Because in asymmetrical warfare, the very concept is to strike when the larger, more powerful enemy is least prepared. This is what the Japanese did when they attacked Pearl Harbor in the early morning hours on a Sunday. This is why the 1968 Tet holiday offensive was launched when the Army of the Republic of Vietnam was in a low state of readiness. But then, perhaps it would have been more sporting of the Russians to have called in first before launching their mock attack."
www.g2mil.com...
Originally posted by Zaphod58
There were three incidents in October and November.
The planes were tracked on all three,
and the reason they weren't intercepted in one of them was because the carrier was undergoing UNREP, and was moving across the wind at low speeds.
They were tracked by the carrier for 30-45 minutes before they approached the carrier.
The Russian planes were SU-24s and SU-27s.
The examples above from unscripted naval exercise evolutions provide ample evidence of the vulnerability of US Navy carrier battle groups to attacks from diesel submarines, but of course there are other ways to sink a carrier, as the Russian Air Force knows well. In October 2000, the smart-looking aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk was “mugged” by Russian SU-24 and Su-27 aircraft, which were not detected until they were virtually on top of the carrier. The Russian aircraft buzzed the carrier’s flight deck and caught the ship completely unprepared. To add insult to injury, the Russians took very detailed photos of the Kitty Hawk’s flight deck, and very courteously, provided the pictures to the American skipper via e-mail. In a story in the December 7, 2000 edition of WorldNetDaily, one US sailor exclaimed, “The entire crew watched overhead as the Russians made a mockery of our feeble attempt of intercepting them.” Russia’s air force is now only a faint shadow of what it once was, but even now, they can demonstrate that they can, if necessary, do significant damage to the US Navy. It is little wonder then that a Russian newspaper gloated that “If these had been planes on a war mission, the aircraft carrier would definitely have been sunk.
Why also did the Kitty Hawk, 40 minutes later, finally launch aircraft to intercept the Russian planes that had already flown over, but did no physical harm to the ship? Why was it necessary to belatedly intercept the Russians if the US Navy was so confident that the Russians were no threat? And why did the Washington Times impart that the “Kitty Hawk commanders were so unnerved by the aerial penetration they rotated squadrons on 24-hour alert and had planes routinely meet or intercept various aircraft?” Because in asymmetrical warfare, the very concept is to strike when the larger, more powerful enemy is least prepared. This is what the Japanese did when they attacked Pearl Harbor in the early morning hours on a Sunday. This is why the 1968 Tet holiday offensive was launched when the Army of the Republic of Vietnam was in a low state of readiness. But then, perhaps it would have been more sporting of the Russians to have called in first before launching their mock attack."
www.g2mil.com...
Mr Bacon said that the carrier had now increased its "alert posture" and would respond more quickly to flyovers.
The Pentagon had initially denied that the planes had flown so close.
US admits Russians photographed carrier.
Their account contradicts an official version of the Oct. 17 incident in the Sea of Japan and a subsequent Russian flyover while the Kitty Hawk's crew underwent training in international waters near Russia.
Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon on Nov. 30 quoted the Navy as telling him, "In both cases, the planes were acquired by the battle group's radar at a considerable distance, and in both cases, interceptors were put into the air and the planes maintained a suitable distance away from the Kitty Hawk."
But two Navy sources say that in the first incident, the Russian planes, an Su-27 Flanker and Su-24 Fencer, flew directly over the Kitty Hawk's tower. One source said they swooped to 200 feet; another Navy official said "several hundred feet."
From the moment the commander ordered planes launched, it took 40 minutes to scramble aircraft.
The first to launch was an EA-6B Prowler, an electronic warfare jet unsuitable for intercepting, one Navy source said. Later, F-18s went airborne to cut off the two Russian planes. A Navy official disputed this, saying he was told that F-18 Hornets were the first to launch.
A retired Navy captain, who flew jets over the Sea of Japan, said the launch or "alert" time should have been 15 minutes in a strategic area bordered by North Korea, Russia and Japan.
"They didn't have the right alert status for where they were," the retired officer said. "It should have been a lot shorter alert time."
Kitty Hawk commanders were so unnerved by the aerial penetration they rotated squadrons on 24-hour alert and had planes routinely meet or intercept various aircraft.
U.S. ship took 40 minutes to respond to order