Originally posted by verylowfrequency
reply to post by C0bzz
Again I'm no aviation expert, but I do know how computers work - they do exactly what you tell them to do - except in this case they were provided
with the wrong information which caused the software to do exactly what it had been programed to do and thus it was not the sensor failure that caused
the crash.
It was the sensor failure that exposed a flaw in the software design, because that scenario was not planned for when it was designed. Had it had the
ability to check another source of sensor data, another words it could of cross checked other sources of data before the fatal action was taken.
The software should of had the ability to pull other sources of data so that it could predict the likely simultaneous sensor failures - at least to
the point that it would of given the pilots better information so that they were able to take corrective action.
Perhaps the flaw would of never been exposed had the crashes not occurred, that I do consider. Still once a flaw is exposed it seems in the aviation
industry liability is more important than admitting a poor design and immediately fixing it.
[edit on 23-10-2009 by verylowfrequency]
Firstly, you are assuming that the computer systems crashed, or were put into an error mode - that is not clear, the only errors received by the
maintenance base were of a cascade failure which is almost certainly the result of the breakup of the aircraft.
Secondly, Pitot Static ports are at the core of aviation instrumentation, and failure of either will result in an emergency situation regardless of
whether the aircraft is fly by wire, has digital instrumentation or not.
Without those instruments, you have no airspeed, vertical speed, altitude and other details with which to fly the aircraft, and no indication of
whether the aircraft is in a safe situation or not.
With regard to your 'cross check', there are at least two sets of pitot static ports on each aircraft, and the data is cross checked - but if the
ports are subjected to the same conditions, then they can fail in the same fashion (as is assumed with the Air France crash, the ports iced up due to
inadequet deicing systems, and that would have happened to both ports - hence the requirement to change at least one of the ports).
But the other issue is, if the ports failed in certain ways there would be no indication to either pilot or flight systems that the data is erronous,
resulting in a dire situation.
Software is not magic, there is no way it can take a bad or unknown situation and make sense of it - and yes, I am a software engineer in the aviation
industry, working on aviation systems. You go up to a point, and after that point you make the best of a bad situation - if you know or suspect you
are in a bad situation, you inform the pilots but if you don't know or can't suspect (as is the case in a lot of possibilities) then there is
nothing to be done as to all intent and purpose you are still in normal flight mode as you cant know otherwise.