You are nuts! We were allied with Argentina BUT treaty bound with the UK, Thatcher wanted the UK to retake its terrirtory and as a matter of pride did
not need the USA to do it for them......you really need to look into the situation in 1982 more.......
We helped all we were asked and then some......After reading a bit more it seems that the UK recieved everything it asked for and denied other offered
help.
Legally, the United States had military treaty obligations to both parties in the war, bound to the UK by NATO and to Argentina by the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Alexander Haig, the United States Secretary of State, briefly (April 8–April 30) headed a "shuttle diplomacy"
mission before President Ronald Reagan declared U.S. support for Britain and instituted sanctions against Argentina. Support of the USA was initially
equivocal, and is reported to be the result of urging by Haig and Caspar Weinberger, who advised the President to support the UK. Reagan famously
declared at the time that he could not understand why two allies were arguing over "That little ice-cold bunch of land down there". Reagan
sympathized with Galtieri because of his anti-Communist position. He had received a reportedly warm reception when he visited the US. Galtieri likely
didn't think that the UK would react; otherwise it is doubtful Argentina would have launched the attack. Of course, this would have been astounding
to British people at the time, already familiar with Margaret Thatcher's controversial uncompromising style of government. In as many words, she
declared that the Crown and the Empire had been assaulted, and would not surrender the Falkland Islands to the Argentinian jackboot. This stance was
aided, at least domestically, by the staunchly conservative British press, especially The Sun, which ran such headlines as 'THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK'
(when the British task force was dispatched) and 'GOTCHA' (following the sinking of the General Belgrano). A US preoccupation with the Soviet Union
and communism and the thought Britain could handle the matter on her own may have factored into this view as well, although assessments of this theory
vary. In the broader sense of the Cold War, with the performance of UK forces watched closely by the Soviet Union, it was worthwhile for the UK to
handle without assistance a conflict minor in scale compared to an all-out NATO vs. Warsaw Pact war. Regardless, American non-interference was vital
to the U.S.-British relationship. Ascension Island, a UK possession, was on lease to the Americans and the British needed to resume its use as a relay
point and air base. The main and decisive American contribution was AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles of the latest L model (these missiles were much more
deadly than older models of the Sidewinder), spy satellites and intelligence information. There were also rumours, later expanded upon by Weinberger,
which spoke of lending an aircraft carrier, although this was not public knowledge at the time. It is worth noting that both Weinberger and Reagan
would go on to receive honorary knighthoods, the honour of Knight Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, from Queen Elizabeth
II. American critics of the U.S. role claimed that, by failing to side with Argentina, the U.S. violated its own Monroe Doctrine.
Shuttle diplomacy and US involvement
As expected, the Argentine populace reacted favourably, with large crowds gathering at the Plaza de Mayo (in front of the presidential palace) to
demonstrate support for the military initiative. In response to the invasion, the British government under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher declared a
war zone for 200 miles (320 km) around the Falklands and assembled a naval task force with which to retake the islands. Most European powers voiced
support for Great Britain, and European military advisers were withdrawn from Argentine bases; however, most Latin American governments sympathized
with Argentina. A notable exception was Chile, which maintained a state of alert against its neighbour, owing to a dispute over islands in the Beagle
Channel. The perceived threat from Chile prompted Argentina to keep most of its elite troops on the mainland, distant from the Falklands theatre. In
addition, Argentine military planners had trusted that the United States would remain neutral in the conflict, but, following unsuccessful mediation
attempts, the United States offered full support to Great Britain, allowing its NATO ally to use its air-to-air missiles, communications equipment,
aviation fuel, and other military stockpiles on British-held Ascension Island, as well as cooperating with military intelligence.
On April 25, while the British task force was steaming 8,000 miles (13,000 km) to the war zone via Ascension Island, a smaller British force retook
South Georgia island, in the process capturing one of Argentina's vintage diesel-electric submarines. On May 2 the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano
was sunk outside the war zone by a British submarine. Following this controversial event, most other Argentine ships were kept distant from the
conflict, but Argentine submarine action continued to threaten the British fleet. Meanwhile, the British naval force and the land-based Argentine air
force fought intensive battles, during which the Argentines sank the HMS Sheffield and the container ship Atlantic Conveyor with Exocet air-to-sea
missiles. In addition, two frigates and another destroyer were sunk and several other vessels damaged, but the majority of Argentine bombs did not
detonate. Argentina also failed to prevent the British from making an amphibious landing near Port San Carlos, on the northern coast of East Falkland,
on May 21. From this beachhead the British infantry advanced southward to capture the settlements of Darwin and Goose Green, after which they turned
eastward to surround Stanley on May 31. The large Argentine garrison there surrendered on June 14, effectively ending the conflict. British forces
reoccupied the South Sandwich Islands on June 20.
The British captured some 11,400 Argentine prisoners during the war, all of whom were afterward released. Nearly 750 Argentine troops were
killed--including 368 in the sinking of the General Belgrano--while Britain lost 256. Scores of Argentine aircraft of various types were destroyed,
most while on the ground, and the British lost 10 Harrier jets and more than two dozen helicopters. Military strategists have debated key aspects of
the conflict but have generally underscored the roles of submarines (both Britain's nuclear-powered vessels and Argentina's older, diesel-electric
craft) and antiship missiles (both air-to-sea and land-to-sea types). The war also illustrated the importance of air superiority--which the British
had been unable to establish--and of advanced surveillance. Logistic support was vital as well, because the armed forces of both nations had operated
at their maximum ranges. (See also Naval warfare: The age of the guided missile.)
Argentina's ignominious defeat severely discredited the military government and led to the restoration of civilian rule there in 1983. Meanwhile,
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher converted widespread patriotic support into a landslide victory for her Conservative Party in that year's
parliamentary election.
Falkland Islands War 1982