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originally posted by: Psynic
originally posted by: jaffo
originally posted by: Psynic
originally posted by: jaffo
originally posted by: Psynic
originally posted by: AutumnWitch657
a reply to: RP2SticksOfDynamite
And when they do what will you have to say then?
Let's cross that bridge if and when we come to it.
That no debris has been found up to now is a lot more relevant than your "what if?"
This plane will more likely than not turn up eventually in the southern Indian Ocean.
Due to the lack of any evidence whatsoever to indicate the Southern Indian Ocean, other than a conveniently invented mathematical theory called BTO, which has NEVER BEFORE BEEN USED and which Sir Timothy Clark says is nonsense, your continual assurances of the A/C being discovered there is really pointless.
So is your baseless theory. The whole "evade radar by flying near a border" thing is so stupid as to be beyond laughable.
I didn't realize how deeply confused you truly are.
Please show me where I made any claim to the effect of "evading radar by flying near a border".
Take your time.
originally posted by: Xcathdra
originally posted by: thesmokingman
Technology that existed many years ago makes it impossible for this plane to just disappear. There is more to the story yes, but I do believe that the US and Malaysia at the very least know where the plane is, no matter what happened to it. In fact, I guarantee it.
That's just it... Looking at all possible scenarios you come to a conclusion that if one nation knew where the plane was there would be a second nation who would report it. If it landed in Kazakhstan then there would be nations reporting that ho are not friendly to Kazakhstan. Same with Israel, Iran etc etc.
The only way for the scenario to work would be if ALL major players with the capability to monitor deep airspace are in on the "plan".
originally posted by: drock905
I asked Mr. Wise If he can explain how flying close to borders would help an aircraft evade detection by radar. that seems to be the most common issue surfacing in this thread. Unfortunately it doesn't appear that he answered it.
originally posted by: Metallicus
There is no way 'they' just lost this huge airliner. I don't know if this gentleman is correct, but I am positive the 'official story' is wrong.
"The northern trajectory goes towards northern Iran, passing through Pakistan and Afghanistan, the heartland of Al Qaeda and multiple Islamic extremist insurgencies.
While the route goes over countries renowned for security instability, the region is covered by multiple radar systems.
However, while the northern route goes over countries renowned for security instability, the region is covered by multiple radar systems.
"It's hard to believe it could go over northern Thailand undetected. They have extensive radar," said Des Ball, professor of strategic and defence studies at the Australian National University.
There are also radar installations operated by Myanmar, China, India and the US, among others, underneath the northern flight path. In addition, high tech US surveillance satellites also intently monitor the area as part of the war on terror.
"Going over land is more logical but it's hard to see how the plane wouldn't have been detected," said Professor Ball.
Even though MH370 turned off its transponders and disabled its secondary radar, military radar and some civilian radar would still be able to pick it up with what is known as primary radar".
Q. Did the pilots use terrain following to mask the aircraft from radar?
Highly unlikely. A one-time Air Force member and pilot members have told us that, even with extensive training, special terrain-following radar and mapping, night goggles etc. The Air Force has lost aircraft and crews. Without extensive training, knowledge and experience, it would be suicidal. Also note much terrain masking is flown at or below 500 (five hundred) feet above the terrain.
originally posted by: thesmokingman
Technology that existed many years ago makes it impossible for this plane to just disappear. There is more to the story yes, but I do believe that the US and Malaysia at the very least know where the plane is, no matter what happened to it. In fact, I guarantee it.
originally posted by: Arbitrageur
Inmarsat could be wrong I guess, but they seem pretty confident about the southern path so that's probably a bigger reason I don't favor the northern track.
originally posted by: rebelv
originally posted by: Metallicus
There is no way 'they' just lost this huge airliner. I don't know if this gentleman is correct, but I am positive the 'official story' is wrong.
I had been wavering towards the idea that it was landed at Diego Garcia,
but at this point I guess any theory is as good as the next one.
Rebel 5
I just had a look again at the Inmarsat data logs... My view on the Inmarsat data logs show that:
- There was a good hour of missing satcom link to the aircraft at 17:07 and the system was logged on again at 18:25.
-- Simply put, the aircraft satcom did not respond to queries sent by the ground system.
-- All the communications logged here are from the P channel, and T channel, no R channel (which is the satellite's receiving channel).
-- This indicates that the satcom on the aircraft was not working during this time.
-- Either the aircraft was upside down during this time, or there was a AC power failure onboard.
-- A simple navigation problem would have resulted in the satcom link not being lost but simply reverting to the back up satcom link antenna. The HGA would lose contact due to the lack of ARINC429 feed, but the LGA would still be working with no doppler correction.
-- What is difficult to understand is that what happens from 17:07 an 17:21 when the transponers went off. This needs a further look into.
- The final handshake was previously thought as the aircraft suffering from fuel exhaustion given the following:
-- This requires a failure of power supply resulting from the electrical generator on the left engine, and that power was then restored as the system switches to the generator from the right engine.
-- The final handshake process was quickly followed by silence.
-- Putting the time of occurence with the fuel load, it is now more likely than before that this was a result of fuel exhaustion of the aircraft.
-- This would require the log on request to be first detected on the R channel, but in this case it's from the P channel.
-- HOWEVER, the information released shows that the final handshake was initiated by the ground, not by the aircraft, so this makes it unlikely that fuel exhaustion was the trigger for this handshake.
From the data, it does look like there is a possibility that this may not be foul play at all and that it could be a mishap of an electrical sort that resulted in a cascading of failures of the communications system as per Pihero's theory, and that the crew may have been planning to divert to Penang, but was overwhelmed by something that resulted in them not ending up in Penang and ending up going elsewhere, under control or not. This is indicated by the radar plot that they did not go straight towards Penang, but seems towards navigational waypoints normally used in the arrivals into Penang from the north west.
Further, this seems to be backed up by the lack of response from the aircraft's satcom between 17:07 and 18:25 and aircraft initiated log-on at 18:25, which is before the tranponder going offline, until after the aircraft disappeared from military radar,
Again, the satcom (antenna, and satellite data unit) cannot be turned off on its own from the cockpit. You need to go to the E&E bay and pull the circuit breakers to turn it off.
The only other way to switch it off is to take power away from the left AC Bus. And there's no way to put power back to the left AC Bus from outside the cockpit while the aircraft is flying.
From the cockpit, the crew can switch off the ACARS (ie: tell ACARS to not send or receive anything through the satcom), but not the satcom itself.
Switching the left AC bus off means... the left utility bus is also switched off...
and... that means,the following are affected... Left engine EEC, primary flaps trailing edge, Window heaters, onboard brouters, pitot heaters, TAT probe heaters, Left AOA sensor heater, Cabin System Management Unit (and downstream users of it), Cabin overhead electrical units, pre-recorded cabin messages, Passenger Systems Services, IFE (audio and video), Satcom, Voice Recorder (CVR?), some of the left fuel boost pumps, Right AC Hyd Pump, Center 1 AC Hyd Pump, Some flight controls affected...
data 7/03/2014 16:42:04.408 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 146 14920 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 16:42:31.906 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 125 14900 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 16:42:47.907 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 123 14920 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 16:43:12.407 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 126 14920 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 16:55:37.907 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 156 15200 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 16:55:52.907 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 159 15200 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 16:56:07.906 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 158 15220 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 16:56:17.407 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 156 15240 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 17:07:03.907 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 130 15600 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 17:07:18.906 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 132 15600 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 17:07:33.907 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 130 15620 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 17:07:48.907 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 131 15620 ACARS
data 7/03/2014 18:25:34.461 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 273 51700 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 18:27:03.905 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 176 12560 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 18:27:08.404 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 172 12520 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 18:28:14.904 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 143 12480 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 19:41:02.906 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 111 11500 Log-on/Log-off Acknowledge
data 7/03/2014 20:41:04.904 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 141 11740 0x15 - Log-on/Log-off Acknowledge
data 7/03/2014 21:41:26.905 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 168 12780 0x15 - Log-on/Log-off Acknowledge
data 7/03/2014 22:41:21.906 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 204 14540 0x15 - Log-on/Log-off Acknowledge
data 8/03/2014 00:10:59.928 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 252 18040 0x15 - Log-on/Log-off Acknowledge
data 8/03/2014 00:19:37.443 IOR-R1200-0-36F6 R-Channel -2 49660 Log-on/Log-off Acknowledge
Log-On Request, initiated from the aircraft terminal.
data 7/03/2014 18:25:27.421 IOR-R600-0-36E1 R-Channel 142 17120 Log-on Request (ISU)/Log-on Flight Information
data 8/03/2014 00:19:29.416 IOR-R600-0-36F8 R-Channel 182 23000 Log-on Request (ISU)/Log-on Flight Information
originally posted by: earthling42
It was not even data, just a handshake from which they got timings (ping return) and burst frequency offset, it would be crazy to think that inmarsat and IG were deluded with false data.
I just had a look again at the Inmarsat data logs... My view on the Inmarsat data logs show that:
- There was a good hour of missing satcom link to the aircraft at 17:07 and the system was logged on again at 18:25.
-- Simply put, the aircraft satcom did not respond to queries sent by the ground system.
-- All the communications logged here are from the P channel, and T channel, no R channel (which is the satellite's receiving channel).
-- This indicates that the satcom on the aircraft was not working during this time.
-- Either the aircraft was upside down during this time, or there was a AC power failure onboard.
-- A simple navigation problem would have resulted in the satcom link not being lost but simply reverting to the back up satcom link antenna. The HGA would lose contact due to the lack of ARINC429 feed, but the LGA would still be working with no doppler correction.
-- What is difficult to understand is that what happens from 17:07 an 17:21 when the transponers went off. This needs a further look into.
- The final handshake was previously thought as the aircraft suffering from fuel exhaustion given the following:
-- This requires a failure of power supply resulting from the electrical generator on the left engine, and that power was then restored as the system switches to the generator from the right engine.
-- The final handshake process was quickly followed by silence.
-- Putting the time of occurence with the fuel load, it is now more likely than before that this was a result of fuel exhaustion of the aircraft.
-- This would require the log on request to be first detected on the R channel, but in this case it's from the P channel.
-- HOWEVER, the information released shows that the final handshake was initiated by the ground, not by the aircraft, so this makes it unlikely that fuel exhaustion was the trigger for this handshake.
From the data, it does look like there is a possibility that this may not be foul play at all and that it could be a mishap of an electrical sort that resulted in a cascading of failures of the communications system as per Pihero's theory, and that the crew may have been planning to divert to Penang, but was overwhelmed by something that resulted in them not ending up in Penang and ending up going elsewhere, under control or not. This is indicated by the radar plot that they did not go straight towards Penang, but seems towards navigational waypoints normally used in the arrivals into Penang from the north west.
Further, this seems to be backed up by the lack of response from the aircraft's satcom between 17:07 and 18:25 and aircraft initiated log-on at 18:25, which is before the tranponder going offline, until after the aircraft disappeared from military radar,
Again, the satcom (antenna, and satellite data unit) cannot be turned off on its own from the cockpit. You need to go to the E&E bay and pull the circuit breakers to turn it off.
The only other way to switch it off is to take power away from the left AC Bus. And there's no way to put power back to the left AC Bus from outside the cockpit while the aircraft is flying.
From the cockpit, the crew can switch off the ACARS (ie: tell ACARS to not send or receive anything through the satcom), but not the satcom itself.
Switching the left AC bus off means... the left utility bus is also switched off...
and... that means,the following are affected... Left engine EEC, primary flaps trailing edge, Window heaters, onboard brouters, pitot heaters, TAT probe heaters, Left AOA sensor heater, Cabin System Management Unit (and downstream users of it), Cabin overhead electrical units, pre-recorded cabin messages, Passenger Systems Services, IFE (audio and video), Satcom, Voice Recorder (CVR?), some of the left fuel boost pumps, Right AC Hyd Pump, Center 1 AC Hyd Pump, Some flight controls affected...
data 7/03/2014 16:42:04.408 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 146 14920 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 16:42:31.906 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 125 14900 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 16:42:47.907 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 123 14920 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 16:43:12.407 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 126 14920 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 16:55:37.907 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 156 15200 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 16:55:52.907 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 159 15200 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 16:56:07.906 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 158 15220 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 16:56:17.407 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 156 15240 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 17:07:03.907 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 130 15600 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 17:07:18.906 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 132 15600 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 17:07:33.907 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 130 15620 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 17:07:48.907 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 131 15620 ACARS
data 7/03/2014 18:25:34.461 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 273 51700 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 18:27:03.905 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 176 12560 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 18:27:08.404 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 172 12520 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 18:28:14.904 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 143 12480 Acknowledge User Data
data 7/03/2014 19:41:02.906 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 111 11500 Log-on/Log-off Acknowledge
data 7/03/2014 20:41:04.904 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 141 11740 0x15 - Log-on/Log-off Acknowledge
data 7/03/2014 21:41:26.905 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 168 12780 0x15 - Log-on/Log-off Acknowledge
data 7/03/2014 22:41:21.906 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 204 14540 0x15 - Log-on/Log-off Acknowledge
data 8/03/2014 00:10:59.928 IOR-R1200-0-36ED R-Channel 252 18040 0x15 - Log-on/Log-off Acknowledge
data 8/03/2014 00:19:37.443 IOR-R1200-0-36F6 R-Channel -2 49660 Log-on/Log-off Acknowledge
Log-On Request, initiated from the aircraft terminal.
data 7/03/2014 18:25:27.421 IOR-R600-0-36E1 R-Channel 142 17120 Log-on Request (ISU)/Log-on Flight Information
data 8/03/2014 00:19:29.416 IOR-R600-0-36F8 R-Channel 182 23000 Log-on Request (ISU)/Log-on Flight Information