You mean one Private First Class did all this????

There are a few Wikileaks threads out there, but I want to concentrate on this aspect of the story. Supposedly one PFC is responsible for this huge leaked file. I'm having a problem believing that. I did find out that he was busted from a Specialist (E-4) rank to PFC (E-3) for fighting, but this brings up more questions than it answers.

Secondly, military security involves a horrendous number of rules all designed to prevent this sort of leak. Computers, for example, have their USB ports deactivated and thumb drives are not allowed on the premisis. CD-R/W devices are deacivated. Yet this guy, Bradley Manning, supposedly smuggled out all these files on a CD labeled "Lady Gaga." Manning had access to SIPRNET. To give you an idea of requirements, see this link. One of the things the link talks about is that your use of SIPRNET is monitored. Manning must have spiked some charts by copying that much information onto a CD. That's a huge file, probably compressed, that had to have been noticed.

Although his Wikipedia Entry says he entered the Army at 18, this can't possibly be true. He was 20. His charge sheet indicates he joined in 2007, so he's been in three years.

The biggest thing that strikes me here is that the security had to have been very lax for this to have happened. He should not have been able, physically, to copy the files. Security rules were violated by people other than Manning here. The second biggest thing that strikes me is that he maintained a Secret security clearance at all. He had gotten into serious trouble at least twice including once that busted him an entire grade, which is serious, usually career-ending punishment. Normally if you have any kind of judicial action against you in the military, you lose your clearance, even if it is "just" a Secret clearance. I've seen officers lose their careers over a small security-related mistake yet Manning was allowed to stay in place. Unbelievable!

Then you have the added fact of his homosexuality. And, yes, it matters, if for no other reason that in today's military with it's "Don't ask; don't tell" policy, you can be placed in a compromising position and blackmailed because of it. If the military were open about this, it wouldn't matter, but it isn't, so it does. That was also "part of his stress" so it's relevant that way as well.

Next you have SIPRNET for "secret" stuff. Well, I'm here to tell you (having held a Secret clearance myself) that Secret isn't that secret, really. Top Secret is, but not Secret, per se. Oh, you may not want that stuff common knowledge, but stuff is classified Secret often as a matter of course, not because there is anything particularly secret about it. Diplomatic Cable? Secret! Even if it's about the dinner menu.

And what's so bad about what has been revealed? That the Obama administration looks like an idiot? You mean you didn't know? That the Arabs don't like the Persians? Little history might help here. That the Straits of Malacca are an important shipping lane? I thought that was a Vietnam issue. Really, there is no significant damage that has yet been revealed. The "revelations" amount to chicken poop. Even these 'strategic soft targets' are no big deal. As I said elsewhere, any terrorist worth his 72 virgins has a better list than that.

I usually do not like to jump on the conspiracy bandwagon. I think most of the so-called conspiracies promoted here are a bunch of bunk, but here I am thinking this uneducated private (His only other job was in a pizza parlor) was able to pull off this heist from a supposedly secure and monitored environment where only a "need to know" gets you access. Perhaps it was just a Perfect Storm of his taking advantage of incompetent security and grabbing these files.

When you put all this together, including his bust, it looks to me like a setup. He may have been primed and pushed to do this, subtle suggestions made to what was 'important,' computers where the CD-ROM just happened to be activated, some punishment to push him into being disgruntled. No, I don't have proof, but having witnessed military Secret security first hand as a participant, this simply does not sound like the whole story to me.

Manning was a patsy much like " Oswald " of the 60's. The fall guy or better known scapegoat would be Assange. Stop and think, would look pretty bad to the American people of we " off'ed " one of our own for high treason. SoOOoo, we set up a fall guy, a foreigner, someone who can take the fall.

I agree, there are just to many unanswered questions, and this just has " set up " written all over it~

Do you have to be a certain rank in order to have a certain security clearance?
I have been wondering about this myself since I heard what rank he was.

Originally posted by Whereweheaded
Manning was a patsy much like " Oswald " of the 60's.

OMG!!! I was just thinking this after reading the OP, but didn't post it. I can see Manning, having been found guilty of treason, lined up in front of the firing squad....any last words? Manning: "I'm a patsy".

This certainly has that kind of feel to it.

reply to post by schuyler


I think you bring up some valid points.

Some other things to be pointed out. SIPRnet access is usually in a secured room. No cell phones or cameras. A secret clearance isn't Carte Blanche to the wealth of all documents labeled SECRET. On top of the classification, there is as you stated, the condition of "Need to Know". This basis is floating and constantly changing. One day you could retain the "Need to Know" and the next you are no longer in the loop. This flexibility is key to maintaining mistakes given to those with a clearance of any kind.

I think your theory to be correct. While maybe not directly coached, it very likely seems quite orchestrated. Disgruntle him and begin making his life hell in the military. Poke, prod and provoke him until they know he is putty and will serve a need.

One thing I thought about was that maybe in a random sweep of regular internet usage, they noticed an interest in maybe sites like ATS. Giving them the knowledge that he could easily be led to the prize thinking he has stumbled upon something so great.

Then, all this information just happened to be in one tightly wrapped up location with a big bow. I am with you on this. He was coached or maybe something more sinister.

reply to post by Elieser


Nope, the clearance is based upon your job and the need to know.

In the armed forces, classified information of all kinds is routinely handled, transported, and filed by low ranking enlisted members with little to no supervision. I find it 100% plausable, from my own observations, that it is possible for a E3 or an E4 to make off with sensitive materials.

reply to post by schuyler


The best thread regarding the Wikileaks issue I have yet seen and one of the recent best on ATS in general, nice one

I have some serious doubts about both sides (Assange/Wikileaks and his 'whistleblowers') of this story, I don't know why, but something doesn't seem right.

I'm glad to see that someone is bothering to scrutinise the leaks origins rather than just focusing on the supposed bigger picture. Sometimes these things can be missed in the hype.

I don't really have anything to add, you seem to know your stuff, but I thank you for bringing a bit of common sense, level headedness to this whole cock-fight

reply to post by schuyler


I've got to agree with pretty much all of that. If the FBI can turn an Oregon teenager into a terrorist of Jihad, who is to say our military can't manipulate a demoted soldier into leaking what they want leaked.

You make valid points about how he shouldn't have been able to copy the material onto his "Lady Gaga" CD, do you think it is possible that he hand typed all of the information he had access too into a Notepad file already on his CD? He still shouldn't have been about to write the CD of course, but that could explain how the copying of files went undetected.

You also say the CD/ROM and USB drives are deactivated, which means they are still in the CPU case. Are the computer cases locked? Because it is possible to reconnect them by opening up the case, and it's as simple as plugging in one or two cords.

reply to post by HomeBrew


Maybe some, but the information is all over the place relating to multiple subjects. Last I remember we do not put all our eggs in one basket....one big basket.

If the leaks were focused, I could see this as plausible. The low level information of 'damning' information all placed into a neat little file or folder on the SIPRnet? Really?

IF that be the case then the real threat is a piss poor security system that has gone off the cliff since I last had knowledge of it.

Manning told Lamo that he enlisted in the Army in 2007 and held a Top Secret/SCI clearance, details confirmed by his friends and family members. He claimed to have been rummaging through classified military and government networks for more than a year and said that the networks contained “incredible things, awful things … that belonged in the public domain, and not on some server stored in a dark room in Washington DC.”

Wired.Com

Supposedly he held a Top Secret/SCI. A bit more access but FAR more restriction and the turpitude of his actions come more heavily into play.

reply to post by HomeBrew


That may have been true in the 60's and late 70's, but be that it may I'm former military, the " new " methods of security would prevent any type of " stealing " of material. Though we know anything is possible, it wouldn't hold true in this case. The USG needs a patsy, and a fall guy...looks like they got'em!


And no to another poster, the USB devices onboard most sensitive cases are removed.

Originally posted by schuyler
Computers, for example, have their USB ports deactivated and thumb drives are not allowed on the premisis. CD-R/W devices are deacivated. Yet this guy, Bradley Manning, supposedly smuggled out all these files on a CD labeled "Lady Gaga." Manning had access to SIPRNET. To give you an idea of requirements, see this link. One of the things the link talks about is that your use of SIPRNET is monitored.


The biggest thing that strikes me here is that the security had to have been very lax for this to have happened. He should not have been able, physically, to copy the files. Security rules were violated by people other than Manning here. The second biggest thing that strikes me is that he maintained a Secret security clearance at all. He had gotten into serious trouble at least twice including once that busted him an entire grade, which is serious, usually career-ending punishment. Normally if you have any kind of judicial action against you in the military, you lose your clearance, even if it is "just" a Secret clearance. I've seen officers lose their careers over a small security-related mistake yet Manning was allowed to stay in place. Unbelievable!

I work on a military installation and have a secret clearance. None of our computers have any physical restrictions from copying data through cd/rw or a usb port. As far as criminal activities costing a clearance; probably won't happen unless you've constantly been in trouble or get arrested for something dealing with moral turpitude(stealing, purjury, forgery, etc) or like you said, a security related mistake. When you've got a bunch of people with Secret clearances they tend to all act like there's no secrets.

Originally posted by Elieser
Do you have to be a certain rank in order to have a certain security clearance?
I have been wondering about this myself since I heard what rank he was.

His job would require him to have a high security clearance and put him in contact with this type of classified info. Its very plausible that he got these out of a secured area.

To bad he didn't stop and wonder where he would be in 50 years because of his actions.

Originally posted by Elieser
Do you have to be a certain rank in order to have a certain security clearance?
I have been wondering about this myself since I heard what rank he was.

Not at the Secret level, anyway. No. As a practical matter a Secret investigation takes awhile, so you would have risen in rank a bit as a matter of course. You have to have the clearance before you start the training and that can delay things for you. Normally you are an E-1 in boot camp, and E-2 when you graduate, and pretty quickly, within months, an E-3. The deal for many is that when they graduate their first school beyond boot (called an "A" school in the Navy) you get promoted to E-4.

Just as an example, if you are a linguist you go to the Defense Language Institute at Monetery, California for your "A" school language. When you graduate that you need a Secret clearance before you go to your next school to learn teh technical aspects of the job. Manning was an "Intelligence Specialist," which really isn't very high up in the heirarchy of eiteh rank or training. I suspect he was a file clerk with a clearance. I've found no evidence so far that he had any kind of advanced training. A language school, such as in Arabic, could be two years long and he simply hasn't been in the Army that long. An E-3 with three years in is about as low as you can go. He was already a screw-up.

Only problem with this theory, is if he did steal this information, not to mention actually got out of the installation with these finds, there would have been conclusive evidence to support these allegations. At this point, no conclusive evidence has been submitted to substantiate the USG claims.

Originally posted by ownbestenemy
reply to post by HomeBrew

 

Maybe some, but the information is all over the place relating to multiple subjects. Last I remember we do not put all our eggs in one basket....one big basket.

If the leaks were focused, I could see this as plausible. The low level information of 'damning' information all placed into a neat little file or folder on the SIPRnet? Really?

IF that be the case then the real threat is a piss poor security system that has gone off the cliff since I last had knowledge of it.

Good points, but perhaps you would be supprised just how 'small' and 'accessable' an entire base can be for some. It's very routine for any enlisted individual to perform multiple duties all over the place. But I agree that it would not be a simple task, yet I cant discount the reality of possibility.

By the way, I served in the mid 90's and am sure security has clamped down since then. However, I assume most of the work is being done by low ranking enlisted, and as such, the plausability of this being done by one(or a small handful) still seems possible to me.

reply to post by HomeBrew


Keep in mind though, and E-3 servicemen, isn't really gonna be up on the food chain, which would further suggest, his lack of actual " hands on " applications to the sensitive type's of material.

Originally posted by ownbestenemy
reply to post by HomeBrew

 

Maybe some, but the information is all over the place relating to multiple subjects. Last I remember we do not put all our eggs in one basket....one big basket.

If the leaks were focused, I could see this as plausible. The low level information of 'damning' information all placed into a neat little file or folder on the SIPRnet? Really?

IF that be the case then the real threat is a piss poor security system that has gone off the cliff since I last had knowledge of it.

You have to remember that one document that has been leaked has nothing to do with the next. What he probably did was grab a whole bunch of random documents and took off with them. There really doesn't seem to be any organization of the documents so far.

Originally posted by Whereweheaded
reply to post by HomeBrew

 

Keep in mind though, and E-3 servicemen, isn't really gonna be up on the food chain, which would further suggest, his lack of actual " hands on " applications to the sensitive type's of material.

Doesn't matter what rank he is.

With his clearance and job put him in contact with those documents.

Originally posted by Whereweheaded
reply to post by HomeBrew

 

Keep in mind though, and E-3 servicemen, isn't really gonna be up on the food chain, which would further suggest, his lack of actual " hands on " applications to the sensitive type's of material.

99% of all work in the military is done by E1-E5 ranked members. I have zero doubt that a E3/E4 could have all but unsupervised access with classified materials for transport, fileing, copying, decrypting/incrypting, ect...