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Originally posted by darkelf
reply to post by Throbber
Is it ok to kill civilians when they take up arms to dendend their country?
If I don't respond for a while, it's because I'm leaving to go to work.
Following established practice, the Army imposed certain conditions for its cooperation in forming a cabinet. The Army's conditions were, in fact, drawn up in the War Ministry's Military Affairs Bureau, some of the members of which shared the extremists' strong suspicion of Suzuki's intentions. The conditions laid down were:34
1. Prosecution of the war to the finish.
2. Formation of a cabinet such as to assure the earliest possible unification of the Army and Navy.
3. Prompt execution of measures desired by the Army to assure victory in the decisive battle of the homeland.
All three stipulations had the same essential purpose: to prevent any peace designs on the part of the premier-designate. The outgoing War Minister, Field Marshal Sugiyama, approved the conditions in toto as drafted in the Military Affairs Bureau, and presented them to Admiral Suzuki on 6 April, when the latter called to request the Army's cooperation in forming the new cabinet.35 In this talk with Marshal Sugiyama, Admiral Suzuki agreed to the Army's terms.36 The premier-designate could not ignore the fact that if he took issue with the Army at this stage it would undoubtedly result in his failure to form a cabinet. Suzuki's sole hope of success lay in accepting the Army's conditions.
In view of these highly complex circumstances, it was natural that the Suzuki Cabinet, during the first month of its existence, showed no visible sign of harboring peace intentions. Indeed, Premier Suzuki and even the more strongly peace-minded of his ministers fully realized that it was essential to make the strongest possible defense of Okinawa and to intensify homeland battle preparations to the maximum in order to place Japan in a better position for an eventual peace move.49
The Government therefore concentrated its initial attention on moves to expand war production and ameliorate the increasingly serious situations in regard to food and transportation. At the same time, acting through the Supreme War Direction Council, Premier Suzuki requested a comprehensive survey by the Council secretariat of all aspects of the national fighting strength.50 This survey was of vital importance, for it was intended to provide a sound basis for judgement as to whether and how long Japan could continue the war.
Turning to the question of enemy strategy, Kido expressed fear that a continuation of mass
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air attacks with incendiary bombs would "make a holocaust" of towns and villages throughout the country. Along with the destruction of their homes, people would lose their food stocks and clothing. Social unrest of alarming proportions would become inevitable with the advent of winter, and there was grave danger that the situation might get out of control. Kido's plan continued:88
From the viewpoint set forth above, I consider that it is essential for Japan to make a resolute move to terminate hostilities and restore peace. By what methods and steps, then, should this objective be attained? This problem calls for the most careful consideration.
In the light of various announcements, speeches and articles publicized by the enemy as part of a peace offensive, it is almost certain that the major enemy objective is the overthrow of the so-called gumbatsu, or militarist clique, in this country. Consequently, I believe that the proper way to start peace negotiations would be for the fighting services to propose peace initially, and for the Government then to decide on a peace plan and open negotiations. However, in the light of actual conditions in Japan, such action is virtually impossible at this juncture. Furthermore, if we wait for an opportunity to ripen for such action, it may come too late, and Japan may share the fate of Germany, making it impossible to secure even our minimum demands: the safeguarding of the Imperial family and the preservation of the national polity.
The Cabinet, meeting the same afternoon, debated the delicate question of how the Three-Power pronouncement should be handled domestically. Togo, who feared that immediate publication would put the Government in a position where it would be pressured into coming out openly against the Potsdam terms, urged withholding the declaration from the public for the time being. Other members of the Cabinet, however, argued that this would be unwise since the declaration had been broadcast throughout the world and would quickly leak out to the Japanese public. War Minister Anami urged that it was essential for the Government, in publishing the declaration, to repudiate it explicitly and even endeavor to exploit it for the purpose of boosting the fighting spirit of the nation.
Against the War Minister's stand, Premier Suzuki again came out strongly in support of Togo's thesis that the Government should
The conferees promptly agreed that the first and most important condition must be that acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration would not endanger the "national polity," or the prerogatives of the Imperial family. But Anami, the War Minister, and Umezu, Chief of Army General Staff, insisted that three additional conditions be approved
1. That the Japanese military forces overseas be disarmed and demobilized by Japan itself ;
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2. That all war criminals be prosecuted by the Japanese Government itself; and,
3. That there be no Allied occupation of Japan.151
The principle of self-disarmament was endorsed by Admiral Toyoda, Chief of Navy General Staff. He reluctantly supported Anami and Umezu on the two other conditions. Foreign Minister Togo, however, vigorously opposed any extra conditions. He warned that to press for terms other than the sole reservation governing the Imperial prerogatives would jeopardize the peace negotiations even before they started. Both Suzuki and Yonai supported Togo in his agruments, but after three hours of inconclusive deliberations, the Council was forced to adjourn in a deadlock.
War Minister Anami rejected Togo's arguments and while admitting that the Soviet Union could take over Manchuria, where the heaviest fighting was occurring, in two or three months time, he attempted to minimize the effectiveness of the atom bomb on the home front. Far from giving up, he concluded, Japan should insist on the four conditions discussed by the six leaders of the Supreme War Direction Council that morning, and continue hostilities in the event those conditions were rejected.
The protracted and grim debate was punctuated by heated argument between the War and Navy Ministers on Japan's ability to continue the war. Yonai, painting a definitely pessimistic picture, emphasized that the capacity to wage war should be viewed from over-all considerations and that since the problem of continuing the war was a matter to be decided on the basis of a total war, he suggested that the conditions in the munitions, food producing and transportation industries, as well as morale problems, should be discussed frankly. By so doing, he said, the Government would obtain a clear over-all appraisal of the real situation. The extremely depressing reports by the Ministers in charge on these questions bore out Yonai's deep concern.154
Suzuki then requested each Minister to state his views on Togo's proposal that Japan accept the Declaration subject to the one provision. At the conclusion of the Cabinet session, the lineup on the Togo proposal stood as follows Against-War Minister Anami, Home Minister Abe and Justice Minister Matsuzaka: For-Foreign Minister Togo and Navy Minister Yonai. Although one or two remained non-committal, the others favored intermediate positions with most of them leaning toward Togo. A suggestion by Education Minister Ota that the Cabinet resign because of its inability to resolve the impasse was quickly scotched by Suzuki.
Originally posted by Throbber
As a result of the actions of the west, Japan has been scarred.
Originally posted by Throbber
In otherwords, As a result of the actions of the west, Japan has been scarred.
Originally posted by Throbber
I also like it how that research you've done suggests that an incredible amount of lives would have been lost if it weren't for the nuclear bomb, and yet we still used conventional warfare to make nazis surrender in the end.
Originally posted by Throbber
But it was the west's decision to launch a nuclear attack on Japanese cities, not Japan's.
So, why was it so important to launch a nuclear attack on innocent civilians?
Oh, and don't try to get me with that total war b/s, countries have always lied about their citizen's true intentions in order to seem more intimidating.
I also like it how that research you've done suggests that an incredible amount of lives would have been lost if it weren't for the nuclear bomb, and yet we still used conventional warfare to make nazis surrender in the end.
Originally posted by Throbber
I stand by my belief, please explain to me why i am wrong in that a nuclear assault on any place in Japan AT ALL would cause Japanese surrender.
Originally posted by Throbber
You're saying a nuclear explosion isn't noticable?
Originally posted by Throbber
It's the fact that people accept them* as legitamate targets that i can't get over.
Even if it's war, you're condoning genocide to people whom may or may not even be your enemy.
I'll bring us back to my previous point - Do you think that if they hadn't surrendered that we would have gone ahead and nuked japan from the pages of history?
EDIT: Don't forget, when we speak of 'them' and 'those' we should infact be referring to 'Those Civilians'.
Originally posted by Throbber
You're saying a nuclear explosion isn't noticable?