Hiroshima bomb pilot dies aged 92

This man is a true American Hero. Just old warrior from a war of epic proportion that had a very historic mission and succeeded in performing his task. He was just one of hundred's of thousands of heroes of that generation that allows every person in the free world to do what they do today.

My thoughts and prayers go to this man and his family.

Originally posted by darkelf
reply to post by Throbber

 

Is it ok to kill civilians when they take up arms to dendend their country?

If I don't respond for a while, it's because I'm leaving to go to work.

Yes.

A civilian is not a civilian if he takes up arms for his country, He is a combatant, prepared to kill.

If you are prepared to kill, you must be aware that you also stand a chance of being killed.

I apologise if this has stirred up some sort of issues with people.


EDIT: Cool hand, you've ignored what i've been saying - it didn't need to be any city whatsoever.

As for the american war hero, i agree that he is indeed a hero, and that anyone who slanders is name his scum*.

Which is also why i believe that Your president should attend his funeral.



*I am aware of the precarious position i am in, don't worry.

I guess you could say that i am standing on the edge of this topic, without falling either way.

War is by far the most complex thing that humanity has created, and therefore it can be seen as it's greatest problem.

[edit on 1-11-2007 by Throbber]

I always love the revisionist history and their take on WW2.

Japan used homes as factories to manufacture any number of items for the military complex. They did for 2 reasons. First, the US Army air force had next to destroyed all major factories and industrial areas. Second, the military of Japan had ordered the dispersal of industry so it couldn't be destroyed like a factory with the mistaken belief that the Allies would not attack "pure" civilian areas.

Many more people of all countries involved, would have been killed or wounded, if an invasion of Japan had occurred. The bombing of legitimate targets proved more effective in making Japan realize it was a defeated nation than just putting bullets into people trying to protect land with swords, knives, and poles. (yes, this was their plan and using kids to do this on top of it)

As for fallout comments, this is great 20/20 hindsight vision. Fallout only became a known threat in the 50's with larger bombs and more scientific study. All that was know in 1945 was a big boom would occur and hopefully, it would happen in a city and not in the airplane.

www.army.mil...

Following established practice, the Army imposed certain conditions for its cooperation in forming a cabinet. The Army's conditions were, in fact, drawn up in the War Ministry's Military Affairs Bureau, some of the members of which shared the extremists' strong suspicion of Suzuki's intentions. The conditions laid down were:34

1. Prosecution of the war to the finish.

2. Formation of a cabinet such as to assure the earliest possible unification of the Army and Navy.

3. Prompt execution of measures desired by the Army to assure victory in the decisive battle of the homeland.

All three stipulations had the same essential purpose: to prevent any peace designs on the part of the premier-designate. The outgoing War Minister, Field Marshal Sugiyama, approved the conditions in toto as drafted in the Military Affairs Bureau, and presented them to Admiral Suzuki on 6 April, when the latter called to request the Army's cooperation in forming the new cabinet.35 In this talk with Marshal Sugiyama, Admiral Suzuki agreed to the Army's terms.36 The premier-designate could not ignore the fact that if he took issue with the Army at this stage it would undoubtedly result in his failure to form a cabinet. Suzuki's sole hope of success lay in accepting the Army's conditions.

In view of these highly complex circumstances, it was natural that the Suzuki Cabinet, during the first month of its existence, showed no visible sign of harboring peace intentions. Indeed, Premier Suzuki and even the more strongly peace-minded of his ministers fully realized that it was essential to make the strongest possible defense of Okinawa and to intensify homeland battle preparations to the maximum in order to place Japan in a better position for an eventual peace move.49

The Government therefore concentrated its initial attention on moves to expand war production and ameliorate the increasingly serious situations in regard to food and transportation. At the same time, acting through the Supreme War Direction Council, Premier Suzuki requested a comprehensive survey by the Council secretariat of all aspects of the national fighting strength.50 This survey was of vital importance, for it was intended to provide a sound basis for judgement as to whether and how long Japan could continue the war.

Turning to the question of enemy strategy, Kido expressed fear that a continuation of mass

[692]


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air attacks with incendiary bombs would "make a holocaust" of towns and villages throughout the country. Along with the destruction of their homes, people would lose their food stocks and clothing. Social unrest of alarming proportions would become inevitable with the advent of winter, and there was grave danger that the situation might get out of control. Kido's plan continued:88

From the viewpoint set forth above, I consider that it is essential for Japan to make a resolute move to terminate hostilities and restore peace. By what methods and steps, then, should this objective be attained? This problem calls for the most careful consideration.

In the light of various announcements, speeches and articles publicized by the enemy as part of a peace offensive, it is almost certain that the major enemy objective is the overthrow of the so-called gumbatsu, or militarist clique, in this country. Consequently, I believe that the proper way to start peace negotiations would be for the fighting services to propose peace initially, and for the Government then to decide on a peace plan and open negotiations. However, in the light of actual conditions in Japan, such action is virtually impossible at this juncture. Furthermore, if we wait for an opportunity to ripen for such action, it may come too late, and Japan may share the fate of Germany, making it impossible to secure even our minimum demands: the safeguarding of the Imperial family and the preservation of the national polity.

In response to the Potsdam Declaration.

The Cabinet, meeting the same afternoon, debated the delicate question of how the Three-Power pronouncement should be handled domestically. Togo, who feared that immediate publication would put the Government in a position where it would be pressured into coming out openly against the Potsdam terms, urged withholding the declaration from the public for the time being. Other members of the Cabinet, however, argued that this would be unwise since the declaration had been broadcast throughout the world and would quickly leak out to the Japanese public. War Minister Anami urged that it was essential for the Government, in publishing the declaration, to repudiate it explicitly and even endeavor to exploit it for the purpose of boosting the fighting spirit of the nation.

Against the War Minister's stand, Premier Suzuki again came out strongly in support of Togo's thesis that the Government should

After the first bomb dropped.

The conferees promptly agreed that the first and most important condition must be that acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration would not endanger the "national polity," or the prerogatives of the Imperial family. But Anami, the War Minister, and Umezu, Chief of Army General Staff, insisted that three additional conditions be approved

1. That the Japanese military forces overseas be disarmed and demobilized by Japan itself ;

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2. That all war criminals be prosecuted by the Japanese Government itself; and,

3. That there be no Allied occupation of Japan.151

The principle of self-disarmament was endorsed by Admiral Toyoda, Chief of Navy General Staff. He reluctantly supported Anami and Umezu on the two other conditions. Foreign Minister Togo, however, vigorously opposed any extra conditions. He warned that to press for terms other than the sole reservation governing the Imperial prerogatives would jeopardize the peace negotiations even before they started. Both Suzuki and Yonai supported Togo in his agruments, but after three hours of inconclusive deliberations, the Council was forced to adjourn in a deadlock.

War Minister Anami rejected Togo's arguments and while admitting that the Soviet Union could take over Manchuria, where the heaviest fighting was occurring, in two or three months time, he attempted to minimize the effectiveness of the atom bomb on the home front. Far from giving up, he concluded, Japan should insist on the four conditions discussed by the six leaders of the Supreme War Direction Council that morning, and continue hostilities in the event those conditions were rejected.

The protracted and grim debate was punctuated by heated argument between the War and Navy Ministers on Japan's ability to continue the war. Yonai, painting a definitely pessimistic picture, emphasized that the capacity to wage war should be viewed from over-all considerations and that since the problem of continuing the war was a matter to be decided on the basis of a total war, he suggested that the conditions in the munitions, food producing and transportation industries, as well as morale problems, should be discussed frankly. By so doing, he said, the Government would obtain a clear over-all appraisal of the real situation. The extremely depressing reports by the Ministers in charge on these questions bore out Yonai's deep concern.154

Suzuki then requested each Minister to state his views on Togo's proposal that Japan accept the Declaration subject to the one provision. At the conclusion of the Cabinet session, the lineup on the Togo proposal stood as follows Against-War Minister Anami, Home Minister Abe and Justice Minister Matsuzaka: For-Foreign Minister Togo and Navy Minister Yonai. Although one or two remained non-committal, the others favored intermediate positions with most of them leaning toward Togo. A suggestion by Education Minister Ota that the Cabinet resign because of its inability to resolve the impasse was quickly scotched by Suzuki.

Here are some information about the Japanese debate about surrendering or to keep on fighting relating the firebombings as well as nuclear weapons being used on their homeland.

Still, none of that mentions the nessecity of bombing cities.

And i did read it, btw - i found it very informative.

I'm not saying that we didn't have to nuke them, i'm saying we nuked them in a bad way - like sticking your sword in and twisting it.

In otherwords, As a result of the actions of the west, Japan has been scarred.

EDIT: If you want me to be un-reasonable to the point of which i will stir up an arguement, i can do that quite easily.

[edit on 1-11-2007 by Throbber]

Originally posted by Throbber
As a result of the actions of the west, Japan has been scarred.

And the prisoners of war held/tortured by the japanese wern't scarred? and as for all of the people saying japan shouldnt have been nuked because it cost several hundred thousand lives, how many hundreds of thousand lives would have been lost if all of the japanese teritory would have been captured useing only convential means? and lets not forget these would have been losses on all sides as well as civilian losses once the fighting had entered the towns and cities

Originally posted by Throbber

In otherwords, As a result of the actions of the west, Japan has been scarred.

As the result of Japan's ACTIONS, Japan has been scarred. Lets not forget that.

reply to post by deltaboy


But it was the west's decision to launch a nuclear attack on Japanese cities, not Japan's.

Unless you happen to think there's some sort of Japanese/American Conspiracy to strengthen Japan's position on the global stage, you're ignoring my point.

So, why was it so important to launch a nuclear attack on innocent civilians?

Oh, and don't try to get me with that total war b/s, countries have always lied about their citizen's true intentions in order to seem more intimidating.


EDIT: Solidshot, it wasn't civilians whom were doing the torturing.

I also like it how that research you've done suggests that an incredible amount of lives would have been lost if it weren't for the nuclear bomb, and yet we still used conventional warfare to make nazis surrender in the end.

[edit on 1-11-2007 by Throbber]

Originally posted by Throbber

I also like it how that research you've done suggests that an incredible amount of lives would have been lost if it weren't for the nuclear bomb, and yet we still used conventional warfare to make nazis surrender in the end.

I think you'll find this was due to the bomb not being ready until after the german surrender, if it had been imho it very likely would have been used against the nazi's as well.

reply to post by solidshot


Oops. i made an error.

Hey i can't be right all the time now, can i?

Originally posted by Throbber
But it was the west's decision to launch a nuclear attack on Japanese cities, not Japan's.

It is nice how you conviently forget to mention that Trumman gave the chance for Japan to surrender BEFORE we used the weapons. They choose not to, we choose to drop the bomb to encourage them to and save allied lives.

So, why was it so important to launch a nuclear attack on innocent civilians?

Show proof of such a thing and I will believe it. Every able bodied person in Japan supported the war effort.

Oh, and don't try to get me with that total war b/s, countries have always lied about their citizen's true intentions in order to seem more intimidating.

Others here have already addressed that.

I also like it how that research you've done suggests that an incredible amount of lives would have been lost if it weren't for the nuclear bomb, and yet we still used conventional warfare to make nazis surrender in the end.

Are you serious? We didn't have enough material to make the bombs until after Germany surrendered.

[edit on 1/11/07 by COOL HAND]

It is nice how you conviently forget to mention that Trumman gave the chance for Japan to surrender BEFORE we used the weapons. They choose not to, we choose to drop the bomb to encourage them to and save allied lives.

Convenient, no.

Nice, Yes.

Again you've ignored the point on how there were other targets than cities.


Show proof of such a thing and I will believe it. Every able bodied person in Japan supported the war effort.

Why would there be proof to the contrary?

Others here have already addressed that.

I'm sure that they have.


Are you serious? We didn't have enough material to make the bombs until after Germany surrendered.

See my previous post.


My point is that there didn't have to be a nuclear assault on the cities of Japan, that a nuclear attack on a remote, otherwise un-inhabited part of japan would acheive the same result.

I stand by my belief, please explain to me why i am wrong in that a nuclear assault on any place in Japan AT ALL would cause Japanese surrender.

Originally posted by Throbber
I stand by my belief, please explain to me why i am wrong in that a nuclear assault on any place in Japan AT ALL would cause Japanese surrender.

The weapon needed to be used pubicly in the hopes of encouraging them to surrender. Had we bombed a remote area, their army would have just blocked it off and the war would have just kept on going.

What would have been the point of developing that weapon if you are going to only use it on out of the way areas? Where is the fear factor for it then?

reply to post by COOL HAND


You're saying a nuclear explosion isn't noticable?

Originally posted by Throbber
You're saying a nuclear explosion isn't noticable?

Not if enough people don't see it and talk about it.

Why can't you get over the fact that they were legitimate targets? It was war and they were industrial centers for Japan, thus making them legitimate targets.

reply to post by COOL HAND


It's the fact that people accept them* as legitamate targets that i can't get over.

Even if it's war, you're condoning genocide to people whom may or may not even be your enemy.

I'll bring us back to my previous point - Do you think that if they hadn't surrendered that we would have gone ahead and nuked japan from the pages of history?

EDIT: Don't forget, when we speak of 'them' and 'those' we should infact be referring to 'Those Civilians'.

Is it industrial centers we were aiming for or those hundreds of thousands of people?

And i seriously doubt they'd be able to cover up a nuclear explosion, by the way.

[edit on 1-11-2007 by Throbber]

[edit on 1-11-2007 by Throbber]

Originally posted by Throbber
It's the fact that people accept them* as legitamate targets that i can't get over.

Why, it was war. One that they started.

Even if it's war, you're condoning genocide to people whom may or may not even be your enemy.

Advocating the bombing of one or two cities does not mean I condone genocide. Where did you come up with that from? These weren't even their most populated cities at the time.

I'll bring us back to my previous point - Do you think that if they hadn't surrendered that we would have gone ahead and nuked japan from the pages of history?

That all depends on how much time they would have needed to get another bomb ready. If the delay would have been too long then we would have launched a conventional invasion and the loss of life would have been much greater.

EDIT: Don't forget, when we speak of 'them' and 'those' we should infact be referring to 'Those Civilians'.

There was no such thing as a civilian in 1945 Japan.

Why, it was war. One that they started.

And?

The reasons for war are never as plain as 'They started it'.

Perhaps the amount of war on an international scale convinced them that war was accepted in modern society, as it had been for them throughout their historu - despite the 'democratic' west's opinions.


Advocating the bombing of one or two cities does not mean I condone genocide. Where did you come up with that from? These weren't even their most populated cities at the time.

It was not a case of Bombing Cities, it was a case of Bombing the Innocent Women And Children in those Cities, if there were no people in the cities, then those cities would not have been bombed - Get that through your skull.


That all depends on how much time they would have needed to get another bomb ready. If the delay would have been too long then we would have launched a conventional invasion and the loss of life would have been much greater.

Which would defy the entire point of nuking them in the first place, thank you.

It was a desperate gamble, in otherwords.


There was no such thing as a civilian in 1945 Japan.

Would you like a bigger brush to colour an entire race with, sir?

[edit on 1-11-2007 by Throbber]

Originally posted by Throbber


You're saying a nuclear explosion isn't noticable?

And yet you think firebombing would be enough to persuade them to surrender?

Bomb mountains with incendiary devices, it should definitely end the war.

reply to post by deltaboy


No, bomb mountains with nuclear devices.