It looks like you're using an Ad Blocker.
Please white-list or disable AboveTopSecret.com in your ad-blocking tool.
Some features of ATS will be disabled while you continue to use an ad-blocker.
For the moment, all evidence is speculative and circumstantial.
This could have just been a terrible accident, coincidentally occurring after threats leveled against the South Korean nuclear power industry by hackers who may have been freelance environmental extremists.
Some will laugh at the notion that such a convenient disaster could have occurred coincidentally, while others – particularly those who remain skeptical that the North Korean government had a direct role in the Sony attack – will caution against drawing conclusions based solely on the denial that random misfortune is possible.
It’s a safe guess that those South Korean standby security teams are going to have an even less relaxing holiday week than they thought.
Officials from Washington, Tokyo and Seoul will sign a trilateral intelligence-sharing pact in an effort to strengthen their surveillance network on the nuclear-armed pariah state of North Korea, Seoul officials said.
According to the agreement, to be signed on Monday, South Korean and Japanese officials will share intelligence on Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs, via Washington, South Korea’s Defense Ministry said in a statement, AP reported.
Seoul believes North Korea has made progress in its efforts to develop and produce nuclear missiles that are capable of reaching US territory, or US military bases that are located in both South Korea and Japan.
Students of the First Cyber War should by now be familiar with the shadow dances of deniability and separation conducted by hostile regimes, and the converse possibility that the work of independent digital vandals could be mistakenly attributed to foreign powers with aligned interests… especially if said foreign powers make a point of applauding when something goes kablooey. Nobody’s wearing a uniform or marching under a flag in this new brand of warfare.
The logical [t]hing to do, from the outset, would be to have ALL critical infrastructure sitting on internal LANs only, with absolutely NO connection to the outside world... ever! I mean, the solution to external hacks or the threats of them is simple, isn't it?
For the same reason a Rural-Medical-Practitioner MAY need a Specialist ... ( i.e. medical-video-conferences )
Why would infrastructure control systems even need any remote access in the first place? Ok, there may be times when access from a safe place, for disaster operations and safety evacs may be needed away from the plant / control hub, but these should be planned anyway and hardwired into the LAN as a contingency anyway.
Everyone is on the Cheapest-Drop-Dead-Time-Schedule ... ( i.e. short-cutting )
For me, security planning and contingency go hand in hand, so I wonder why so many critical infrastructure systems, and those that plan and implement them, seem not to be able to follow simple rules and safeguards?
Of course, it doesn't help that for years the government(s) and their agencies have worked with the manufacturers to leave backdoors in the hardware and software systems - for fighting terrorism of course! These back doors, thus known to those agencies are open to abuse by many within those agencies, and also there to be found by determined external elements.
To be the SAFEST ??? ... Do NOT Omit Anyone Anywhere.
I fear the actions of those government agencies a lot more than I do the cyber criminals out to make a buck.