Syria: The Pause That Refreshes

The recent failure by the Obama administration to carry through on a military strike of Syria should not be interpreted as anything but a momentary check to their plans to topple the Assad regime and replace it with one more compliant to Western corporate interests, before moving on to attempt to do the same thing in Iran.

It is important to remember that eastern Syria has already fallen, in parts, to the al Nusra Front and to Syrian Kurds who profess loyalty to Assad's regime but who have been forced to secure autonomous control of their own region of the country in order to protect themselves from "ethnic cleansing" by anti-Assad jihadis.

I think what we will see in the western end of Syria is a return to what has been the most effective tactic pursued by the United States in its campaign against Assad, and that is a return to attempts to bribe top Assad loyalists into defecting from the regime or, to assassinate them outright.

Assassinating Assad himself must be at the top of the "to do" list for NATO's clandestine services and their allies among the cannibals.

With Assad gone, there could be serious disarray in the Baath party. In fact, since anything is possible, another strategy for the Americans would be to bribe an ambitious Baath Party member to stay in position until someone can get to Assad. This person might even assist in facilitating Assad's removal.

Another thing that we might see in the near future is an attempt by Israel to renew hostilities against Hezbollah in Lebanon in hopes of putting enough pressure on them to withdraw forces from Syria. This might return the situation in Syria to one in which rebels were capable of taking out Assad's forces or of fighting a prolonged bloody internal conflict that could eventually lead to the collapse of the regime from exhaustion.

An outbreak of Hezbollah aggression against Israel on the southern border of Lebanon would be easy to cook up and would make as much strategic sense for Hezbollah as a gas attack on a neighborhood in Damascus would make for Assad, i.e., none at all.

These are the actions that NATO's champions of human values don't talk about when they discuss their options.

Another perfectly good thread goes to waste.

Possibly the worst subject to bring up on ATS.

S&F

The Americans and their NATO partners have not, to my knowledge, shipped arms that had been promised to the anti-Assad forces. These forces are still awaiting shipments that they were desperate to see before the gas attack episode occurred. (Motive for the attack?)

It's possible that the US/NATO would prefer to work with a traitor from within the Baath Party set-up, who would control a post-Assad, pro-Western Syrian government.

State Department wizards must be mumbling formulae and stirring large cauldrons far into the night over this.