Lockheed-Martin (Quantum?) Computing Troubles

well basically I read this yesterday:

This is a very significant time in the history of D-Wave. We’ve sold the world’s first commercial quantum computer to a large global security company, Lockheed Martin. That’s a real milestone for us. We are excited to work with Lockheed and future customers to tackle complex problems traditional methods cannot resolve.

First Quantum Computer Sold

then while browsing today, i noticed this:

Lockheed, the biggest provider of information technology to the U.S. government, is grappling with "major internal computer network problems," said one of the sources who was not authorized to publicly discuss the matter.

Lockheed network hit by major disruption

and i got to thinking, could they be connected? did the techs at LockMart hook up the D-Wave One to their network? what do you people think?

MODS: kindly move this to the appropriate forum if this thread doesn't belong in this one, thanks.

Hello Skynet!

from just listening lockheed is way more advanced than anyone thinks but it seems no one ever investigates them.

well realisticaly if you hook up a creativity machine to a quantum computer and give it the internet as a data source.... theres no telling how fast it would evolve and if you could do anything to stop it.

Ive always said.... feed it the most enlightened information you can and stay out of its way untill in reaches a point worthy of conversation. Nothing but the truth can save you.

I'd say it's unrelated. The D-Wave system is not a computer in the standard sense - and would likely not be hooked up to a network, to begin with.

They are likely undergoing an upgrade of their computer networks and running into compatibility issues between newer systems and older outlying systems.

Edit:

On further reading, it would appear this is completely unrelated....

The slowdown began on Sunday after security experts for the company detected an intrusion to the network, according to technology blogger Robert Cringely. He said it involved the use of SecurID tokens that employees use to access Lockheed's internal network from outside its firewall,

A spokesman for EMC Corp, whose RSA division makes the tokens, declined to comment on any security issues affecting specific customers.

EMC disclosed in March that hackers had broken into its network and stolen some information related to its SecurIDs. It said the information could potentially be used to reduce the effectiveness of those devices in securing customer networks.

This was before the announcement of the D-Wave system being sold to Lockheed. Not that they'd have had enough time to get the thing assembled and operational in the two days that have passed since the sale was announced (or even since the D-Wave One was put onto the market).

And it deals with an external intrusion.

Steve Winterfeld, cyber technical lead at TASC, an advanced systems company spun off from Northrop Grumman Corp, said TASC and other companies were extremely concerned about the breach since it meant that the SecurID tokens could no longer be viewed as completely secure.

"You have no idea how many people are freaked out right now," Winterfeld told Reuters. "TASC is no longer treating the RSA device as if it were as secure as it was beforehand."

This is actually more serious than it sounds.

en.wikipedia.org...

reply to post by Aim64C


thanks for the clarification. i was just about to hit the sack when i submitted that. although it did seem quite a coincidence to me at the time when i saw that article about lockheed's network troubles.

couldn't they just use the D-Wave One to create/generate new tokens or perhaps design the software needed to do so? as mentioned in the first article:

Rose: We have used the D-Wave One to run numerous applications. For example, we used the system to solve optimization problems arising from building software that could detect cars in images. This process outputs software that can be deployed anywhere – mobile phones, for example. The software the D-Wave One system wrote, with collaborators from Google and D-Wave, was among the best detectors of cars in images ever built.

using the D-Wave One to tackle this task might even provide lockheed with better and more efficient encryption to secure their networks. ... they could be doing that right now, or could they have done so already?

reply to post by toreishi


While D-Wave offers a variety of new offerings for security companies, the ultimate problem with network security lies in the fact that a computer must transfer data. You also have to have fixed and known variables for encryption to work - the recipient of encrypted data must always have a way to access that encrypted data, using some process to derive the key from the data, or an established encryption key.

The data must also pass through node servers on the networks - and compromised servers searching for outgoing encrypted credentials can intercept the data and, given other information can be obtained, used to log on.

What it boils down to is that any time you have two computers talking to each other through a node that can be accessed by other people - the potential for 'being hacked' exists - regardless of what measures you put in place. It may require a mole inside the facility to physically hand over codes and hashes - but it's only a matter of time in any facility before someone decides they hate their job or simply aren't getting paid enough.

Further - I doubt Lockheed even has an operational D-Wave system. The whole system encompasses 100 square feet and requires 12 kilowatts of power (I'm presuming, mostly, to run the cryogenic systems). You don't just take it out of the box and spend the night downloading operating system updates. This thing requires some serious supporting infrastructure. What Lockheed bought was the kit to build it and support for the system, basically. It'll likely be months before they are done setting it up and running diagnostic tests to ensure the system is working as it should and not producing a bunch of fuzz results (would kind of suck to use that thing to develop new programs to stitch together distributed aperture radar images and end up with a bunch of garbage).

The first thing they will likely do is use it to optimize a wide range of code running on their systems, already. With many programs encompassing several (dozen) megabytes of executable code and parsed scripts on top of that - computer programs that can analyze that code for various errors and vulnerabilities as well as suggest ways to optimize the code will be what this thing is all about. I expect it will be a very big thing in the software development market - if not become a third-party service (IE - you submit your code to a company that owns a fleet of these things and they run an optimization service).

Pretty interesting, and important, really, as computer programs are beginning to grow far larger than the human being is capable of keeping track of. This sort of stuff can cut development times for programs by orders of magnitude.

looks like lockheed's problem is only the tip of the iceberg.

Unknown hackers have broken into the security networks of Lockheed Martin Corp and several other U.S. military contractors, a source with direct knowledge of the attacks told Reuters.

Link

something seems a bit off. especially with the G8 discussions on implementing restrictions to the net these past few days. it just seems too convenient a time for this sort of thing to happen, kinda like 9/11 all over again. this time hackers = terrorists.

reply to post by toreishi


Well, to be blunt - the DoD and a number of its contractors have been fighting a losing war in network security. Every year brings new patches to programs that patch existing exploits while unwittingly allowing for another. With contractors requiring the use of remote access and network transfer of files between regions and sub-contractors - the risk of network intrusion is simply a non-negotiable risk of the modern day.

However - it is no secret that countries like China actively fund and support cyberwarfare divisions with the goal of launching attacks on other nations information systems.

An attack like this on Lockheed is going to be the work of a coordinated group with centralized goals and objectives. That's not any random group of hackers or pranksters.

The problem is becoming even more evident as more high profile incidents occur - Sony having their servers hacked and personal data (with financial information also) taken. The two may or may not be related - we don't have the information to tell.

This is nothing new, however. Back in 2007/2008 - information came to the surface that information regarding the F-35 had been compromised and leaked over the network to unauthorized clients. This is merely the latest - and one of the most sweeping - cases.

In effect - we need our own cyber warfare group. We need to develop teams with the experience and ability to track down foreign espionage efforts and target their physical servers for destruction by special ops teams (where appropriate). Your small-time facebook hacker isn't really part of the picture in this scenario - it's the ones causing real problems for national security. Like it or not - we are, quite literally, at war with China (and Iran - as they've got their own cyberwarfare division that is currently operating at will against us). It's only proper we be good sports about the matter and return the favor.

Originally posted by Aim64C


This is actually more serious than it sounds.

That's an understatement. SecurID is the access control backbone of virtually every serious US company (my employer included) and government institution.

This is a breach from a professional national intelligence service against a very hardened and very high value target---it could have been many years old.

Originally posted by Aim64C
In effect - we need our own cyber warfare group. We need to develop teams with the experience and ability to track down foreign espionage efforts and target their physical servers for destruction by special ops teams (where appropriate). Your small-time facebook hacker isn't really part of the picture in this scenario - it's the ones causing real problems for national security. Like it or not - we are, quite literally, at war with China (and Iran - as they've got their own cyberwarfare division that is currently operating at will against us). It's only proper we be good sports about the matter and return the favor.

We have two:

en.wikipedia.org...
en.wikipedia.org...

but they might not be good enough.

reply to post by mbkennel


These are really no different than the TSA - a largely static-reactive initiative. To clarify - a passive measure is a restrictive/qualifying measure. It's like a fence, wall, and/or sign indicating that 'not just anyone' should be allowed access.

In the network world - these are encryption methods, login credentials, malware prevention methods, etc. These are fine in their own right. Not just anyone can log in to DoD systems without proper authorization (CAC encryption certificates and the respective client software - and even then, that's just NIPR - SIPR is restricted to certain terminals, due to the nature of the material on SIPRNET).

But, as we have seen - anyone can sit outside of a passive measure and look for ways to defeat it. Just as people sat outside the backscatter machines and found ways to defeat the measure in both complex and very simple ways. Billions of dollars investing in the development of that preventative measure become little more than a nuisance to the average person and only a mild obstacle to the determined assailant.

Similarly, in the world of network security - we have a variety of different systems meant to detect and shut down intrusion - but they can all be defeated by simple social engineering techniques (get the users to download malware by telling them it's free porn or games - two of the easiest ways to get people to bite) or more complex network attack systems fielded by other intelligence agencies.

What we really lack is a proactive solution. It is getting increasingly more expensive to develop systems that are only marginally more effective at preventing network intrusion - it's a vastly diminishing return; just like in airport security. We need the authority to, literally, sniff out foreign network attack agencies and eliminate them. I don't mean "shut them down" with legal action - kill their operatives, destroy their chains of command, and blast their hardware to kingdom come.

I know some here will not like that idea - worried that the highschool hack-prankster will end up getting taken out by Delta Force or something - but, that's really not even part of the concern. The concern are entities that have a clear and present ability to defeat secure logon protocols coupled with the intent and history of attempting to do so. Domestic threats can be handled via the Constitutional procedure - but foreign threats should be treated as such and eliminated with extreme prejudice.

Considering how much of our economy and how much of our infrastructure is managed by networks - this sort of thing cannot be allowed to go on. The sort of network attacks we are seeing, if directed by foreign government entities, should be considered an open declaration of war. While espionage is part of defense and intelligence networks - there is a point where "spy games" are no longer games of cat and mouse with only information at stake - but a warfighting ability of their own.

I may be a bit over the top and lacking diplomacy on this issue - but it's hardly going to be diplomatic when a few million credit card holders end up having billions in phony charges racked up to their account and the entire banking system operating in "WTF Mode." When it comes to raw military prowress - the U.S. pretty much blows every other nation and alliance out of the water in terms of capability and hypothetical wars on a level playing field. But if such a network attack is possible - it would almost completely paralyze our military until the confusion subsided (and who knows how long that would take - especially if networks were shut down to prevent further intrusion - the damage done by the intrusion isn't necessarily greater than the damage done by triggering a shutdown of the network; a standard operating procedure for secure networks experiencing an intrusion... pull the plug).