i hate nasa

i was just watching a special on the challenger the spaceship that exploded in 1986 or 1989 i believe. The reason it blew up was because of the o rings, it was cold and they failed, infect it was on record the coldest day that day when challenger exploded with some of the most wonderful people that didn’t deserve what happened. A company tried to stop them from launching that day but nasa didn’t listen it didn’t take the facts...they are so ignorant i mean it only takes some common sense to see theses things.

i bet that’s how they are with aliens the same with the rest of the u.s. government

no offense to anyone who used to work there…

I forgot where, but i read something that said when they were making the o rings some guy used a calculator instead of a slide rule. his calculations were wrong, and had he been using a slide rule he would have noticed something was wrong. I remember it was something about the advantages of using a slide rule instead of a calculator, which they called an electric liar.

Originally posted by 56
I forgot where, but i read something that said when they were making the o rings some guy used a calculator instead of a slide rule. his calculations were wrong, and had he been using a slide rule he would have noticed something was wrong. I remember it was something about the advantages of using a slide rule instead of a calculator, which they called an electric liar.

No - there was an ice build up on the sealed joint and the ice was the ultimate root cause. But the seal/joint design was kind of sucky as well.

Concerning the statement that some company tried to talk them out of it, that's not entirely true. It was a long line of bad decisions from Morton-Thiokol all the way through NASA. It was just flat a bad day on shuttle is what it was.

Originally posted by Valhall

No - there was an ice build up on the sealed joint and the ice was the ultimate root cause. But the seal/joint design was kind of sucky as well.

Concerning the statement that some company tried to talk them out of it, that's not entirely true. It was a long line of bad decisions from Morton-Thiokol all the way through NASA. It was just flat a bad day on shuttle is what it was.

I agree w/ Valhall , this was an egregious error that was at the time overlooked or over ridden.

I remember , unfortunately ,watching the tragedy unfold at school as my first live on T.V. experience that I can remember.

The O-Rings weren't the only problem that the Challenger faced before it was lost in 1986. The mission was delayed several times due to weather and various other problems. I remember reading there were problems with a hatch closing and a failure of a fire detection system during fueling procedures.

The flaw in the O-ring design was known by both NASA and the contractor that manufactured the SRB's (Morton-Thiokol) but brushed it off as a flight risk. So, really NASA is not the only one to blame here.

There is always risk associated with space exploration, always has been, and there will continue to be into the foreseeable future. The astronauts knew that. No, they probably did not deserve to die, but they were aware of the risks they were taking. That being said, I don't think you should hate NASA because of the space shuttle failures. If you look at the statistics, there were 2 failures out of a total of 114 flights. In my opinion, that's not too bad a record. I'm not trying to say that the lives lost were insignificant, because it is significant. It's unfortuneate that this happened and if it was up to me, I would have probably delayed the launch.

[edit on 23-1-2006 by UnknownOrigins]

Originally posted by UnknownOrigins

There is always risk associated with space exploration, always has been, and there will continue to be into the foreseeable future. The astronauts knew that. No, they probably did not deserve to die, but they were aware of the risks they were taking.

Absolutely correct about the inherent risks, but the risk that was taken that took Challenger was an unnecessary risk. The launch shouldn't have happened. And I was wrong when I said the ice was the root cause. The root cause was the decision to go for launch. That's what killed them.

" The root cause was the decision to go for launch. That's what killed them." - Valhall

Yes , and we ( the kids at the time) all watched live on T.V.

After the fact (several months) everyone seemed to grasp the problem ... , but at the time it was "go for launch".


Edit: my typo's

Edit: Also I have to say I don't hate NASA!

I mean hey! All the best UFOs come from NASA footage !

What is there really to hate?



[edit on 23-1-2006 by lost_shaman]

with all of the delays it was actually like something was trying to stop them...

Yer NASA suck; they haven't even landed on the moon yet and they already want to land on Mars!

Here are some links about the Challenger disaster:

Fifteen years ago, two senior spacecraft engineers spent six hours pleading with Nasa to delay the launch of Challenger. The next day, the shuttle exploded in the skies, with the loss of its entire crew.

www.guardian.co.uk

But when Morton Thiokol told NASA not to launch, NASA’s upper management said they wanted to meet with the engineering firm’s management and engineers in 45 minutes, Boisjoly said. They wanted Morton Thiokol to prove the launch would fail. “We had 45 minutes to prepare for the most important meeting of our lives,” Boisjoly said.

Morton Thiokol engineers and management presented all the proof they could to NASA that the launch would be disastrous, but NASA would not back down, Boisjoly said. NASA accused Morton Thiokol of coming up with criteria the eve of the launch and it accused engineers of messing up the launch schedule, Boisjoly said.

In the mist of the pressure, Morton Thiokol managers stepped to the side, ignoring their engineers’ recommendations, and decided to make a “management decision,” Boisjoly said. They gave NASA the OK to launch with no criteria on the weather.

www.madisoncourier.com

Boisjoly was a senior engineer for the company that built the solid rocket boosters for the shuttle, and says he warned against liftoff in freezing conditions the day the Challenger was set to launch on Jan. 28, 1986. The go-ahead for liftoff resulted in the explosion that killed six astronauts and schoolteacher Christa McAuliffe.

Boisjoly testified before the presidential commission that investigated the tragedy, was branded a "whistleblower," and lost his 27-year career in the aerospace industry. He has given hundreds of lectures on the Challenger disaster and is a self-employed forensic engineer.

www.uc.edu

On the evening of January 27, 1986, Thiokol was providing information to NASA regarding concerns for the next day's planned launch of STS 51-l. Thiokol engineers were very concerned that the abnormally cold temperatures would affect the "O" rings to nonperformance standards. The mission had already been canceled due to weather, and, as far as NASA was concerned, another cancellation due to weather was unthinkable ([4] pg. 23). Both parties were already aware that the seals on the SRB needed upgrading but did not feel that it was critical. Though the information provided by the GDSS (with an associated expert system) showed that the "O" rings would perform under the predicted temperatures, Thiokol engineers questioned their own testing and data that were programmed into the GDSS. Thus on the eve of the Challenger launch, NASA was being informed that their GDSS had a flawed data base.

At this point, NASA requested a definitive recommendation from Thiokol on whether to launch. Thiokol representatives recommended not to launch until the outside air temperature reached 53º F. The forecast for Florida did not show temperatures reaching this baseline for several days. NASA responded with pressure on Thiokol to change their decision. NASA's level III manager, Mr. Lawrence Mulloy, responded to Thiokol's decision by asking, "My God, Thiokol, when do you want me to launch, next April?" ([4] pg. 24).

After this comment the Thiokol representatives requested five minutes to go off-line from the GDSS. During this period the Thiokol management requested the chief engineer to "take off his engineering hat and put on his management cap," suggesting that organizational goals be placed ahead of safety considerations [4]. Thiokol reentered the GDSS and recommended that NASA launch. NASA asked if there were any other objections from any other GDSS member, and there was not.

dssresources.com

Google Search I

Google Search II


[edit on 2006/1/24 by GradyPhilpott]

Originally posted by conspiracy123
Yer NASA suck; they haven't even landed on the moon yet and they already want to land on Mars!

Huh?

The Apollo program was designed to land humans on the Moon and bring them safely back to Earth. Six of the missions (Apollos 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, and 17) achieved this goal. Apollos 7 and 9 were Earth orbiting missions to test the Command and Lunar Modules, and did not return lunar data. Apollos 8 and 10 tested various components while orbiting the Moon, and returned photography of the lunar surface. Apollo 13 did not land on the Moon due to a malfunction, but also returned photographs. The six missions that landed on the Moon returned a wealth of scientific data and almost 400 kilograms of lunar samples. Experiments included soil mechanics, meteoroids, seismic, heat flow, lunar ranging, magnetic fields, and solar wind experiments.


Apollo Program

Edit: Oh wait! I forgot this is ATS.


[edit on 2006/1/24 by GradyPhilpott]

Originally posted by GradyPhilpott

Originally posted by conspiracy123
Yer NASA suck; they haven't even landed on the moon yet and they already want to land on Mars!

Huh?

Apollo Program

Edit: Oh wait! I forgot this is ATS.

[edit on 2006/1/24 by GradyPhilpott]

Lol sorry; just another one of my crazy conspiricies.

I watched it too. The thing that really ticks me off is the Rogers Commision didn't blame "any one person" and the upper management that made the decision to go ahead with the launch (NASA and/or M-T) were not fired. The engineer who was trying desperately to tell management about the o-ring problem eventually quit. Somehow it always seems to work that way.

There are two items we shouldn't lose sight of.

First Learning how to go up high and fast is dangerous. This morning I came back for a trip which involved four take-offs and landings in airplanes and i did not worry at all because other people had tested the aircaft and done all the dangerous stuff. But any kind of pioneering enterprise is dangerous, and space flight is right up there. People are going to get killed doing it, and everyon e actually involved in these enterprises knows and accepts it.

Second no real engineer will try to even atempt to make something risk free; it simply can't be done. Whe you're designing a complex systemk, yiou have to make a series of decisions to make it safe, cheap, and on time. There's almost always a conflict there, and you have to make decisions which will hopefully come up with a cost- and safety-effective approach.

Nine times out of ten, the O-rings would not have catastrophically failed in cold weather. That time they did and the NASA program managers made an incorrect (and tragic) call. Because of this, the people involved (NASA Congress itself, and the American taxpayers) over-reacted and, as a result, the shuttle program began its decline to the point where now it is -- for all practical purposes -- defunct.

The o-rings were demonstrated to fail below a certain temperature. This flight was during the coldest day of any flight so far, by I believe 30 degrees. There was ice forming on the shuttle the night before. The engineers were demanding that the flight be postponed until the temperature was at a safe level for the o-rings and NASA and T-M overruled them with unfortunate consequences. It was there fault ALONE!

Most here might not remember, but the fateful Challenger launch occurred on the morning of the 1986 State of the Union Speech. I have no proof, but with the launch already having been postponed, I believe that the White House wanted a shuttle in orbit for that speech and that is what fueled the decision-making process.

[edit on 2006/1/24 by GradyPhilpott]

I'm just a lowly mechanic, but I posed a question to mgt., that got a great response. Silence.
"You want it right, or right now" ?

Just my 2 cents,
Lex

Here's an interesting opinion piece by Mike Mullane, a former shuttle astronaut. He was just interviewed on local TV, because of his book, Riding Rockets : The Outrageous Tales of a Space Shuttle Astronaut, because he currently lives here, and because the anniversary of the Challenger disaster is coming up.

Mullane has some very harsh criticisms for NASA and the culture that placed the schedule above all other considerations and that downplayed design flaws, thereby playing Russian roulette with the lives of astronauts. He says that the Columbia disaster was hard evidence that there were no lessons learned at NASA from the Challenger disaster.

The fact that the third anniversary of the shuttle Columbia's fiery disintegration will be noted on Feb. 1 is a certain indication the agency didn't retain Challenger's deadly lessons. In many ways, that was the greatest tragedy of Challenger.


Columbia's loss, just like Challenger's, wasn't an accident but rather a prediction. Cultural issues within the agency allowed intense schedule pressures (pressures to expand the shuttle flight rate preceding Challenger and pressures to meet space station construction milestones preceding Columbia) to overwhelm warnings of serious design flaws. The flaw that brought Challenger down was in the booster rocket O-ring design; for Columbia it was in the foam used to insulate the gas tank. In fact, in some of its findings, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board could have plagiarized the Challenger Rogers Commission report nearly word for word. The only edits required would have been to substitute "External Tank" for "Solid Rocket Booster" and "foam-shedding" for "O-ring erosion."

Every American should use the anniversaries of Challenger and Columbia to remember those astronauts who have paid the ultimate price. At the Kennedy Space Center Astronaut Memorial, there are 24 names etched in granite.

news.yahoo.com

Mullane also believes that the shuttle should be abandoned because every time it flies, it delays a lunar program and, ultimately, a Mars program.

Originally posted by ATSGUY


no offense to anyone who used to work there…

lol used to work there what about the guys that work there currently lol