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There are multiple variables that interfere with your theory.
In mid-2004, John Conway and Simon Kochen of Princeton University proved the Free-will Theorem. This theorem states "If there exist experimenters with (some) free will, then elementary particles also have (some) free will." In other words, if some experimenters are able to behave in a way that is not completely predetermined, then the behavior of elementary particles is also not a function of their prior history. This is a very strong "no hidden variable" theorem.
The Conway-Kochen proof of the Freewill Theorem relies on three axioms they call SPIN, TWIN and FIN:
Particles have the 101-property. This means whenever you measure the squared spin of a spin-1 particle in any three mutually perpendicular directions, the measurements will be two 1s and a 0 in some order.
There is a finite upper bound to the speed at which information can be transmitted.
If two particles together have a total angular momentum of 0, then if one particle has an angular momentum of s, the others must necessarily have an angular momentum of -s.
Firstly, it does not take into account "risk minimisation". For example, let's say I am the driver from your first scenario: what if I decide to drive a car that is equipped with the latest airbag technology and interior cushioning, and I happen to survive the crash?
Secondly, would you consider inaction to be a form of action? Using the shark example, would my decision not to go swimming at the beach influence the likelihood that some other person will be bitten by a shark or not?
Why do we call this result the Free Will theorem? It is usually tacitly assumed that experimenters have sufficient free will to choose the settings of their apparatus in a way that is not determined by past history. We make this assumption explicit precisely because our theorem deduces from it the more surprising fact that the particles’ responses are also not determined by past history.
Thus the theorem asserts that if experimenters have a certain property, then spin 1 particles have exactly the same property. Since this property for experimenters is an instance of what is usually called “free will,” we find it appropriate to use the same term also for particles.
Thirdly, many could argue that one is forced to make a decision that carries causal consequences (eliminating the existence of Free Will). For example, I could eliminate the chance I will die by car crash by never driving; shark attack by never swimming; falling over and cracking my skull by never walking or going out etc. but if I refrained from doing anything to reduce the risk of injury/death, I would probably develop deep vein thrombosis (DVT) or have a heart attack from lack of exercise.
a) The "choice" to minimise any risks does not make you bulletproof, but it has the potential to interfere with probability and statistics. As well as the airbags example, I could too have asked how many drivers have never been involved in an accident before - another variable that has the potential to affect probability and statistics for the chance of dying on that road.
Probability and statistics may be reliable some of the time, but they are not infallible. Somebody driving for the first time on that road can die in an accident, while somebody who has driven on that road over 25 years can remain accident free.
b) If their choice is independent of my choice, then how are statistics acceptable in this context? Shouldn't every example be treated as a unique situation where statistics are irrelevant?
c) One is forced to make a decision because sitting on a chair literally all day or staying in bed without movement over a long period of time will lead to health problems which are not sustainable.