posted on Aug, 29 2011 @ 03:17 PM
Generally speaking, open-source intel networks are a bad idea for this very reason. Too many people have the keys and there is a lack of structure
and cohesion.
The game of espionage is an expensive one and you have to be able to protect your sources. If I've seen something so horribly wrong as to be a
'whistle blower' - there's likely a lot of money, lives, etc at stake. A dead whistle-blower is no use - couter-espionage contractors will be
brought in to sift through my phone records, text messages, IP activity history, forum handles, and dig as far as they can. My family, as well.
They'll pull random dots out of a hat and start connecting them in weird manners - try to disrupt my relationship with wife/kids/etc.
Ultimately, they'll hope to force a whistle-blower to capitulate and say "enough - I was just being an attention whore and lying." If not -
they'll do what they can to trash their reputation.
This does depend upon what environments we are dealing with. I'm getting into the more extreme ends of things - like corporate mergers, purging of
staff unjustifiably, and other types of events. "Disclosure" by Micheal Crichton is a very interesting take on this type of scenario. Someone
saying "security is lax" as an anonymous source isn't a fly on the wall worth smashing with a hammer.
Anyway - the point is, when dealing with informants handling those kinds of secrets, you need to be able to make them disappear and be their insurance
policy. If you can't do that, or -fail- to do that, you'll quickly lose face and people will go elsewhere with their secrets.