Pearl Harbor: A Sneak Attack?

a reply to: mike dangerously

From my understanding, we had broken their codes.

That also applies to German naval codes and their Army codes.

From El Alamein on, we had their plans before the fight was even entered. (That's how we beat Rommel).

What I'd point out is the 'battle of the bulge'. We were caught flat-footed on that one. The reason being is those 'plans' were never sent to the front lines! It was planned, organized back in Berlin. Therefore no opportunity to prepare.

Back to Pearl Harbor. This was also planned, organized in Japan. Again, no signals to the forward naval units that would have given us the heads-up.Apparently, we knew something was up, but not the details. Not the target or the date of the attack.

I'm extrapolating on this one, yet the constant suggestion of 'allowing it happen' is also a huge extrapolation as well.

When the battle of the Bulge example is factored in, this scenario seems more likely than allowing the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor.

Hoover was warned but he didn't send it up..www.defensemedianetwork.com...

a reply to: rossacus

The sole fact that not a single a/c carrier was in Pearl at the time is telling. We were on a war footing already for a couple of years. We were hard at work and producing all manner of military equipment. We just needed a spark to enliven the public.

The images of the ironwork of the Arizona has always bothered me. It has an appearance of being an old, used up WWI ship. Was it left in Pearl as a viable decoy? What about our subs, how many just happened to be out at sea and missed the action? Was the cost of allowing a "sneak attack" worth it? Many in command will say it was because we only lost a couple of thousand people.

originally posted by: JIMC5499

originally posted by: hellobruce

originally posted by: paraphi
Japan was at war with China.

And the Soviet Union

The Soviet Union didn't declare war on Japan until 1945.

They did not declare war until 1945 but they fought them in 1932.

The Battle of Lake Khasan (July 29, 1938 – August 11, 1938) and also known as the Changkufeng Incident (Chinese: 张鼓峰事件; pinyin: Zhānggǔfēng Shìjiàn, Japanese pronunciation: Chōkohō Jiken) in China and Japan, was an attempted military incursion from Manchukuo (by the Japanese) into territory claimed by the Soviet Union. This incursion was founded in the belief of the Japanese side that the Soviet Union misinterpreted the demarcation of the boundary based on the Convention of Peking treaty between Imperial Russia and the former Qing-Dynasty China

One of many sources

The US suspected Japan would attack something. That is why the fleet was moved from California to Pearl to begin with. So it would be in a better position to respond to an attack on the Philippines, which seemed the most likely US target. Of course many in the US also though Japan would simply hit the Dutch for the oil and maybe the UK colonies as well as they were to busy in Europe to do anything.

In the intelligence world, your biggest problem is not the lack of information it is sorting through the tons of information you are getting and figuring out what is most likely right. After something happens it easy to go back and find the clues and ignore everything else. In real time you do not have that.

First lets cover a few things. The oil embargo enacted by the US on Japan was partly do to its war in China but, directly a response to the Japanese occupation of French territory (a gift from the Germans) putting Japans forces much closer to the Philippines. The mostly likely chance of an attack on the US was seen as the Philippines, in which case the fleet at Pearl would then sail and save the day.

The US and Europe had a strong racial bias against the Japanese and saw them as incapable of any real strategic thinking or innovation. They may copy the Wests weapons but, they could not move beyond that.

Pearl Harbor was to shallow for torpedo attack. So it was considered safe. Nobody thought the Japanese would be able to design new torpedoes that could be used in the shallow harbor. After all nobody else had.

It was also considered very unlikely Japan could or would operate a large force so far from home.

And the Japanese treaty with Germany only required Germany to support Japan is Japan was attacked. So FDR could never come up with a plan to use an attack by Japan to go to war with Germany. That Germany did declare war on the US is one of WW2s biggest surprises and nobody really seems to know why Hitler did it.

So yes the US suspected something was coming. That it might be an attack on the Philippines. Or it might be on a dozen other non US targets. Pearl Harbor was considered to far and its harbor to shallow to be attacked. At Pearl the biggest fear was a terrorist attack by local Japanese Americans. And that is what preparations were made for.

I've always wondered what would have happened if Japan just attacked the Dutch East Indies, Singapore, Malaysia, India etc.
and didn't attack US interests. Would the US have stayed out of WWII?

originally posted by: nwtrucker
From my understanding, we had broken their codes.

Code breaking in WW2 is long story. Japanese naval codes were partially broken by the British, Dutch, Aussies and the US by the time of Pearl Harbor, but not enough to know what was going on. The codes were largely cracked by 1942.

The German codes generated through the Enigma devices were nearly cracked by the Polish due to close links with the Germans prior to WW2. When war broke out the British set up the Bletchley Park facility and made progress so that in 1940 some codes could be translated and as the war progressed the British got better at it and ended up building the first computers named Colossus. The British were helped when the Royal Navy captured code books from the German submarine U110 in 1941, in an incident that was unashamedly turned American by Hollywood in the (joke) film U571, but that’s another thread. The activities at Bletchley Park are said to have shortened the war by two years.

The Germans cracked the British naval codes before the war and this and this allowed them to track convoys. They also cracked Russian codes. Fortunately for the allies, the Germans never really joined up their intelligence operation so never created a rival Bletchley Park. The Germans also decrypted communications across the US diplomatic service, which caused the British problems in North Africa as American diplomats liked to “natter” to each other.

a reply to: MrSpad

The seeds for World War II pacific involvement were down during World War I . Myself I trace it back to the 21 demands and the virtual exclusion and humiliation of the Japanese Empire at the Versialles treaty .

The Twenty-One Demands (Japanese: 対華21ヶ条要求, Taika Nijūikkajō Yōkyū, simplified Chinese: 二十一条; traditional Chinese: 二十一條; pinyin: Èrshíyī tiáo) were a set of demands made during the First World War by the Empire of Japan under Prime Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu sent to the weak government of the Republic of China on January 18, 1915. The demands would greatly extend Japanese control of Manchuria and of the Chinese economy, and were opposed by Britain and the United States. In the final settlement Japan gained a little but lost a great deal of prestige and trust in Britain and the US.

source


The first inroads into China and Manchuria, also gave them a taste for expansion .

On 2 September 1914, Japanese forces landed on China's Shandong province and surrounded the German settlement at Tsingtao (Qingdao). During October, acting virtually independently of the civil government, the Imperial Japanese Navy seized several of Germany's island colonies in the Pacific - the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Islands

source

a reply to: MrSpad

Haha.

Let's see, how many admirals had to be fired or reassigned because they would not leave the Pacific fleet defenseless in PH. At least two.

The admiral who did was court marshalled. He was eventually exonerated years later in a little publicized court case.

I think out mates down under gave us a very accurate description of what was coming our way and when it would get here.

There is copious official documentation that supports the instigation, baiting, and foreknowledge of the attack.

Maybe if I get to PC I'll link some.

a reply to: paraphi

I appreciate the clarification.

Does my 'guess' on the Bulge and Pearl Harbor analogy make sense, based one your understanding?

originally posted by: ISawItFirst
a reply to: MrSpad

Haha.

Let's see, how many admirals had to be fired or reassigned because they would not leave the Pacific fleet defenseless in PH. At least two.

The admiral who did was court marshalled. He was eventually exonerated years later in a little publicized court case.

I think out mates down under gave us a very accurate description of what was coming our way and when it would get here.

There is copious official documentation that supports the instigation, baiting, and foreknowledge of the attack.

Maybe if I get to PC I'll link some.

In hind site it is easy to look back and ignore everything but, what is pertinent to what happened. The US had tons of warnings at the time that Japan was going to attack, the reports all just said some place completely different. Reports of Japans fleet being in spot one day and in a completely different spot the next. Or sometimes to places at once. The fact is Pearl was considered safe from Carrier attack because torpedoes could not be used and for any traditional navel attack the fleet would have plenty of time to sortie out and meet it. The most logical target in the US eyes would have been to avoid US territory all together. Nobody knows if FDR could have gotten the US to do anything if Japan has just gone after the Dutch colonies and the oil they needed. On the off chance an attack on the Philippines to distract the US would have been the most likely conclusion. Japan sending its fleet far away to hit a target like Pearl where the fleet was safe because of its shallow waters was at the bottom of the list of likely targets.

I wonder what would of happened if the Japanese spotter noticed the carriers were not in harbour?

a reply to: JIMC5499

There had been numerous border clashes with the Soviets in the late '30's. ...and essentially, the Soviets tore 'em a new one.

Georgy Zhukov was one of the commanders during the clashes. Later to become famous for helping lead the Red Army across Europe against the Nazi's.

Undeclared, I'll grant you, but pretty much a war, just the same.

a reply to: seagull

If they are shooting at me, it's a war. Didn't know about that.

originally posted by: vonclod
I wonder what would of happened if the Japanese spotter noticed the carriers were not in harbour?

The primary targets were the battle ships. Despite Japan using carriers in this attack, something saw as an unique experience, even they saw carriers as only a support role to battleships. To the Americans as well the loss of the battleships was considered a disaster and they used the carriers they had used in-spite of not having the battleships they were suppose to support out of desperation. In the next couple months both Japan and America would come to see they were completely wrong.

a reply to: MrSpad

There were some, in both navies, who had discarded that thinking.

Minoru Genda who planned the attack.

Mitsudo Fuchida who led the attacks first wave.

...and a host of others.

Oddly enough, the Admiral who led the strike force Vice Adm. Chuichi Nagumo was among the least air minded of the IJN high command.

Bill Halsey who commanded one of the three US carrier task forces was extremely air minded, as was Jack Fletcher who commanded another one.

Another oddity, Raymond Spruance who later made his bones commanding fifth fleet during the Mariana's campaign, was considered to be a black-shoe admiral, who favored the big gunned battleships.

So in both navies, carrier aviation was beginning to gain acceptance, though it was still very much a red-headed stepchild.

I love these threads...

originally posted by: seagull
a reply to: MrSpad

There were some, in both navies, who had discarded that thinking.

Minoru Genda who planned the attack.

Mitsudo Fuchida who led the attacks first wave.

...and a host of others.

Oddly enough, the Admiral who led the strike force Vice Adm. Chuichi Nagumo was among the least air minded of the IJN high command.

Bill Halsey who commanded one of the three US carrier task forces was extremely air minded, as was Jack Fletcher who commanded another one.

Another oddity, Raymond Spruance who later made his bones commanding fifth fleet during the Mariana's campaign, was considered to be a black-shoe admiral, who favored the big gunned battleships.

So in both navies, carrier aviation was beginning to gain acceptance, though it was still very much a red-headed stepchild.

I love these threads...

Oh yeah you always a few who are thinking beyond the box. The same with the role Tanks would play. But, those guys were always butting up against the establishment. Even after Taranto, the sinking of the Bismark, Pearl Harbor, etc. so many still seemed to want to pretend the battleship were still the king. Granted down the road battle ships would be upgraded to become big missile platforms and coastal bombardment platforms. Something they did fine but, sadly other much cheaper ships could do just as well. Still would cool to have on of those things in the fleet.

a reply to: MrSpad

We called in gunfire from the USS New Jersey in 1983. Our helo was 7 miles away and the muzzle blast still shook us pretty good.

a reply to: MrSpad

Still would cool to have on of those things in the fleet.

Wouldn't it be, though?

I got to see one of them back when they were brought back into service during the Reagan Admin., don't remember which one it was, but I remember being very impressed. So big. So fast. Even though they were just short of fifty years old, still faster than most ships in the water...

a reply to: cavtrooper7 Heh,sounds like Hoover alright that old drag queen discounted Popovs warning simply because he didn't like him.