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3.2.1.1. Findings, conclusions, causes, recommendations, analysis, and the deliberative process of
safety investigators. Diagrams and exhibits if they contain information which depicts the analysis
of safety investigators. This includes draft versions of the above material.
3.2.1.2. Information given to safety investigators pursuant to a promise of confidentiality (paragraph
3.4.).
3.2.1.3. Computer generated animations, simulations, or simulator reenactments in which safety
investigator analysis is incorporated. Animations made exclusively from recorder data (including
Military Flight Operations Quality Assurance data) are not privileged.
3.2.1.4. Photographs, imagery, and animations that reveal the deliberative process of the board,
including photographs with markings.
3.2.1.5. Life Sciences Material that contain analysis by a safety or life sciences investigator.
NOTE: 72-hour histories, 14 day histories and interview narratives by Medical Officer are only
privileged if privilege was granted.
ROFCIBC
reply to post by boomer135
I flew tankers for 26 of my 28 years. Half in KC135s other half in KC10s with a stint in Caribous.
In the 135 I was an IP for 12 years and a CCTS instructor for five.
One thing I remember, and I checked my -1 to make sure.
The rudder PCU was "fail safe" to the powered mode. IOW it took electrical power to shut it OFF. Had the c/b been popped the rudder would have been in the powered mode, not manual, so the copilot would not have been stressed by flying in the manual mode. Resetting the c/b would have only allowed the rudder to be put in the manual mode by turning off the switch on the center console.
Further, lacking some sort of asymmetrical thrust manual or powered would have been no different, little or no rudder input required.
Also, once the airspeed got above 250 KCAS the rudder power would have been reduced to prevent over controlling due to high rudder PCU pressure.
In short, the analysis by "boomer135" just doesn't pass the "smell test" at least not from my perspective. I suppose it's possible that the 135 was modified to make the rudder power a "fail fail" system so if the control power was lost the rudder would revert to the manual mode. But I'd like to see some documentation about that modification, i.e. TCTO #
I would welcome a little more from the poster as to what his expertise and experience in the 135 he had.
boomer135
Real quick, my expertise is nowhere near yours when it comes to systems knowledge. I'd say you have a few more years on me sir! I was a boom operator for six years, mostly in Grand Forks, ND. I have around 2500 flight hours, a little over 1000 combat or combat support hours, About 750 instructor hours, and probably around 100 evaluator hours. I went through CFIC in 2003.
When it comes to the flight control systems and the points you bring up, I can't argue with your expertise. I'll just say that the analysis is only what I've read in the reports. That being said, if you look at how the plane broke apart and the sequence of events, most people in the tanker world I talk to came to almost the same conclusion as the boards did.
On that note, I'm trying to find a counter argument to your dash one reference and I simply can't find anything to argue. The American people will get a little taste from the accident board eventually.
ROFCIBC
boomer135
Real quick, my expertise is nowhere near yours when it comes to systems knowledge. I'd say you have a few more years on me sir! I was a boom operator for six years, mostly in Grand Forks, ND. I have around 2500 flight hours, a little over 1000 combat or combat support hours, About 750 instructor hours, and probably around 100 evaluator hours. I went through CFIC in 2003.
When it comes to the flight control systems and the points you bring up, I can't argue with your expertise. I'll just say that the analysis is only what I've read in the reports. That being said, if you look at how the plane broke apart and the sequence of events, most people in the tanker world I talk to came to almost the same conclusion as the boards did.
On that note, I'm trying to find a counter argument to your dash one reference and I simply can't find anything to argue. The American people will get a little taste from the accident board eventually.
boomer135,
First, I have not read, nor do I have access to any of the official SIB material. I was basing my comments on the sequence of events you posted, especially about the popped CB and the fatigue issue of one of the pilots.
Here are the things you posted that just didn’t make sense to me.
“During the climb out of Manas AB, the PCU failed and they had been flying the jet manually due to the rudder power circuit breaker being popped open.”
and
“Consequently, they reset the rudder power circuit breaker while the rudder was being applied in the full deflection by the co-pilot.”
As I pointed out if the CB was popped, the rudder would be in the power, not manual mode. So the rest of the paragraph about the rudder suddenly slamming over if the CB was reset just doesn’t make sense. Also, I can’t imagine a pilot having the strength to apply full deflection against the power mode.
If the pilots were fighting a powered hardover rudder and the CB reset made it revert to the manual mode, then it would be much easier to control. True there would have been a quick move away from whatever direction the rudder was in, but that would have been in the manual mode. One could surmise that extensive “rudder walking” might stress the vertical stabilizer to the point of failure.
Can’t speak to your -1 Warning reference regarding the PCU shut off CB as I don’t find that in my -1. There is a generic warning about resetting CBs more than once, which may be what you are referring to.
As for the Q3 for a student demo, there could have been a lot of reasons for that, some with no connection to actual aircraft control. Don’t know what they call SACR 60-4 now but something as innocuous as an inadequate briefing or debrief may have been involved. I remember when the KC10 blew up on the ramp at Barksdale and all the flying records of the crew that had last flown the airplane were collected for the SIB. Just part of their procedures.
edit on 2211112013 by ROFCIBC because: minor formatting error