The Mind is the Body is the Mind
1 the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness
and thought: as the thoughts ran through his mind, he came to a conclusion | people have the price they are prepared to pay settled in their minds.
• a person's mental processes contrasted with physical action: I wrote a letter in my mind.
2 a person's intellect: his keen mind.
• a person's memory: the company's name slips my mind .
• a person identified with their intellectual faculties: he was one of the greatest minds of his time.
3 a person's attention: I expect my employees to keep their minds on the job.
• the will or determination to achieve something: anyone can lose weight if they set their mind to it.
Definition of MIND
: recollection, memory
a : the element or complex of elements in an individual that feels, perceives, thinks, wills, and especially reasons
b : the conscious mental events and capabilities in an organism
c : the organized conscious and unconscious adaptive mental activity of an organism
A mind (pron.: /ˈmaɪnd/) is the complex of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, thinking, reasoning, perception, and judgement—a
characteristic of human beings, but which also may apply to other life forms.
A long tradition of inquiries in philosophy, religion, psychology and cognitive science has sought to develop an understanding of what mind is and
what are its distinguishing properties. The main questions regarding the nature of mind is its relation to the physical brain and nervous system –
a question which is often framed as the Mind-body problem, which considers whether mind is somehow separate from physical existence (dualism and
idealism), deriving from and reducible to physical phenomena such as neurological processes(physicalism), or whether the mind is identical with the
brain or some activity of the brain. Another question concerns which types of beings are capable of having minds, for example whether mind is
exclusive to humans, possessed also by some or all animals, by all living things, or whether mind can also be a property of some types of man-made
These are some common definitions of “mind” from various sources; but this conclusion by Wikipedia is my personal favorite:
Whatever its relation to the physical body it is generally agreed that mind is that which enables a being to have subjective awareness and
intentionality towards their environment, to perceive and respond to stimuli with some kind of agency, and to have consciousness, including thinking
What is “that which enables” us to be conscious and aware? What is that “entity” and “complex” they describe as the mind? I think the
answer’s quite obvious.
In order to be able to do anything
, one must first be born and be living; it is a necessary prerequisite to be in the universe before you can
perceive it. In order to perceive anything, one must first be possessed of senses. It’s obvious that to see one must have eyes. But the eyes cannot
see on their own, for they must be attached to a brain—indeed they are a part of the brain itself
. The brain needs a skull to protect it
because of it’s fragility. The brain and skull must be connected to the spinal cord, which must be supported, along with the entire nervous system,
bound with sinew and tendon, by the muscle and the bones of the skeleton. Somewhere in the core resides the digestive, respiratory, endocrine, and
circulatory systems doing their constant duties while enclosed in the safety of the ribcage and beyond. Finally, all of it must be wrapped together in
the biggest, maybe even the most important organ, the surface layer skin, where the body meets the rest of the universe.
We can understand that a brain cannot think on its own; it’s not the brain doing the thinking. Ears cannot hear on their own; ears aren’t what are
hearing. Skin cannot feel on it’s own; it’s not the skin doing the feeling. There is an “entity” here doing all this. There is a “complex”
of functions, organs and organism happening here. It is “that which enables a being to have subjective awareness and intentionality towards their
environment, to perceive and respond to stimuli with some kind of agency, and to have consciousness, including thinking and feeling.” It is the
being itself—the body, the mind, the soul, the organism, the psych, consciousness, awareness, the self, the human being—all words used to describe
the same thing.
Let’s face it—there is no mind, no ego, no soul, no body, no spirit. We should rid these words of too much lofty reverence and recognize them for
what they are. They are linguistic conveniences and words that label states of appearances and ideas about the same thing; words to describe facets of
a multi-faceted stone, a particular, an entirely unique entity, the individual we call Ourselves or I.
Eliminative Materialism & Nominalism
Will ridding words such as these from philosophy, neuroscience and psychology allow us to proceed in the right direction?
Yes my OP is overly dramatic, and maybe it would be too premature to remove the mind from thought, but what I am proposing is a form of eliminative
materialism and nominalism, the fairly dangerous idea that mental states, qualia, consciousness, universals, the mind and the like don’t necessarily
exist outside their linguistic function.
Adopting this view would radicalize theory of mind, philosophy, psychology, religion and neuroscience.
Eliminative materialism entails unsettling consequences not just about our conception of the mind, but also about the nature of morality, action,
social and legal conventions, and practically every other aspect of human activity. As Jerry Fodor puts it, “if commonsense psychology were to
collapse, that would be, beyond comparison, the greatest intellectual catastrophe in the history of our species …” (1987, p. xii). Thus,
eliminative materialism has stimulated various projects partly designed to vindicate ordinary mental states and establish their respectability in a
sophisticated account of the mind. For example, several projects pursued by philosophers in recent years have attempted to provide a reductive account
of the semantic content of propositional attitudes that is entirely naturalistic (i.e., an account that only appeals to straightforward
causal-physical relations and properties). Much of the impetus for these projects stems in part from the recognition that eliminative materialism
cannot be as easily dismissed as earlier writers, like C. D. Broad, had originally assumed.
Should we consider it?