Objectives: To collect and analyze data from deaths and injuries, and from evaluation of the responses by medical services and by ﬁre, rescue, and police services 1 year after the terror attack on World Trade Center.
Methodology: Epidemiologic data were collected from all involved agencies and analyzed. The authors personal experience from working at the scene during the event and several other personal testimonies were also included in this analysis.
Results: Totally 2,762 death certiﬁcates were issued by the state of New York for victims of the terror attack. 1,361 (49.9%) of these were issued for victims whose remains could not be identiﬁed. All but nine of these victims died at the day of the attack. 77% of the victims were male, medium age 39 years. Of the dead were 342 ﬁre ﬁghters and paramedics and 60 police ofﬁcers. A total of 1,103 patients were treated during the ﬁrst 48 days in ﬁve key hospitals receiving the majority of the injured. 29% of these were rescue workers. 66% of the injured were male, average age 39 years. The most common injuries were respiratory impairment (49%) and ocular affection (26%), many severe. The most common trauma was lacerations (14%) and sprains (14%). Of those administered to hospital, 19% had trauma and 19% burns. Head injuries were registered in 6% and crush injuries in 4%. With regard to response from involved agencies, communication failure was the most common and difﬁculties in command operations and scene control were also prevalent.
Conclusions: The difﬁculties encountered were very similar to those commonly seen in major accidents or disasters, although on a great scale. Response plans have to be critically reviewed based on the experiences from this and other events, in order to preempt difﬁculties such as those described here in future responses to major urban accidents and disasters.
The initial rescue response began almost immediately after the ﬁrst aircraft impacted the North tower. The ﬁrst alarm for ﬁre units in lower Manhattan was quickly elevated to a third alarm by the ﬁrst arriving battalion chief Joe Pfeifer. Each ‘‘alarm’’ would typically dispatch three engine and two ladder companies, which included approximately 25-30 ﬁreﬁghters aboard ﬁve trucks. Eventually a full ﬁve alarm (the highest level of response) would be activated. This would ofﬁcially direct at least 25 trucks with 125-150 ﬁre- ﬁghters to respond directly to the scene . When the scope of the disaster became apparent with the second aircraft crash, the ﬁre dispatch center-initiated what was once referred to as a ‘‘borough call’’, the highest level of disaster response possible within the city. With the aid of the Starﬁre vehicle tracking computer system, all available units in Manhattan, a total of 121 engine companies, 62 ladder companies, 4 rescue squads and various other specialty companies were sent to the scene – a force equivalent to 22 alarms . This massive response, almost half of the entire Fire Department of New York, was made without the usual authorization from a high-level FDNY ofﬁcer. Dispatcher John Lightsey lamented, ‘‘Here in Manhattan we dispatched everyone, every company, from 125th street on down… [concerning the lack of authorization] We didn’t follow the rules; we went above the rules’’ . By 9:00 am, 15 min after the ﬁrst impact, Commissioner Van Essen estimated that 200 ﬁreﬁghters were already in the tower lobbies .
Originally posted by RockLobster
reply to post by lunarasparagus
"The initial rescue response began almost immediately after the ﬁrst aircraft impacted the North tower"
videos of this on youtube , OSers cant see how weird it is for FEMA to be there the night before the attacks with dumper trucks and set up a HQ , C.D.I involved in the clean-up operation , the steel was shipped out of America A.S.A.P.
How blatant do they need to be ?
I think all aspects of 911 need to be thoroughly questioned....for the whole picture to make any sense.