reply to post by ZIVONIC
Agree with the first response. Too many intangiables. For example, if the US would have not had their thermals and night sites, then likely they wait
until clear weather (much of the 91 offensive was fought in fog/bad weather) But for fun........ The Iraqis would have faired better in so far as
scoring more kills on the Americans., but the training in combined arms operations the US has would be the defining factor. In fact 3 things would
factor the most.
1 Battalion sized simulators. Most US armored bases have upwards of a battalion of M-1/M-2 simulators that are interlinked. A battalion at Fort
Hood, can "Fight" a battalion stationed at Grafenwher Germany. It's online gaming to the extreme. They experience battalion and brigade sized
coordination of movement and engagement routinely with "major" sim exercises normally held 2-3 times a year for each unit. This isn't including
officer command post and map type exercises, or the entire unit going to the field for extended training, or gunnery (which itself is usually monthly
if not more often). No other army spends the time or money doing such exercises at the higher unit levels. It's one thing to get a platoon or
company out in the field, it's another to move battalion upwards of divisions, in fact studies of gulf war I indicate the Iraqi's, when they did try
to maneuver, had extreme difficulties at or above the brigade level. Primarily because they just never practiced it..
2. NTC, the national training center. The NTC would take a while to explain. This is the "top gun" of armored warfare, with an entire regiment
"playing" a roughly russian style armored regiment in the field. .VISMODs make up the enemy force (and in some cases actual russian equipment) and
they use Russian tactics. A Russian general that once visited the base said the 11th US Cav was probably best russian regiment in the world. The
"Russians' routinely beat the US units in their M-1s. Primarily due to experience. Rather then explain the whole concept I will refer you to this
link, which has several others.
The US has a similar center JRTC at Fort Polk (mostly light infantry) and another at Grafenwher Germany.
3. AirLandBattle 2000, the primary doctrine for US armored warfare since 1980. While much of it is classified, unclassified breakdowns of this
doctrine and it's tactics are an essential part of US successes. While technically replaced by the new "full spectrum" doctrine. For armored
warfare the basic tactics are still rooted in AirLandBattle.
Other factors abound as well. Western soldiers typically are well trained in basic maintence of their vehicals. This isn't the case in all armies,
especially arab armies. Logistics and supply is of HUGE emphasis in the US Army, both of these are not highly valued in many armies (even some
western armies struggle with this).
Finally I will refer you and any interested parties to this document. It's very interesting. Essentially it is a breakdown of a several day
discussion between two German generals who fought the Russians on the Eastern Front and their modern NATO counterparts in the early 80's. It goes
into the differences in the western soldier and the russian soldier. The document discusses how the differences would effect the battle, and they even
discussed how a fight between NATO/Warsaw Pact in the 80's would go down. Interesting stuff.
So, US soldiers in the T-72s and Iraqi's in export M-1s, US still wins but suffers potentially higher casualties. They would likely get in on the
flanks during the day and use the weaker side armor as an advantage.