There is (gentle Reader) nothing (the word of God onely set apart) which so much beautifieth and adorneth the soule and minde of mã, as doth the knowledge of good artes and sciences: as the knowledge of naturall and morall Philosophie. The one setteth before our eyes, the creatures of God, both in the heauens aboue, and in the earth beneath: in which as in a glasse, we beholde the exceding maiestie and wisedome of God, in adorning and beautifying them as we see: in geuing vnto them such wonderfull and manifolde proprieties, and naturall workinges, and that so diuersly and in such varietie: farther in maintaining and conseruing them continually, whereby to praise and adore him, as by S. Paule we are taught. The other teacheth vs rules and preceptes of vertue, how, in common life amongest men, we ought to walke vprightly: what dueties pertaine to our selues, what pertaine to the gouernment or good order both of an housholde, and also of a citie or common wealth. The reading likewise of histories, conduceth not a litle, to the adorning of the soule & minde of man, a studie of all men cõmended: by it are seene and knowen the artes and doinges of infinite wise men gone before vs. In histories are contained infinite examples of heroicall vertues to be of vs followed, and horrible examples of vices to be of vs eschewed. Many other artes also there are which beautifie the minde of man: but of all other none do more garnishe & beautifie it, then those artes which are called Mathematicall. Unto the knowledge of which no man can attaine, without the perfecte knowledge and instruction of the principles, groundes, and Elementes of Geometrie. But perfectly || to be instructed in them, requireth diligent studie and reading of olde auncient authors. Amongest which, none for a beginner is to be preferred before the most auncient Philosopher Euclide of Megara.
Of Mathematicall thinges, are two principall kindes: namely, Number, and Magnitude. Number. Number, we define, to be, a certayne Mathematicall Sũme, of Vnits. Note the worde, Vnit, to expresse the Greke Monas, & not Vnitie: as we haue all, commonly, till now, vsed. And, an Vnit, is that thing Mathematicall, Indiuisible, by participation of some likenes of whose property, any thing, which is in deede, or is counted One, may resonably be called One. We account an Vnit, a thing Mathematicall, though it be no Number, and also indiuisible: because, of it, materially, Number doth consist: which, principally, is a thing Mathematicall. Magnitude. Magnitude is a thing Mathematicall, by participation of some likenes of whose nature, any thing is iudged long, broade, or thicke. “A thicke Magnitude we call a Solide, or a Body. What Magnitude so euer, is Solide or Thicke, is also broade, & long. A broade magnitude, we call a Superficies or a Plaine. Euery playne magnitude, hath also length. A long magnitude, we terme a Line. A Line is neither thicke nor broade, but onely long: Euery certayne Line, hath two endes: A point. The endes of a line, are Pointes called. A Point, is a thing Mathematicall, indiuisible, which may haue a certayne determined situation.” If a Poynt moue from a determined situation, the way wherein it moued, is also a Line: mathematically produced, whereupon, of the auncient Mathematiciens, A Line. a Line is called the race or course of a Point. A Poynt we define, by the name of a thing Mathematicall: though it be no Magnitude, and indiuisible: because it is the propre ende, and bound of a Line: which is a true Magnitude. Magnitude. And Magnitude we may define to be that thing Mathematicall, which is diuisible for euer, in partes diuisible, long, broade or thicke. Therefore though a Poynt be no Magnitude, yet Terminatiuely, we recken it a thing Mathematicall (as I sayd) by reason it is properly the end, and bound of a line. Neither Number, nor Magnitude, haue any Materialitie. First, we will consider of Number, and of the Science Mathematicall, to it appropriate, called Arithmetike: and afterward of Magnitude, and his Science, called Geometrie.
Continued in following post



with a contemporary perspective on the Renaissance. 




