Good questions...and while I'm far from the best-informed person on the planet, I'll do my best to give you good answers. Let's go in order...
i dont understand the current thinking the us navy has why does it spend billions of dollars to build something that takes 8 years to build god
forbid they lose one they have to wait another 8 years to replace it.
In a word, doctrine. In any military organization since, oh, the Roman Empire, armies, navies, and later air forces have all had general themes
(doctrines) that set out how they would engage the enemy. Doctrine is important, since it drives the design and procurement of weapons and equipment,
and drives the training of every level of the service from recruit through officer candidate. "Train like you fight, fight like you train." is
something you'll hear a lot. To bring this back to topic, the U.S. Navy is ca carrier-based force (and has been for the last 67 or so years).
Changing that will take years (or a sudden shift in the power structure, such as the loss of the Pacific battle line at Pearl Harbor). The carrier
battle group is the centerpiece of current naval doctrine, and will remain so as long as it remains the most effective way to accomplish the Navy's
strategic and tactical goals...and probably for a couple of decades past that point while a new doctrine (and the associated new hardware and
training) are developed.
i further dont understand why there isnt more defensive armament on them either. its a simple design to add more cwis and vls on the sides like the
russians did with the admiral kuznatsov.
Form follows function. There's very little on a modern warship that's there "because it looks cool". In the case of a USN aircraft carrier, the
primary purpose of the ship is to carry, support, and operate her aircraft. Anything that takes away from that purpose is bad design. It's easy to
say "just tack on a CIWS mount" or "just drop in a few VLS cells", but it's much easier to say than to do. Those defensive weapons place demands
on the ship's utility network (power, compressed air, and other support), occupy a lot of internal volume (particularly the VLS cells), and occupy
(or render dangerous) fair-sized patches of deck space. You might think that a ship as big as a CVN would have no shortage of internal volume, and
that 4+ acres of flight deck would be plenty of space, but take a quick look at photos or videos of carrier operations, and you'll find that both
hull volume and deck space are worth their weight in gold. By the time you factor in the increased weight, utility load, and volume / deck area
requirements, it's a choice between 1 CIWS mount and 1-2 aircraft...or 1 VLS pack and a dozen aircraft. Given that the CVN's primary purpose is to
operate aircraft, that trade simply isn't worth it.
i dont understand why current airwings have shrunk from the 95 aircraft i can hold to acutal 60 for the current wings strength.
Two reasons for this. One is the overall reduction in the Navy's aircraft inventory...it's considered better to operate all the carriers with
reduced air wings (allowing more deployment options, and some insurance against loss or damage) than to give up flight decks in order to fill up the
remaining ones. The other is a trade-off between the number of aircraft, and the quality of support. With fewer aircraft on board, conditions aren't
as crowded and dangerous on and below decks. More spares per airframe can be carried, and overall fuel consumption drops, allowing longer or more
active deployments for the remaining airframes. That said, the degree of the reduction bothers me more than I like to think about...
i do see the logic with reduced manpower the next gen carrier is suppose to have. but even less cwis.
theres alot that i am not aware and some more experienced views are welcome.
The reduction in manpower is an attempt to reduce operating costs more than anything else. As for the lack of intrinsic defensive weapons, remember
that a CVN doesn't go *anywhere* alone. She travels with an escort group tasked with her protection, and modern battle-management systems tie the
entire group together into a remarkably symbiotic relationship. In an all-up engagement, one ship may assume control over the weapons and sensors on
another ship that has a better engagement geometry. Essentially, the escorts protect the carrier, and the carrier provides the offensive punch for the