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...Feith insists that Saddam still had WMD programs in place and the capability to resume production. He says even Rumsfeld conceded privately that the U.S. might not find any weapons of mass destruction on the ground. And he told the president so in a memo that outlined all of the things that could possibly go wrong.
Some call it, “the CYA Memo,” but Feith says that is a mischaracterization of the list. "I mean, it was very intense and very disturbing work to anticipate all the possible problems of a war."
Feith called the document "the Parade of Horribles," and printed many of them in his book, he says, to refute the perception that Secretary Rumsfeld and President Bush launched the war without considering or understanding the possible consequences.
Kroft summarizes some of them, including the possibility that the U.S. could become so absorbed with its Iraq effort that it would pay inadequate attention to other serious problems; that war could cause more harm and entail greater costs than expected; that it would not go on for two to four years, but eight to 10 years; that terrorist networks could improve their recruiting and fundraising as a result of the U.S. being depicted as anti-Muslim; that Iraq could experience ethnic strife among Kurds, Sunnis and Shia and that the war could damage America’s relationship with allies and its reputation in the world community.
Kroft asks Feith if perhaps one or two of these “horribles,” might happen. Feith responds, "One of the things that is reflected in this memo is Secretary Rumsfeld's deeply-held view that it's foolish to try to predict the future," says Feith.
"Well, as it turned out, he was pretty good at anticipating problems” Kroft responds, “because virtually all these things have happened."
"Well, in a broad sense,” Feith concedes. “A lot of these things happened. It was a very honest effort to assess what the downsides of war would be."
When Kroft follows up with, "You still recommended that it was the right thing to do." Feith explains, "We certainly understood that these are the things that might happen. That's why we wrote them down. And I do think that, when the president assessed the risks of leaving Saddam in power, you could have come up with quite a serious, troubling list of the risks involved in leaving Saddam in power."