On January 31, 2008, when the Winograd Commission submitted its final report on the Second Lebanese War of July 2006, this was a first in Israeli
history: a report on why the Israeli military had failed in a war.
The Winograd Commission offers a quite honest appraisal of some aspects of the July 2006 War.  It acknowledges that it was "a serious missed
opportunity." Israel had "initiated a long war, which ended without its clear military victory (italics added)." The Commission notes that a
militia "of a few thousand men resisted, for a few weeks, the strongest army in the Middle East, which enjoyed full air superiority and size and
technology advantages." Nothing could reverse Israel's handicaps: not even a massive ground offensive launched in the last days of the war...
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