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"EADS also impressed potential customers by investing its own money to build and test a prototype of an innovative boom that will be used to transfer fuel between planes. Boeing, reinforcing its image as comfortable incumbent, carried out tests using an older boom design, and said it would build a next-generation boom only if it won the big U.S. contract.
Even Boeing's tanker victories in Japan and Italy have been tarnished. Japan received its first tanker in February, about a year late, and Italy's program is about two years behind schedule, with the first aircraft now expected for delivery in the next few months. Although some of the delay stems from modifications requested by the customers, Boeing has acknowledged technical problems as well. "
In evaluating Past Performance, the Air Force ignored the fact that Boeing -- with 75 years of success in producing tankers
Factor 1 -- Mission Capability
-- Boeing scored "Blue (Exceptional) and Low Risk" in this area – the highest possible rating in the most critical "factor" in this competition.
-- The Air Force assessed Boeing as meeting or exceeding all Key Performance Parameters (thresholds and objectives). Indeed, the Air Force evaluated Boeing as having significantly more strengths (discriminators) than the competitor.
Therefore, it follows that Boeing 1) received the highest rating possible, 2) met or exceeded all KPP thresholds and objectives, and 3) was graded as having significantly more strengths than the competition
Factor 2 -- Proposal Risk
-- Boeing's proposal risk was rated "Low"
-- Surprisingly, the competitor was also rated as low despite the high risk associated with its evolving multi-country, multi-facility, multi-build approach as contrasted with Boeing's integrated approach to design, build, and certification in existing facilities with experienced personnel
Therefore, it follows that Boeing 1) was low risk, 2) had an integrated and lean build approach, and 3) the competition should have been assessed greater risk for its complex and unproven multi-country build approach.
Factor 3 -- Past Performance
-- Boeing's past performance was rated "Satisfactory"
-- Northrop Grumman/Airbus was also rated satisfactory, despite having no relevant tanker experience and having never delivered a tanker with a refueling boom
-- Press reports indicate that some of the most relevant programs for Airbus (the KC-30 for Australia and the A-400M) are both significantly over cost and behind schedule.
Therefore, it follows that Boeing 1) had satisfactory past performance, and 2) relevant Airbus programs like the Australian KC-30 tanker and the A-400M are struggling.
Factor 4 -- Cost/Price
-- As determined by the RFP, "Most Probable Life Cycle Cost" (MPLCC) was the only measure of cost to be assessed
-- The Air Force described the cost visibility information Boeing provided as "unprecedented" and rated Boeing's MPLCC cost "Reasonable," "Balanced," and meeting "Realism" criteria – all the highest ratings a competitor can receive
-- As recognized by the Air Force itself in 2002, the significantly bigger A-330 would demand a greater infrastructure investment with dramatically lower operational effectiveness
Therefore, it follows that 1) Boeing's MPLCC was judged by the Air Force to be realistic, 2) Boeing's submitted MPLCC were significantly lower than the Air Force adjusted MPLCC costs and, 3) the Air Force adjustments to Boeing MPLCC costs effectively deprived Boeing of the benefits associated with its integrated in-line production approach.
Boeing has decided to put the US Air Force on trial for the surprise decision to opt for an Airbus aircraft for a $12.1 billion tanker deal, legally challenging the KC-X contract award to the rival Northrop Grumman/EADS North America team.
The airframer's formal protest filed on 11 March argues the USAF's decision should be overturned mainly because of two reasons: a series of improper changes made to a key evaluation formula and a judging system that unfairly discounted the relevance of Boeing's past performance on commercial aircraft.
The first complaint alleges that the USAF inserted last-minute changes into a highly detailed formula used to evaluate mission performance for both teams, but failed to notify the two bidders.
Boeing believes this action put its bid at a disadvantage. A separate Northrop business unit helped the USAF develop the evaluation formula, which was likely to allow Northrop's tanker team to spot - and respond - to the changes much sooner, says Mark McGraw, Boeing's KC-767 programme manager.
A spokeswoman for Australia's Department of Defense, however, points out that the early 2009 date is actually several months behind the original schedule. She also notes that the tanker modifications to the KC-30B airframe are "extensive" and even the delayed delivery in early 2009 carries risk.
An EADS spokesman counters, however, that Airbus was not at fault for the delays, which was "requested by the customer because of some changes they implemented".
While not mentioned by Mark McGraw, Boeing complains in its protest that the US Air Force “altogether failed to comprehend the inherent manufacturing genius of the 767 bid.” (see last paragraph on page 3). This may provide some insight into Boeing’s mindset regarding the tanker competition, and partially explain why the company was so upset to lose the contract.
inherent manufacturing genius
Two “major combat operations” scenarios were tweaked to add additional ramp space in the Cmarps model that doesn’t actually exist. This allowed for the KC-30 to gain enough access at a “priority base,” according to Boeing officials, that it otherwise would have been too large to achieve. Limited ramp space can make operations with larger aircraft more difficult, because of tight parking and ground maneuver space. Though company and Air Force officials didn’t identify that location -- the operational scenarios are actually classified -- it could be Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar. According to an earlier Air Force analysis of various tanker models, only four A330-based tankers can operate from that base assuming 30 ft. of space between rows of parked aircraft and interior taxi ways as well as a standard 50 ft. wingtip-to-wingtip distance between for aircraft parking.
www.aviationweek.com.../KCX031908.xml&headline=USAF%20On%20The%20KC-X%20Defensive%20A%20Year% 20Ago
from the same source.
Space between parked aircraft, however, was another change made by the Air Force during the competition, Boeing says. The service cut the space between parked tankers in half, to 25 ft.,
The Combined Mating and Ranging Planning System (Cmarps) was designed for the Strategic Air Command in the 1980s and is now used by planners in Air Mobility Command
If true, part of the Airbus win included modified base structures that do not exist.