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Saddam's Foreign Minister was an Informant

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posted on Mar, 20 2006 @ 08:04 PM
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During the lead up to the invasion of Iraq administistration officals such as George Tenet and Donald Rumsfeld touted a source inside Saddam Hussien's inner circle. It has turned out to be Naji Sabri, Iraq's foreign minister, who is now teaching somewhere safe. Turns out that his information turned out to be more accurate than the CIA's own assessment.
 



www.msnbc.msn.com
y Aram Roston, Lisa Myers
& the NBC Investigative Unit
Updated: 7:36 p.m. ET March 20, 2006

In the period before the Iraq war, the CIA and the Bush administration erroneously believed that Saddam Hussein was hiding major programs for weapons of mass destruction. Now NBC News has learned that for a short time the CIA had contact with a secret source at the highest levels within Saddam Hussein’s government, who gave them information far more accurate than what they believed. It is a spy story that has never been told before, and raises new questions about prewar intelligence.

The sources say Sabri’s answers were much more accurate than his proclamations to the United Nations, where he demonized the U.S. and defended Saddam. At the same time, they also were closer to reality than the CIA's estimates, as spelled out in its October 2002 intelligence estimate.

For example, consider biological weapons, a key concern before the war. The CIA said Saddam had an "active" program for "R&D, production and weaponization" for biological agents such as anthrax. Intelligence sources say Sabri indicated Saddam had no significant, active biological weapons program. Sabri was right. After the war, it became clear that there was no program.

Please visit the link provided for the complete story.


What fasinates me about all this is how, at least according to this article, the CIA and the administration was touting this informant, and at the same time wasn't listening to him at all. They apparently had all the selling points that they wanted and didn't want any contridictions. At the same time they weren't adverse to claiming the informant, they weren't bothering to listen to, as the source of their information.

I have tried to find other links online to this but it is quite new so all I could find was what was posted on msnbc. I am sure more will surface with time.

Related News Links:
www.msnbc.msn.com



[edit on 23-3-2006 by asala]

(Mod edit: Please quote sparingly from external sources.)

See: Posting work written by others. **ALL MEMBERS READ**

[edit on 3/24/2006 by Majic]




posted on Mar, 24 2006 @ 01:43 AM
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Nice post grover, odd that it hasn't been reported on more. If memory serves me correctly, he was paid 100 grand. They pay him and then don't listen.
Maybe the information was looked at and it just didn't fit the preplanned agenda.

Whats really odd is how quiet this post has been!
By the way, can we get a refund now? The info was never used, still in the package.



posted on Mar, 24 2006 @ 03:59 AM
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Originally posted by grover

What fasinates me about all this is how, at least according to this article, the CIA and the administration was touting this informant, and at the same time wasn't listening to him at all. They apparently had all the selling points that they wanted and didn't want any contridictions. At the same time they weren't adverse to claiming the informant, they weren't bothering to listen to, as the source of their information.


[edit on 23-3-2006 by asala]


The thing is, someone in the CIA no doubt was listening to him, its just that his superiors weren't listening to him. I know it's been said a dozen times, but the reason this got no play, while other informants of much less apparent credibility such as "curveball" and the INC defectors did, was because those people were telling the CIA (and the Office of Special Plans) what the administration wanted to hear. Sure, they'll tout his existence, because it helps bolster credibility- but why bother revealing what he's actually claiming?

More and more CIA agents are coming out of the woodwork to tell us that they were ignored despite presenting a balanced view of the facts and unknowns to the administration. Even when reading those reports that originated with or deal with CIA intelligence relating to Iraq, it becomes apparent that the CIA had a fairly good grasp of what was known and what was probably not reliable. (I think there's supposed to be a particularly good article by a senior CIA official in this quarters Foreign Affairs describing, like so many others, the cherry-picking that occured, although I have yet to read it.)

There was no intelligence failure. What we had was a failure of leadership to present the intelligence product fairly before the Congress and the public.

[edit on 24-3-2006 by koji_K]



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