From Nothing to Nothing

a reply to: Noinden

This reminds me of compartmentalization you get the education label so you can get the job and then throw nearly all that out for the task you are assigned, and depending on the task involved or field if it is one of real personal interest you either toil as a cog not expanding the field you are educated in with more study and education or you do because it is something that you'd do for free because you are so passionate about it... but wink wink no one has to know that or else salary freeze or low starting salary.

Many scientists, engineers, physicists, philosophers etc fall in both of those categories so that expensive piece of paper can mean jack all squat to the field itself as such a cog specialized... then there's some of us bastards and bastardets that have had a passion for many fields for decades upon decades that are the so called uneducated assholes people hate to even have a conversation about one of those areas of rabid consumption.

originally posted by: chr0naut

originally posted by: TzarChasm

originally posted by: chr0naut

originally posted by: TzarChasm
a reply to: chr0naut

I believe it was pointed out earlier that the ontological argument is essentially a case made for why it must be assumed that X is true. Why are we defending the employment of assumptions in scientific inquiry that double as both hypothesis and conclusion? There seems to be a few steps missing. For instance the theory only addresses the existence of X and only so far as to explain why it's okay to put the conclusion before the evidence, because that's totally how the scientific method works. This mathematical proof does nothing to address exactly what such a being is or where they come from or what they can do or how they feel about us specifically. It's conjecture and speculation all the way down.

The OP was a fairly philosophical piece. A reasoned response is valid in that case.

We cannot apply scientific method to ANY absolute knowledge. This is because we cannot raise a valid antithesis against which to test theory. This is a fundamental and accepted limitation on science, explored fully by the philosopher Carl Popper.

Take, for example the laws of thermodynamics. There has been much affirmative and no contrary observation that throws doubt on these "scientific laws" (not my words) but no number of confirming observations can verify a universal generalization. A case could still exist that there is an unobserved exception and one single exception is enough to "break the rule". According to Popper's rationale, the laws of thermodynamics are pseudoscience (shock, horror!).

Once that is realised, it becomes clear that the entire edifice of science, which is built up upon such fundamentals, is, as you said of the ontological argument, "conjecture all the way down".

Differentiation between 'scientific conjecture' or 'philosophical conjecture' or 'mathematical conjecture' is irrelevant. They all have equal weight in human knowledge. You cannot say that a philosophical or mathematical conjecture is immaterial because it does not fit a 'scientific' view. They are of equal 'weight'.

It is true that the ontological argument does not say many things. It is very specific in what it says. It says that a single being such as God neccesarily exists in all possible worlds (no exceptions) and has has only positive value attributes and no negative value attributes. This, of course, rules out atheism and polytheism (in each world) as being valid alternatives.

Suggesting that we abandon the conclusions of the argument because it is limited is an unreasonable denial of what it does say.

So science can't make Universal generalizations about the laws of thermodynamics but you can make Universal generalizations about a cosmic entity? Just a detail I noticed. Additionally the ontological argument fails to satisfactorily Define positive and negative attributes. Are these attributes also Universal generalizations? I will admit the rhetoric is cute but again the ontological argument furnishes its own rebuttal, which I have already posted for you. I can post it again if you like. Not to mention that the ontological argument still does not address where X comes from or how X happens or how X feels about our little blue pearl. Or even if X feels or thinks or does anything at all except be. At that point X is pretty much useless as a hypothetical. Until you invent another thought exercise to convince yourself that you don't really need any substantial data to confirm the properties and dimensions of X.

Gödel's ontological argument includes reference and definitions of "God-like properties" and "positive properties" and "non-positive properties". They are intrinsic and neccesary to the argument.

In the refutation on RationalWiki, where were those properties denoted? The "most perfect island" and "unicorns" clearly do not have "God-like properties" and so that bit is conveniently left out. Please, feel free to review the RationalWiki page to verify this.

The conclusion is that they have refuted something other than Gödel's ontological argument in the hope that no-one would wise up to the "bait and switch", and it seems that they have had some success.

The ongoing work on Gödel's ontological argument by those interested in its modal logic might indicate that a refutation is far from acceptance.

The argument doesn't explain why these attributes are labeled as Godly or not godly or even what Godly means or how they figured out that's what Godly means. It simply says this is what we are assuming and if we are assuming this then we may also (un)reasonably assume these other things. It might be more productive to focus Less on what the ongoing work "might indicate", and more about what the results definitively demonstrate. That's how the scientific method works. Then again if you had such definitive results, you wouldn't need the ontological argument.

Another objection to the argument is also quite simple: one could change the possibility premise, and flip the argument on its head: 

- A being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in W; and 
- A being has maximal greatness if it has maximal excellence in every possible world. 
- It is possible that there isn’t a being that has maximal greatness. (Premise) 
- Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good being does not exist. 
- Therefore, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being does not exist. (axiom S5) 
- Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being does not exist.

There's an indication for you. Just an indication but no less compelling than your rhetoric.

a reply to: chr0naut

Here's a link to a .pdf that contains two scanned pages from Gödel's notes

Seen that. Mentioned it in my previous post.

The 'quote' you included was from Oskar Morganstern's diary and actually said about Gödel that he delayed publishing because he feared people would believe "that he actually believes in God, whereas he is only engaged in a logical investigation (that is, in showing that such a proof with classical assumptions (completeness, etc.) correspondingly axiomatized, is possible)."

That is not the statement I quoted. What next? Losses in translation?

Anyway, the question I asked has been answered, so thank you. You have bolstered a superstitious faith in an invisible, self-contradicting and unnecessary entity with a superstitious faith in the operations of logic.

We’re done here, I think.

originally posted by: TzarChasm

originally posted by: chr0naut

originally posted by: TzarChasm

originally posted by: chr0naut

originally posted by: TzarChasm
a reply to: chr0naut

I believe it was pointed out earlier that the ontological argument is essentially a case made for why it must be assumed that X is true. Why are we defending the employment of assumptions in scientific inquiry that double as both hypothesis and conclusion? There seems to be a few steps missing. For instance the theory only addresses the existence of X and only so far as to explain why it's okay to put the conclusion before the evidence, because that's totally how the scientific method works. This mathematical proof does nothing to address exactly what such a being is or where they come from or what they can do or how they feel about us specifically. It's conjecture and speculation all the way down.

The OP was a fairly philosophical piece. A reasoned response is valid in that case.

We cannot apply scientific method to ANY absolute knowledge. This is because we cannot raise a valid antithesis against which to test theory. This is a fundamental and accepted limitation on science, explored fully by the philosopher Carl Popper.

Take, for example the laws of thermodynamics. There has been much affirmative and no contrary observation that throws doubt on these "scientific laws" (not my words) but no number of confirming observations can verify a universal generalization. A case could still exist that there is an unobserved exception and one single exception is enough to "break the rule". According to Popper's rationale, the laws of thermodynamics are pseudoscience (shock, horror!).

Once that is realised, it becomes clear that the entire edifice of science, which is built up upon such fundamentals, is, as you said of the ontological argument, "conjecture all the way down".

Differentiation between 'scientific conjecture' or 'philosophical conjecture' or 'mathematical conjecture' is irrelevant. They all have equal weight in human knowledge. You cannot say that a philosophical or mathematical conjecture is immaterial because it does not fit a 'scientific' view. They are of equal 'weight'.

It is true that the ontological argument does not say many things. It is very specific in what it says. It says that a single being such as God neccesarily exists in all possible worlds (no exceptions) and has has only positive value attributes and no negative value attributes. This, of course, rules out atheism and polytheism (in each world) as being valid alternatives.

Suggesting that we abandon the conclusions of the argument because it is limited is an unreasonable denial of what it does say.

So science can't make Universal generalizations about the laws of thermodynamics but you can make Universal generalizations about a cosmic entity? Just a detail I noticed. Additionally the ontological argument fails to satisfactorily Define positive and negative attributes. Are these attributes also Universal generalizations? I will admit the rhetoric is cute but again the ontological argument furnishes its own rebuttal, which I have already posted for you. I can post it again if you like. Not to mention that the ontological argument still does not address where X comes from or how X happens or how X feels about our little blue pearl. Or even if X feels or thinks or does anything at all except be. At that point X is pretty much useless as a hypothetical. Until you invent another thought exercise to convince yourself that you don't really need any substantial data to confirm the properties and dimensions of X.

Gödel's ontological argument includes reference and definitions of "God-like properties" and "positive properties" and "non-positive properties". They are intrinsic and neccesary to the argument.

In the refutation on RationalWiki, where were those properties denoted? The "most perfect island" and "unicorns" clearly do not have "God-like properties" and so that bit is conveniently left out. Please, feel free to review the RationalWiki page to verify this.

The conclusion is that they have refuted something other than Gödel's ontological argument in the hope that no-one would wise up to the "bait and switch", and it seems that they have had some success.

The ongoing work on Gödel's ontological argument by those interested in its modal logic might indicate that a refutation is far from acceptance.

The argument doesn't explain why these attributes are labeled as Godly or not godly or even what Godly means or how they figured out that's what Godly means. It simply says this is what we are assuming and if we are assuming this then we may also (un)reasonably assume these other things. It might be more productive to focus Less on what the ongoing work "might indicate", and more about what the results definitively demonstrate. That's how the scientific method works. Then again if you had such definitive results, you wouldn't need the ontological argument.

Gödel's ontological argument actually does define what it means by "God-like properties", so what you said was untrue. It is just that the definition is limited to some specific modal logic. Like all symbolic representation (including all languages) fuzziness of definition could always be proposed. However, if there is some agreed understanding of what those terms might mean, they are semantically useful.

How would Gödel's ontological argument be invalidated by definitive proof of God's existence?

Another objection to the argument is also quite simple: one could change the possibility premise, and flip the argument on its head: 
- A being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in W; and 
- A being has maximal greatness if it has maximal excellence in every possible world. 
- It is possible that there isn’t a being that has maximal greatness. (Premise) 
- Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good being does not exist. 
- Therefore, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being does not exist. (axiom S5) 
- Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being does not exist.

There's an indication for you. Just an indication but no less compelling than your rhetoric.

OK, but that is applied to Anslem's ontological argument, not Gödel's.

originally posted by: chr0naut

originally posted by: TzarChasm

originally posted by: chr0naut

originally posted by: TzarChasm

originally posted by: chr0naut

originally posted by: TzarChasm
a reply to: chr0naut

I believe it was pointed out earlier that the ontological argument is essentially a case made for why it must be assumed that X is true. Why are we defending the employment of assumptions in scientific inquiry that double as both hypothesis and conclusion? There seems to be a few steps missing. For instance the theory only addresses the existence of X and only so far as to explain why it's okay to put the conclusion before the evidence, because that's totally how the scientific method works. This mathematical proof does nothing to address exactly what such a being is or where they come from or what they can do or how they feel about us specifically. It's conjecture and speculation all the way down.

The OP was a fairly philosophical piece. A reasoned response is valid in that case.

We cannot apply scientific method to ANY absolute knowledge. This is because we cannot raise a valid antithesis against which to test theory. This is a fundamental and accepted limitation on science, explored fully by the philosopher Carl Popper.

Take, for example the laws of thermodynamics. There has been much affirmative and no contrary observation that throws doubt on these "scientific laws" (not my words) but no number of confirming observations can verify a universal generalization. A case could still exist that there is an unobserved exception and one single exception is enough to "break the rule". According to Popper's rationale, the laws of thermodynamics are pseudoscience (shock, horror!).

Once that is realised, it becomes clear that the entire edifice of science, which is built up upon such fundamentals, is, as you said of the ontological argument, "conjecture all the way down".

Differentiation between 'scientific conjecture' or 'philosophical conjecture' or 'mathematical conjecture' is irrelevant. They all have equal weight in human knowledge. You cannot say that a philosophical or mathematical conjecture is immaterial because it does not fit a 'scientific' view. They are of equal 'weight'.

It is true that the ontological argument does not say many things. It is very specific in what it says. It says that a single being such as God neccesarily exists in all possible worlds (no exceptions) and has has only positive value attributes and no negative value attributes. This, of course, rules out atheism and polytheism (in each world) as being valid alternatives.

Suggesting that we abandon the conclusions of the argument because it is limited is an unreasonable denial of what it does say.

So science can't make Universal generalizations about the laws of thermodynamics but you can make Universal generalizations about a cosmic entity? Just a detail I noticed. Additionally the ontological argument fails to satisfactorily Define positive and negative attributes. Are these attributes also Universal generalizations? I will admit the rhetoric is cute but again the ontological argument furnishes its own rebuttal, which I have already posted for you. I can post it again if you like. Not to mention that the ontological argument still does not address where X comes from or how X happens or how X feels about our little blue pearl. Or even if X feels or thinks or does anything at all except be. At that point X is pretty much useless as a hypothetical. Until you invent another thought exercise to convince yourself that you don't really need any substantial data to confirm the properties and dimensions of X.

Gödel's ontological argument includes reference and definitions of "God-like properties" and "positive properties" and "non-positive properties". They are intrinsic and neccesary to the argument.

In the refutation on RationalWiki, where were those properties denoted? The "most perfect island" and "unicorns" clearly do not have "God-like properties" and so that bit is conveniently left out. Please, feel free to review the RationalWiki page to verify this.

The conclusion is that they have refuted something other than Gödel's ontological argument in the hope that no-one would wise up to the "bait and switch", and it seems that they have had some success.

The ongoing work on Gödel's ontological argument by those interested in its modal logic might indicate that a refutation is far from acceptance.

The argument doesn't explain why these attributes are labeled as Godly or not godly or even what Godly means or how they figured out that's what Godly means. It simply says this is what we are assuming and if we are assuming this then we may also (un)reasonably assume these other things. It might be more productive to focus Less on what the ongoing work "might indicate", and more about what the results definitively demonstrate. That's how the scientific method works. Then again if you had such definitive results, you wouldn't need the ontological argument.

Gödel's ontological argument actually does define what it means by "God-like properties", so what you said was untrue. It is just that the definition is limited to some specific modal logic. Like all symbolic representation (including all languages) fuzziness of definition could always be proposed. However, if there is some agreed understanding of what those terms might mean, they are semantically useful.

How would Gödel's ontological argument be invalidated by definitive proof of God's existence?

Another objection to the argument is also quite simple: one could change the possibility premise, and flip the argument on its head: 
- A being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in W; and 
- A being has maximal greatness if it has maximal excellence in every possible world. 
- It is possible that there isn’t a being that has maximal greatness. (Premise) 
- Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good being does not exist. 
- Therefore, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being does not exist. (axiom S5) 
- Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being does not exist.

There's an indication for you. Just an indication but no less compelling than your rhetoric.

OK, but that is applied to Anslem's ontological argument, not Gödel's.

Sorry but no the properties attribute values whatever of being Godlike were not defined . Negative and positive are not very good adjectives for properties and attributes . Those are adjectives you use when you don't want to pigeonhole yourself into committing to an actual property or attribute but don't want to admit it . My point is that the ontological argument is in lieu of actual substantial definitive evidence. It is a way of using words to replace the proverbial Smoking Gun. Obviously I'm not going to convince you, but that's okay with me. I couldn't prove gravity to you if you didn't want to believe it.

originally posted by: chr0naut
Once that is realised, it becomes clear that the entire edifice of science, which is built up upon such fundamentals, is, as you said of the ontological argument, "conjecture all the way down".

Differentiation between 'scientific conjecture' or 'philosophical conjecture' or 'mathematical conjecture' is irrelevant. They all have equal weight in human knowledge. You cannot say that a philosophical or mathematical conjecture is immaterial because it does not fit a 'scientific' view. They are of equal 'weight'.

Complete load of nonsense. They most definitely do not hold equal weight when talking about the existence of something and science is most definitely not conjecture all the way down. Evidence talks. Speculation walks. Philosophy, sound math and logical reasoning are a good START to a scientific hypothesis, but after that you need evidence if you wish to continue to prove anything. Philosophy, math and science all work together to prove things empirically, they aren't 3 equal parts of knowledge that prove things separately. You need the evidence, you need the tests, you need working math, and you need logic to connect them together.

The ontological argument is terrible, every version of it. It doesn't prove anything, it speculates about things we have no idea about and assumes properties that can't be rectified in any way shape or form. You could only say that they prove anything, IF their definitions and assumptions are true, but of course that is a HUGE IF.

a reply to: Barcs

Well, in gauging personal experience objectively how many senses as instruments did the phenomina occur in? Each one has it's own sphere of consciousness to be recieved in or area within the brain... each of these sphere's can be an instrument to collect data... of course if the database in the memory is faulty as in being subject to belief in unreality even as a possibility anything experienced in one of those spheres of consciousness can assume that thats what it is or was against the information found in the memory or whatever best can be extrapolated from it... of course then it is simply an assumption and ceases to be a phonomina in and of itself.

Those assumptions then get a label as UFO, Alien, Ghost, Psychic phenomina etc. which become a dogmatic term to the experience to describe the phenomina of course the senses can be fooled, so a good question is in how many senses did this phenomina occur? Not only seeing it, could you feel it, taste or smell it, hear it? For a full comprehenisve experience to be taken as reality as per existing in the frame of reference that you are or it is, then all 5 of those must also be present in awareness to be considered existant in the frame of reference or reality that co-incides or exists the same as oneself.

This is how I stay objective in awareness of what is continually occuring in separating mental fabrications from reality, in order to stay grounded in it if it only occurs in one sense sphere phenomina no need to subject oneself to it as a reality or believe in it's existence as that can lead to illusions and delusions of the mind which carry onself even farther from any reality than one was previously aware of as existant.

Seeing, hearing, touching, smelling tasting and touching all must coellese together to be concidered as reality occuring if it is just a feeling then it is just a feeling same way with the rest of the senses, separate they should be taken as unreal a phantasm a bubble in a stream a temporary occurance and nothing to get excited about, if they occur in all 5 senses at the same time? Real and tangible or reality itself... ideas are not reality until put into practice, the same with any ideology one carries... carry the label or ideology is that how you carry and present yourself at all times? Or simply when the situation occurs or calls for it? If it arises and passes and is not 24/7 365 and only arises when the situation calls for it? That is not a self that is a projected self that fits the moment and what could be called fake, a guise, a public persona...

Living with authenticity has real purpose a real being instead of all the fantasy and fiction that we try to place on top of reality that is not actual reality.

a reply to: BigBrotherDarkness

Or perchance things have become complex enough that you have to be educated in the discipline to understand it. Surely you don't want someone with no medical expertise poking around your innards? Same goes with science. You need to understand what you are looking at.

a reply to: Noinden

I suppose thats why surgeons have been known to leave all sorts of things in the body... yeah shiney metal thats not clamps and forcepts thats the glottus.

Wait what were you saying again?

a reply to: BigBrotherDarkness

Or when people with no training try to do what surgeons do, they kill them 99% of the time....

What I am saying is you have a better chance of someone with training doing the job correctly, than a person with no training or the WRONG training doing it correctly.

Thus to go back to what started this sub thread:

If one is going to try and make discoveries in the realms of the sciences, one needs to be appropriately trained. It is very hard to self train these days, due to the density of information which is contained. Hence I as a chemist and biochemist. Can stomp around those areas, with a very high probability of getting the science, and contributing to it. Indeed I'm paid to do so each day. If I went to astrophysics, while I "know scientific method" I don't actually know enough of the area to speak to it. This is why when someone works outside their discipline, they tend to have co-authors to help them.

So I refute chronaughts comments.

Is it elitist? Who cares, its also the truth

originally posted by: Barcs

originally posted by: chr0naut
Once that is realised, it becomes clear that the entire edifice of science, which is built up upon such fundamentals, is, as you said of the ontological argument, "conjecture all the way down".

Differentiation between 'scientific conjecture' or 'philosophical conjecture' or 'mathematical conjecture' is irrelevant. They all have equal weight in human knowledge. You cannot say that a philosophical or mathematical conjecture is immaterial because it does not fit a 'scientific' view. They are of equal 'weight'.

Complete load of nonsense. They most definitely do not hold equal weight when talking about the existence of something and science is most definitely not conjecture all the way down. Evidence talks. Speculation walks. Philosophy, sound math and logical reasoning are a good START to a scientific hypothesis, but after that you need evidence if you wish to continue to prove anything. Philosophy, math and science all work together to prove things empirically, they aren't 3 equal parts of knowledge that prove things separately. You need the evidence, you need the tests, you need working math, and you need logic to connect them together.

The ontological argument is terrible, every version of it. It doesn't prove anything, it speculates about things we have no idea about and assumes properties that can't be rectified in any way shape or form. You could only say that they prove anything, IF their definitions and assumptions are true, but of course that is a HUGE IF.

If it is based only upon observation and hypothesis and is never really tested (except for repetition of process, producing the same results), how is that different from Aristotle's "science"?

a reply to: Noinden

From nothing to nothing someone became something... Quite the leap.

originally posted by: chr0naut

originally posted by: Barcs

originally posted by: chr0naut
Once that is realised, it becomes clear that the entire edifice of science, which is built up upon such fundamentals, is, as you said of the ontological argument, "conjecture all the way down".

Differentiation between 'scientific conjecture' or 'philosophical conjecture' or 'mathematical conjecture' is irrelevant. They all have equal weight in human knowledge. You cannot say that a philosophical or mathematical conjecture is immaterial because it does not fit a 'scientific' view. They are of equal 'weight'.

Complete load of nonsense. They most definitely do not hold equal weight when talking about the existence of something and science is most definitely not conjecture all the way down. Evidence talks. Speculation walks. Philosophy, sound math and logical reasoning are a good START to a scientific hypothesis, but after that you need evidence if you wish to continue to prove anything. Philosophy, math and science all work together to prove things empirically, they aren't 3 equal parts of knowledge that prove things separately. You need the evidence, you need the tests, you need working math, and you need logic to connect them together.

The ontological argument is terrible, every version of it. It doesn't prove anything, it speculates about things we have no idea about and assumes properties that can't be rectified in any way shape or form. You could only say that they prove anything, IF their definitions and assumptions are true, but of course that is a HUGE IF.

If it is based only upon observation and hypothesis and is never really tested (except for repetition of process, producing the same results), how is that different from Aristotle's "science"?

in what manner do you mean?

a reply to: BigBrotherDarkness

Please show where this is a statement in science Or is that just a statement from you in general?

a reply to: Noinden

Guess you didn't read Chr0nauts post perhaps because of disagreeing?

All science started somewhere basically from early alchemy testing the environment and properties... hands on learning. You're basically saying no one in the masses without an education should be interfering with the fields without holding a degree in them using surgeons as an excuse... lets not forget people were doing brain surgery thousands of years ago.

originally posted by: TzarChasm

originally posted by: chr0naut

originally posted by: Barcs

originally posted by: chr0naut
Once that is realised, it becomes clear that the entire edifice of science, which is built up upon such fundamentals, is, as you said of the ontological argument, "conjecture all the way down".

Differentiation between 'scientific conjecture' or 'philosophical conjecture' or 'mathematical conjecture' is irrelevant. They all have equal weight in human knowledge. You cannot say that a philosophical or mathematical conjecture is immaterial because it does not fit a 'scientific' view. They are of equal 'weight'.

Complete load of nonsense. They most definitely do not hold equal weight when talking about the existence of something and science is most definitely not conjecture all the way down. Evidence talks. Speculation walks. Philosophy, sound math and logical reasoning are a good START to a scientific hypothesis, but after that you need evidence if you wish to continue to prove anything. Philosophy, math and science all work together to prove things empirically, they aren't 3 equal parts of knowledge that prove things separately. You need the evidence, you need the tests, you need working math, and you need logic to connect them together.

The ontological argument is terrible, every version of it. It doesn't prove anything, it speculates about things we have no idea about and assumes properties that can't be rectified in any way shape or form. You could only say that they prove anything, IF their definitions and assumptions are true, but of course that is a HUGE IF.

If it is based only upon observation and hypothesis and is never really tested (except for repetition of process, producing the same results), how is that different from Aristotle's "science"?

in what manner do you mean?

In what manner do you mean, "in what manner do you mean"?

I was talking about the assumptions upon which science is based. If the assumptions are not testable, should we abstain from calling them 'science'?

Consider this analogy: Harry Stottle who fancies himself scientifically aware, has observed that every time he switches the light switch, the light goes on (at least until something breaks). From hearsay he knows that the light globe can work without a switch, so he surmises that the radiant light is somehow intrinsic in the light globe and that the switch on the wall sends a special message to the globe to release its light, or not. No amount of manipulation of the light switch will alert Harry to the errors of his assumption. You would, no doubt, agree that Harry's assumptions are NOT scientific, so how could you would expect that the same untested (and perhaps untestable) assumptions about Thermodynamic laws or whatever, to be scientific?

Science needs more than ONLY the assumption (theory or hypothesis) and observation pairing, to determine the truth.

Science requires testability, which implies that we can raise an alternate case that fits the observations. Perhaps we cannot theorize about an alternate case because we have simply never observed the alternate, or the conditions such an alternate requires?

In the case of many basic precepts upon which science is constructed, we cannot test the assumptions. Nor can we validly use one untested assumption to 'prove' another. The testing part makes it science. It also reveals a limitation of what science is capable of showing.

originally posted by: chr0naut

originally posted by: TzarChasm

originally posted by: chr0naut

originally posted by: Barcs

originally posted by: chr0naut
Once that is realised, it becomes clear that the entire edifice of science, which is built up upon such fundamentals, is, as you said of the ontological argument, "conjecture all the way down".

Differentiation between 'scientific conjecture' or 'philosophical conjecture' or 'mathematical conjecture' is irrelevant. They all have equal weight in human knowledge. You cannot say that a philosophical or mathematical conjecture is immaterial because it does not fit a 'scientific' view. They are of equal 'weight'.

Complete load of nonsense. They most definitely do not hold equal weight when talking about the existence of something and science is most definitely not conjecture all the way down. Evidence talks. Speculation walks. Philosophy, sound math and logical reasoning are a good START to a scientific hypothesis, but after that you need evidence if you wish to continue to prove anything. Philosophy, math and science all work together to prove things empirically, they aren't 3 equal parts of knowledge that prove things separately. You need the evidence, you need the tests, you need working math, and you need logic to connect them together.

The ontological argument is terrible, every version of it. It doesn't prove anything, it speculates about things we have no idea about and assumes properties that can't be rectified in any way shape or form. You could only say that they prove anything, IF their definitions and assumptions are true, but of course that is a HUGE IF.

If it is based only upon observation and hypothesis and is never really tested (except for repetition of process, producing the same results), how is that different from Aristotle's "science"?

in what manner do you mean?

In what manner do you mean, "in what manner do you mean"?

I was talking about the assumptions upon which science is based. If the assumptions are not testable, should we abstain from calling them 'science'?

Consider this analogy: Harry Stottle who fancies himself scientifically aware, has observed that every time he switches the light switch, the light goes on (at least until something breaks). From hearsay he knows that the light globe can work without a switch, so he surmises that the radiant light is somehow intrinsic in the light globe and that the switch on the wall sends a special message to the globe to release its light, or not. No amount of manipulation of the light switch will alert Harry to the errors of his assumption. You would, no doubt, agree that Harry's assumptions are NOT scientific, so how could you would expect that the same untested (and perhaps untestable) assumptions about Thermodynamic laws or whatever, to be scientific?

Science needs more than ONLY the assumption (theory or hypothesis) and observation pairing, to determine the truth.

Science requires testability, which implies that we can raise an alternate case that fits the observations. Perhaps we cannot theorize about an alternate case because we have simply never observed the alternate, or the conditions such an alternate requires?

In the case of many basic precepts upon which science is constructed, we cannot test the assumptions. Nor can we validly use one untested assumption to 'prove' another. The testing part makes it science. It also reveals a limitation of what science is capable of showing.

What assumptions are you talking about here? And how does that vindicate your ontological assumptions?

a reply to: TzarChasm

What assumptions are you talking about here?

The assumption that seeing is believing. He thinks it’s highly dubious.

And how does that vindicate your ontological assumptions?

Because it allows him to believe without seeing.

Logic, don’t you know.

a reply to: chr0naut

Scientific methods would also state starting at the very end of a circuit board and testing each component on it until it's reading does not match... well that would mean hours of reading the outputs and changing the meter... in actual testing you flip it look for burn spots and then check the capacitors that are first to go then resistors etc... as which one is likely to fail first.

Years ago during a break from college I had a construction job and had to hand dig several holes for 3 large adult trees coming in the project manager told me the height and marked the locations me with shovel in hand squatted with a pencil to do a quick calculation to figure the circumference to measure out and dig for the root balls... he laughed and said math doesn't dig holes and it's on the way here.

a reply to: BigBrotherDarkness

You guess wrong.

Sure all science started somewhere, however, science evolves, and changes with the data. This includes how it is performed.

Thus what were people who were essentially self educated, are now people who specialize, so as to do a better job.

As for surgeons. Most of those who did the surgery WERE traiend by people who had done it, hopefully succesfully. However if you look at the US prior to the late 19th century, Doctors got very little training, and did what was called "Heroic Medicine". As in bleedings, purgatives, etc. Those things were often harmful not helpful. Then there was a revolutyion to "european medicine" where scientific method had been applied, and proper training was involved. Lo we have results that helped.

Anyone doing science needs to understand the subject matter. Its that simple