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originally posted by: haman10
you cannot possibly claim that you know about my country better than me . what are you talking about brother ?
if russia helped Iran develop the enrichment capability then why did they vote FOR Iran's sanctions at the UN
In 2002 it was discovered that Iran had a large undeclared nuclear program which included the construction of a uranium enrichment facility based on centrifuge technology and a heavy water research reactor. In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution declaring that Iran was in breach of its commitments under the safeguards agreement signed on May 15, 1975. In July 2006 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1696 (2006) which warned of measures under Article 41 Chapter VII of the UN Charter if Iran fails to comply with the Security Council and IAEA demand to halt uranium enrichment activities. In 2006-2010 the Security Council passed four rounds of sanctions (Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, 1929) in response to Iran’s non-compliance.
Resolution 1737 (2006) banned exports to Iran of any equipment or technology that can be used for uranium enrichment and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. But neither that resolution nor the subsequent ones impose any restrictions on Russia’s cooperation with Iran on the Bushehr NPP project. However, Resolution 1737 contains the requirement to notify the Security Council Committee established pursuant to the same resolution of any deliveries to Iran of equipment or materials, which can be used to build a nuclear power plant. Notifications about such deliveries must be submitted “within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer” of such technology.
? No mate , all of those "Experts" were in Iran because of a deal :
Money for completion of bushehr power plant .
now if you really think that i'm trying in any sort to fool you here , or to exaggerate my country's powers , feel free to ignore my posts in this thread .
Iranian enrichment capability is 100% Iranian . you can even guess it by our centrifuge's name :
IR-1 , IR-2 , ..... IR-6 .
Once again , the only russian "help" was completing bushehr power plant as a deal . not as a secret form of alliance
Iran has acknowledged to the U.N. its uranium enrichment centrifuge program is based on a European firm's designs that appear identical to ones used in Pakistan's quest for an atom bomb, diplomats say.
Tehran, accused by Washington of seeking to develop nuclear weapons, told the U.N. nuclear agency it got the blueprints from a "middleman" whose identity the agency had not determined, a Western diplomat told Reuters on condition of anonymity. It was unclear where the "middleman" got the drawings. The U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has said in a report Iran told the IAEA it got centrifuge drawings "from a foreign intermediary around 1987."
Several diplomats familiar with the IAEA said the blueprints were of a machine by the Dutch enrichment unit of the British-Dutch-German consortium Urenco.
ISIS has learned that the fuel rod bundle seen in photographs of President Ahmadinejad’s visit (see figures 1 and 2) is in fact intended for use in the Arak heavy water reactor. Its close visual similarity to a Russian fuel bundle is because it is indeed a modified Russian RBMK (Reaktor Bolshoy Molschnosti Kanalyiy) fuel design. As discussed in more detail in the August 11 report, RBMK reactors are the commercial descendents of Soviet-era large plutonium reactors of the 1940s and 1950s, and were designed by the Russian research and design institute NIKIET. Based on interviews with knowledgeable officials, NIKIET and a Russian company in Obninsk provided technology for the Arak reactor. This assistance included modifying the design of a RBMK fuel rod bundle for use in the Arak heavy water reactor. As a result of U.S. pressure, this assistance for Arak stopped in the late 1990s. The RBMK fuel pin is clad in an alloy of zirconium with 1% niobium, which is an alloy widely used in Russia. Based on Iranian statements, the Arak fuel pin is also designed to have a zirconium cladding.
But much of Iran’s program, including the design of its uranium hexaflouride facility and the reactor used in its Arak heavy water facility to produce plutonium, can be traced to cooperation in the 1990s with China and Russia.
The IR-40 design is very similar to those used by India and Israel to make plutonium for nuclear weapons, and was apparently designed by Russia's NIKIET.
The Nuclear Technology Center of Isfahan operates four small nuclear research reactors, all supplied by China.
The IR-1 machine is the local version of Pakistan's P1 centrifuge design, and Iran is undertaking R&D on a variant of the more advanced P2 design.
As part of a program to master the nuclear fuel cycle, Tehran has sought to acquire the capability to mine and mill uranium ore. In 1985, Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) specialists located over 5,000 metric tons (MT) of uranium in the Saghand region of eastern Yazd province, making it one of the biggest deposits in the Middle East. They also found 4,000 tons of molybdenum, a mineral which is mixed with steel to make hardened alloys that have nuclear applications. Following subsequent unsuccessful efforts to mine and mill the province’s vast uranium deposits indigenously, Tehran sought external assistance. China’s Beijing Research Institute of Uranium Geology (BRIUG), a division of the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), helped Iran explore for uranium deposits. Russia provided advice and assistance about mining and milling uranium ore, according to U.S. intelligence reports. This assistance may be continuing, despite Moscow’s assurances to the contrary, although it is not clear whether it is controlled by the central government.
Iran requires foreign assistance because it does not possess the capability to mine and mill significant quantities of uranium. In 1992, IAEA inspectors visited the site of an alleged operational mill in Saghand, but found only a small uranium ore drilling rig that was at least five years from production. Iran does have a laboratory scale uranium mill at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC), used to produce yellowcake from raw uranium ore. Further Chinese or Russian assistance will likely allow Tehran to acquire the capability to mine large amounts of natural uranium ore and mill it into yellowcake within a few years. The yellowcake could then be fabricated into heavy water reactor fuel or converted into uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) for use in a uranium enrichment plant. If Tehran continues plans to build a UF6 conversion facility at Isfahan, it would need a steady supply of yellowcake, although it has a small supply that was acquired from South Africa in the 1970s.
Following a strategy similar to Iraq’s and Pakistan’s nuclear development programs, Iran has attempted to acquire a uranium enrichment capability by purchasing centrifuge components piecemeal from Western European suppliers. Tehran established a network of front companies to procure dual-use and prohibited items, with Sharif University as the intended destination.
Iran procured equipment for its gas centrifuge development program from other Western suppliers as well.
Despite its efforts, evidence suggests that Iran does not yet have a centrifuge enrichment facility, even on a laboratory-scale. While Tehran did acquire some of the necessary equipment, it does not possess sufficient quantities of vital production equipment and materials such as maraging steel, and the program appears to have stalled since 1993. The tightening of export controls in supplier countries following revelations that Iraq was close to building a nuclear weapon has greatly hindered Iran’s ability to acquire this material. Even if Tehran were able to build a small enrichment facility, operating the complex centrifuges may be beyond Iran’s scientific, technical, and managerial capability without external assistance, at least over the short-term. However, external assistance from a knowledgeable partner, such as Russia or China, could allow Iran to build and operate an experimental-scale enrichment plant.
During a November 1996 IAEA visit to Isfahan, Iran informed the IAEA Department of Safeguards that it plans to build a UF6 conversion plant at the Nuclear Technology Center. Tehran expects the Chinese-supplied plant, which would be placed under IAEA safeguards, to become operational sometime after 2000. The plans explain the presence of 15 Chinese nuclear experts who were reportedly working at the center in 1995, likely making preliminary preparations for the facility. U.S. officials may have subsequently convinced China to cancel the deal as a prelude to opening U.S. nuclear exports to China. However, Beijing has not agreed to end all nuclear cooperation with Iran, and it has provided Tehran with blueprints for the UF6 facility.
originally posted by: AllSourceIntel
originally posted by: haman10
Iran claimed that technology by herself and with no one's help .
Except for the fact that they did not do such on their own since Russia provided nuclear experts and technical expertise under the Persepolis program in the 1990's and rebuilt the Bushehr Nuclear Plant in the early 2000's.