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The Defense Department needs to get better at lying and fooling people about its intentions. That’s the conclusion from an influential Pentagon panel, the Defense Science Board (DSB), which recommends that the military and intelligence communities join in a new agency devoted to “strategic surprise/deception.” Tricking battlefield opponents has been a part of war since guys started beating each other with bones and sticks. But these days, such moves are harder to pull off, the DSB notes in a January report (.pdf) first unearthed by InsideDefense.com.
“In an era of ubiquitous information access, anonymous leaks and public demands for transparency, deception operations are extraordinarily difficult. Nevertheless, successful strategic deception has in the past provided the United States with significant advantages that translated into operational and tactical success. Successful deception also minimizes U.S. vulnerabilities, while simultaneously setting conditions to surprise adversaries.”
Doing that will not only requires an “understanding the enemy culture, standing beliefs, and intelligence-gathering process and decision cycle, as well as the soundness of its operational and tactical doctrine,” the DSB adds. Deception is also “reliant … on the close control of information, running agents (and double-agents) and creating stories that adversaries will readily believe.”
PURPOSE OF BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION
The purpose of battlefield deception is to mislead or confuse the enemy decisionmaker by distorting, concealing, or falsifying indicators of friendly intentions, capabilities, or dispositions.
The Objective
The objective of battlefield deception is to induce enemy decisionmakers to take operational or tactical actions which are favorable to, and exploitable by, friendly combat operations.
The Risk
The risk, if we don't successfully conduct battlefield deception operations, is that we permit the enemy to see the battlefield clearly, thereby allowing him to gain and retain the initiative. OPSEC alone won't adversely influence enemy capabilities to perceive friendly mission intent or dispositions. He will either commit more assets to gather information or will become dangerously unpredictable.