posted on Nov, 19 2004 @ 06:09 PM
The major issue people are having with Diebold machines in specific and electronic voting in general is that very few have an actual tracable paper
Im not talking about matching the vote to the person, Im talking about guarenteeing that the vote cast is the same as the vote counted. As a
programmer, I can assure you that there are an infinate number of methods in which I can change the voting from within the application without anyone
ever knowing or being able to find out. This is why an electronic count without a paper trail, which many of the states which used the Diebold
machines are relying on, is completely unreliable.
With paper votes, the ballot boxes are padlocked and sealed between the polling stations and the counting houses. With electronic votes, all the
votes are stored on little chips not much bigger than your thumbnail, and in a few cases all of these for some counties were in the hands of single
individuals, who could easily switch them out for another chip.
What is needed is a safe and secure papertrail. Something that gets printed out infront of the user, on thermal paper or something, something the
user can check and make sure that the vote being cast is the one they meant, and something that can be matched vote for vote against hte electronic
versions when a recount is demanded or irregularities are found.
There are a huge number of issues with the Diebold machines in specific, but why is voting being placed in the private domain anyway? Shouldnt the
voting applications be placed in the public domain, so anyone can look at the source code to these applications if they so desire? Wouldnt you want to
know exactly how these black boxes work? I do.