posted on Oct, 6 2004 @ 05:57 PM
Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction
Page Six: Biological
The Biological Warfare (BW) program was born of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and this service
retained its connections with the program either directly or indirectly throughout its existence.
The IIS provided the BW program with security and participated in biological research, probably for its own
purposes, from the beginning of Iraq's BW effort in the early 1970s until the fi nal days of Saddam Husayn's
In 1991, Saddam Husayn regarded BW as an integral element of his arsenal of WMD weapons, and would
have used it if the need arose.
At a meeting of the Iraqi leadership immediately prior to the Gulf war in 1991, Saddam Husayn personally
authorized the use of BW weapons against Israel, Saudi Arabia and US forces. Although the exact nature of
the circumstances that would trigger use was not spelled out, they would appear to be a threat to the leadership
itself or the US resorting to "unconventional harmful types of weapons."
Saddam envisaged all-out use. For example, all Israeli cities were to be struck and all the BW weapons at his
disposal were to be used. Saddam specifi ed that the "many years" agents, presumably anthrax spores, were
to be employed against his foes.
ISG judges that Iraq's actions between 1991 and 1996 demonstrate that the state intended to preserve its
BW capability and return to a steady, methodical progress toward a mature BW program when and if the
ISG assesses that in 1991, Iraq clung to the objective of gaining war-winning weapons with the strategic
intention of achieving the ability to project its power over much of the Middle East and beyond. Biological
weapons were part of that plan. With an eye to the future and aiming to preserve some measure of its
BW capability, Baghdad in the years immediately after Desert Storm sought to save what it could of its BW
infrastructure and covertly continue BW research, hide evidence of that and earlier efforts, and dispose of its
existing weapons stocks.
From 1992 to 1994, Iraq greatly expanded the capability of its Al Hakam facility. Indigenously produced 5
cubic meter fermentors were installed, electrical and water utilities were expanded, and massive new construction
to house its desired 50 cubic meter fermentors were completed.
With the economy at rock bottom in late 1995, ISG judges that Baghdad abandoned its existing BW program
in the belief that it constituted a potential embarrassment, whose discovery would undercut Baghdad's ability
to reach its overarching goal of obtaining relief from UN sanctions.
In practical terms, with the destruction of the Al Hakam facility, Iraq abandoned its ambition to obtain
advanced BW weapons quickly. ISG found no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new BW
program or was conducting BW-specifi c work for military purposes. Indeed, from the mid-1990s, despite
evidence of continuing interest in nuclear and chemical weapons, there appears to be a complete absence of
discussion or even interest in BW at the Presidential level.
Iraq would have faced great diffi culty in re-establishing an effective BW agent production capability. Nevertheless,
after 1996 Iraq still had a signifi cant dual-use capability?some declared?readily useful for BW
if the Regime chose to use it to pursue a BW program. Moreover, Iraq still possessed its most important BW
asset, the scientifi c know-how of its BW cadre.
Any attempt to create a new BW program after 1996 would have encountered a range of major hurdles.
The years following Desert Storm wrought a steady degradation of Iraq's industrial base: new equipment
and spare parts for existing machinery became diffi cult and expensive to obtain, standards of maintenance declined, staff could not receive training
abroad, and foreign technical assistance was almost impossible to
get. Additionally, Iraq's infrastructure and public utilities were crumbling. New large projects, particularly
if they required special foreign equipment and expertise, would attract international attention. UN monitoring
of dual-use facilities up to the end of 1998, made their use for clandestine purpose complicated and risk
Depending on its scale, Iraq could have re-established an elementary BW program within a few weeks to a
few months of a decision to do so, but ISG discovered no indications that the Regime was pursuing such a
In spite of the diffi culties noted above, a BW capability is technically the easiest WMD to attain. Although
equipment and facilities were destroyed under UN supervision in 1996, Iraq retained technical BW knowhow
through the scientists that were involved in the former program. ISG has also identifi ed civilian facilities
and equipment in Iraq that have dual-use application that could be used for the production of agent.
ISG judges that in 1991 and 1992, Iraq appears to have destroyed its undeclared stocks of BW weapons
and probably destroyed remaining holdings of bulk BW agent. However ISG lacks evidence to document
complete destruction. Iraq retained some BW-related seed stocks until their discovery after Operation Iraqi
After the passage of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 in April 1991, Iraqi leaders decided not
to declare the offensive BW program and in consequence ordered all evidence of the program erased. Iraq
declared that BW program personnel sanitized the facilities and destroyed the weapons and their contents.
Iraq declared the possession of 157 aerial bombs and 25 missile warheads containing BW agent. ISG
assesses that the evidence for the original number of bombs is uncertain. ISG judges that Iraq clandestinely
destroyed at least 132 bombs and 25 missiles. ISG continued the efforts of the UN at the destruction site but
found no remnants of further weapons. This leaves the possibility that the fragments of up to 25 bombs may
remain undiscovered. Of these, any that escaped destruction would probably now only contain degraded
ISG does not have a clear account of bulk agent destruction. Offi cial Iraqi sources and BW personnel, state
that Al Hakam staff destroyed stocks of bulk agent in mid 1991. However, the same personnel admit concealing
details of the movement and destruction of bulk BW agent in the fi rst half of 1991. Iraq continued to
present information known to be untrue to the UN up to OIF. Those involved did not reveal this until several
months after the confl ict.
Dr. Rihab Rashid Taha Al 'Azzawi, head of the bacterial program claims she retained BW seed stocks until
early 1992 when she destroyed them. ISG has not found a means of verifying this. Some seed stocks were
retained by another Iraqi offi cial until 2003 when they were recovered by ISG.
ISG is aware of BW-applicable research since 1996, but ISG judges it was not conducted in connection with
a BW program.
ISG has uncovered no evidence of illicit research conducted into BW agents by universities or
The work conducted on a biopesticide (Bacillus thuringiensis) at Al Hakam until 1995 would serve to maintain
the basic skills required by scientists to produce and dry anthrax spores (Bacillus anthracis) but ISG has
not discovered evidence suggesting this was the Regime's intention. However in 1991, research and production
on biopesticide and single cell protein (SCP) was selected by Iraq to provide cover for Al Hakam's role
in Iraq's BW program. Similar work conducted at the Tuwaitha Agricultural and Biological Research Center
(TABRC) up to OIF also maintained skills that were applicable to BW, but again, ISG found no evidence to
suggest that this was the intention.
Similarly, ISG found no information to indicate that the work carried out by TABRC into Single Cell Protein
(SCP) was a cover story for continuing research into the production of BW agents, such as C. botulinum and
B. anthracis, after the destruction of Al Hakam through to OIF.
TABRC conducted research and development (R&D) programs to enable indigenous manufacture of bacterial
growth media. Although these media are suitable for the bulk production of BW agents, ISG has found
no evidence to indicate that their development and testing were specifi cally for this purpose.
Although Iraq had the basic capability to work with variola major (smallpox), ISG found no evidence that it
retained any stocks of smallpox or actively conducted research into this agent for BW intentions.
The IIS had a series of laboratories that conducted biological work including research into BW agents for
assassination purposes until the mid-1990s. ISG has not been able to establish the scope and nature of the
work at these laboratories or determine whether any of the work was related to military development of BW
The security services operated a series of laboratories in the Baghdad area. Iraq should have declared these
facilities and their equipment to the UN, but they did not. Neither the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM)
nor the UN Monitoring, Verifi cation, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) were aware of their existence
or inspected them.
Some of the laboratories possessed equipment capable of supporting research into BW agents for military
purposes, but ISG does not know whether this occurred although there is no evidence of it. The laboratories
were probably the successors of the Al Salman facility, located three kilometers south of Salman Pak, which
was destroyed in 1991, and they carried on many of the same activities, including forensic work.
Under the aegis of the intelligence service, a secretive team developed assassination instruments using
poisons or toxins for the Iraqi state. A small group of scientists, doctors and technicians conducted secret
experiments on human beings, resulting in their deaths. The aim was probably the development of poisons,
including ricin and afl atoxin to eliminate or debilitate the Regime's opponents. It appears that testing on
humans continued until the mid 1990s. There is no evidence to link these tests with the development of BW
agents for military use.
In spite of exhaustive investigation, ISG found no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing BW agent
production systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons.
Prior to OIF there was information indicating Iraq had planned and built a breakout BW capability, in the
form of a set of mobile production units, capable of producing BW agent at short notice in suffi cient quantities
to weaponize. Although ISG has conducted a thorough investigation of every aspect of this information,
it has not found any equipment suitable for such a program, nor has ISG positively identifi ed any sites. No
documents have been uncovered. Interviews with individuals suspected of involvement have all proved
ISG harbors severe doubts about the source's credibility in regards to the breakout program.
ISG thoroughly examined two trailers captured in 2003, suspected of being mobile BW agent production
units, and investigated the associated evidence. ISG judges that its Iraqi makers almost certainly designed
and built the equipment exclusively for the generation of hydrogen. It is impractical to use the equipment
for the production and weaponization of BW agent. ISG judges that it cannot therefore be part of any BW