posted on Oct, 6 2004 @ 05:41 PM
Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction
Page Three: Delivery Systems
Since the early 1970s, Iraq has consistently sought to acquire an effective long-range weapons delivery
capability, and by 1991 Baghdad had purchased the missiles and infrastructure that would form the basis
for nearly all of its future missile system developments. The Soviet Union was a key supplier of missile hardware
and provided 819 Scud-B missiles and ground support equipment.
Iraq's experiences with long-range delivery systems in the Iran/Iraq war were a vital lesson to Iraqi President
Saddam Husayn. The successful Iraqi response to the Iranian long-range bombardment of Baghdad, leading
to the War of the Cities, probably saved Saddam.
By 1991, Iraq had successfully demonstrated its ability to modify some of its delivery systems to increase
their range and to develop WMD dissemination options, with the Al Husayn being a first step in this direction.
The next few years of learning and experiments confi rmed that the Regime's goal was for an effective
long-range WMD delivery capability and demonstrated the resourcefulness of Iraq's scientists and technicians.
Iraq failed in its efforts to acquire longer-range delivery systems to replace inventory exhausted in the
Iran/Iraq war. This was a forcing function that drove Iraq to develop indigenous delivery system production
Desert Storm and subsequent UN resolutions and inspections brought many of Iraq's delivery system
programs to a halt. While much of Iraq's long-range missile inventory and production infrastructure was
eliminated, Iraq until late 1991 kept some items hidden to assist future reconstitution of the force. This decision
and Iraq's intransigence during years of inspection left many UN questions unresolved.
Coalition airstrikes effectively targeted much of Iraq's delivery systems infrastructure, and UN inspections
dramatically impeded further developments of long-range ballistic missiles.
It appears to have taken time, but Iraq eventually realized that sanctions were not going to end quickly.
This forced Iraq to sacrifi ce its long-range delivery force in an attempt to bring about a quick end to the sanctions.
After the flight of Husayn Kamil in 1995, Iraq admitted that it had hidden Scud-variant missiles and components
to aid future reconstitution but asserted that these items had been unilaterally destroyed by late 1991.
The UN could not verify these claims and thereafter became more wary of Iraq's admissions and instituted a
Regime of more intrusive inspections.
The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) has uncovered no evidence Iraq retained Scud-variant missiles, and debriefings
of Iraqi offi cials in addition to some documentation suggest that Iraq did not retain such missiles
While other WMD programs were strictly prohibited, the UN permitted Iraq to develop and possess delivery
systems provided their range did not exceed 150 km. This freedom allowed Iraq to keep its scientists and technicians
employed and to keep its infrastructure and manufacturing base largely intact by pursuing programs
nominally in compliance with the UN limitations. This positioned Iraq for a potential breakout capability.
Between 1991 and 1998, Iraq had declared development programs underway for liquid- and solid-propellant
ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
Iraq's decisions in 1996 to accept the Oil-For-Food program (OFF) and later in 1998 to cease cooperation
with UNSCOM and IAEA spurred a period of increased activity in delivery systems development. The pace of ongoing missile programs accelerated, and the
Regime authorized its scientists to design missiles with
ranges in excess of 150 km that, if developed, would have been clear violations of UNSCR 687.
By 2002, Iraq had provided the liquid-propellant Al Samud II?a program started in 2001?and the solidpropellant
Al Fat'h to the military and was pursuing a series of new small UAV systems.
ISG uncovered Iraqi plans or designs for three long-range ballistic missiles with ranges from 400 to 1,000
km and for a 1,000-km-range cruise missile, although none of these systems progressed to production and
only one reportedly passed the design phase. ISG assesses that these plans demonstrate Saddam's continuing
desire?up to the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)?for a long-range delivery capability.
Procurements supporting delivery system programs expanded after the 1998 departure of the UN inspectors.
Iraq also hired outside expertise to assist its development programs.
ISG uncovered evidence that technicians and engineers from Russia reviewed the designs and assisted development
of the Al Samud II during its rapid evolution. ISG also found that Iraq had entered into negotiations
with North Korean and Russian entities for more capable missile systems.
According to contract information exploited by ISG, Iraq imported at least 380 SA-2/Volga liquid-propellant
engines from Poland and possibly Russia or Belarus. While Iraq claims these engines were for the Al Samud
II program, the numbers involved appear in excess of immediate requirements, suggesting they could have
supported the longer range missiles using clusters of SA-2 engines. Iraq also imported missile guidance and
control systems from entities in countries like Belarus, Russia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
(Note: FRY is currently known as Serbia and Montenegro but is referred to as FRY in this section.)
In late 2002 Iraq was under increasing pressure from the international community to allow UN inspectors
to return. Iraq in November accepted UNSCR 1441 and invited inspectors back into the country. In December
Iraq presented to the UN its Currently Accurate, Full, and Complete Declaration (CAFCD) in response to
While the CAFCD was judged to be incomplete and a rehash of old information, it did provide details on the
Al Samud II, Al Fat'h, new missile-related facilities, and new small UAV designs.
In February 2003 the UN convened an expert panel to discuss the Al Samud II and Al Fat'h programs, which
resulted in the UN's decision to prohibit the Al Samud II and order its destruction. Missile destruction began
in early March but was incomplete when the inspectors were withdrawn later that month.
The CAFCD and United Nations Monitoring, Verifi cation, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) inspections
provided a brief glimpse into what Iraq had accomplished in four years without an international presence
on the ground.
Given Iraq's investments in technology and infrastructure improvements, an effective procurement network,
skilled scientists, and designs already on the books for longer range missiles, ISG assesses that Saddam
clearly intended to reconstitute long-range delivery systems and that the systems potentially were for WMD.
Iraq built a new and larger liquid-rocket engine test stand capable, with some modifi cation, of supporting
engines or engine clusters larger than the single SA-2 engine used in the Al Samud II.
Iraq built or refurbished solid-propellant facilities and equipment, including a large propellant mixer, an
aging oven, and a casting pit that could support large diameter motors.
Iraq's investing in studies into new propellants and manufacturing technologies demonstrated its desire for
more capable or effective delivery systems.