posted on Apr, 16 2012 @ 06:21 AM
Although prior warning is always of some sort of benefit, I have to ask, how exactly one would go about protecting a nuclear reactor from sustained
assault from a reactivated, dormant faultline. We like to go over the events of quakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunami, typhoons and super storms,
because we learn by examination. Because by learning, we overcome, we obsess, and observe obsessively over these events, in a vain attempt to predict
the worst case scenario.
The fact of the matter is that the danger these quakes pose directly is minimal, insignificant in the face of the danger that potential tsunami
waves, triggered by the fault, may pose. From that threat, there is no defence, no action that can deny the sea any land it should choose to conquer,
no structure that can be erected as a surefire protection from the oceanic fury that would be unleashed in a scenario that echoes the events that lead
to the last disaster at the Daiichi plant.
The only thing that the technicians at those sites can do, to prevent a further endangerment of the world, and more locally, the people of Japan, is
to completely dismantle the sites that were damaged, and not in forty years time, but in four. If that means building armoured hazard suits, capable
of fending off the stupendously dangerous levels of radioactivity that an operative might come into contact with when working to such a timeline, then
that is what it will take, and that is what must happen.
There can be no half measures, no corperate complaining about accounting, and costs and man hours of labour spent. This must just be done, and that
is an end to it.
There is only one other alternative that MIGHT be viable, depending on the type of reactors involved, and the fuel they were using. There is a woman
in the states, a scientist, dealing with radiological saftey and threat reduction. She made a substance that when applied to uranium, turns it into
the radiologically inert uranite. If her work can be industrialised and put into mass production, then the safety concerns that the damaged plants
represent, might be able to be negated, without the need for furious, frenzied human activity, around one of the worlds most dangerous working
Outside of that, the options are basically , fix this, or die from it. It will not be the quaking that does the real damage, that poses the real
danger, but the possibility of a repeat performance of the original incident at Fukushima.