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Both reports have been approved by the Committee in both classified and unclassified form.
The unclassified versions of the reports, which are hereby transmitted for printing, are intended to provide Senate, and through it, the American public, a substantial factual record upon which to consider the issues covered by the reports.
- Postwar Findings about Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How they Compare with Prewar Assessments and
- The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress
Point beginning at bottom of page 26
The INC resisted the policy prohibiting operations inside Iraq, believing that doing so was essential for the success of its programs. The conflict between State and INCF about this issue delayed authorization and funding for INC collection activites until a March 2001 amendment to the cooperative agreement when the INCF agreed it would not operate in Iraq. This cleared the way to finding the Information Collection Program (ICP). The March 2001 amendment authorized the INC to "continue its Information Collection Program from nations surrounding Iraq" and provided an office in Washington D.C. for the "purpose of testing, analyzing, translating and distributing information received from Iraq."
Bottom of page 35
In August 2002, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) published a memorandum, Iraq: Evaluation of Documents Presented by the Iraqi National Congress, which offered a coordinated Intelligence Community assessment of the material's contribution to intelligence on Iraq. The Intelligence Community made summary translations of the data -in some cases verbatim translations- and analysts with Arabic language capability also reviewed the documents. The material included reports on the Iraqi Military order of battle and the Special Security Organization, press clippings, meeting notes, and lists of alleged political victims of the Ba'ath Party. The following are the key points from the NIC memorandum:
((Memorandum Heading Censored))
The written material provided to the Intelligence Committee (IC) by the Iraqi National Congress contains little of current intelligence value.
○ Overall, the order of battle information throughout the documents was generally accurate - matching existing IC holdings that are based on all-source reporting. In some significant areas that information, although correct, is out of date and no longer useful.
○ An extensive report on the Iraqi Special Security Organization contained numerous errors.
○ Some of the documents include long lists of names and titles, but few have addresses or phone numbers that would increase their value.
The intelligence value of almost all the data provided by the INC is diminished by our inability to assess the origin and authenticity of the documents. None of the documents, except press clippings, has sourcing or attribution that can be verified or traced.
○The numerous press clippings available are openly available through the Internet or the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
The DIA received documents from INC-affiliated sources before and during its official management of the ICP. In each case documents were disseminated as reporting from sources or as attachments to the source reporting. Such reporting is described below in more detail. The CIA told the Committee it did not receive any documents from the INC after 1998.
Bottom of page 39
The CIA and the DIA used intelligence report from two INC-affiliated sources in intelligence assessments that discussed alleged special operations training of non-Iraqi Arabs at Iraq's Salman Park Unconventional Military Training Facility (Astygia: in the large previous segment of this document, this facility is under suspicion of having nuclear association). Most of the assessments describe the sources as not having direct access to the information and in some cases as "questionable" and "exaggerated". The CIA also included INC-supplied information in a 2003 assessment that the Saddam Hussein regime assassinated dissidents (Astygia: keep in mind the CIA has claimed they stopped recieving information from INC in 1998). This INC information was corroborated by a credible body of reporting from other sources. The specific uses of INC-affiliated defector reporting related to these issues are described in more detail below (Astygia: The sources below this contain more black censor marks than useful information, thus it is hard to put this information together in regards to the source. Nontheless, I suggest reading, you may pick up on something I missed!)
Following the publication of the NIC memorandum, the Director of the Office of Analysis for Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Issues in INR prepared, but never sent, a memorandum to the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia to convey concerns about the NIC Memorandum, in particular about the discussion of Source One's information. The memorandum outlined the concerns discussed in the INR analyst's email discussed previously that Source One frequently assigned WMD purposes to facilities in which he worked. "((2.3 LINES OF CENSORED TEXT FOLLOW)) In short, his information is often very useful, but his claims about WMD work at various facilities are not adequately substantiated in our view."
The Intelligence Community identified a site they believed matched Source One's description, however, there were several inconsistancies between Source One's reporting and the identified site. Source One reported that the construction of the facility had begun in 1999, but construction on the site identified by intelligence began in the summer of 1998. In addition, the facility identified was located on the eastern side of the Tigris siver, but Source One told his debriefers he did not recall seeing the river adjacent to the construction site. He described a concrete pit that exited one of the buildings and drained into an open pit, which intelligence could neither confirm nor deny. Finally, Source One drew a sketch of the site indicating at least six small buildings, but intelligence of the site did not match his sketch. In each case these inconsistancies were included in the reporting.
Source One's reporting specifically on this facility was included in two finished intelligence assessments, the October 2002 NIE on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, and a DIA assessment, Iraq's Reemerging Nuclear Weapon Program, published a month earlier. The NIE included a text box on the reporting on the facility entitled "New Nuclear Facility?" The text box outlined several points about Source One's reporting that drove the Intelligence Community's concerns that the facility may have been nuclear related.
((REPORT HEADING CENSORED, 1.5 LINES))
○ Four of the lead engineers for the project reportedly were associate with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission.
○ The source indicated that he had seen cylinders at [the facility] in 2000 that were similar to sketches of large uranium helaflouride cylinders.
○ Several buildings reportedly were guarded by Amn Al Khas (the Special Security Organization, SSO) and Manthuma Al Amn security personnel.
The Text box also noted that:
"The overall description of the site and the timeliness of its construction as described by the source were reasonably consistant with the details detected through [intelligence]. The site consists of several small buildings of the shape and layout described by the defector, who participated in [the facility's] construction. The site was constructed rapidly in the summer of 1998, although the defector claimed construction had occurred in 1999. We judge that the defector may have been confused about the year."
The NIE concluded that "additional intelligence reporting is necessary before we can confirm a nuclear association for [the facility]." Source One's reporting was not mentioned elsewhere in the NIE, was not included amongst the four pages discussing facilities of concern, was not included in the key judgements, and was not one of six key elements underpinning the key judgement in the NIE that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program.
In contrast to the carefully worded description of the suspect facility as a possible nuclear facility in the NIE, the September 2002 DIA assessment said an Iraqi defector "described a nuclear site near Baghdad" and "reportedly observed similar to those used to hold UF6." The report noted that the defector saw special security at the facility and individuals formerly associated with Iraq's nuclear program. The assessment concluded that the defector's report "suggests the site is either a uranium conversion or gas centrifuge facility". A picture of the site identified as possible the suspect facility was included with a caption that stated "this facility, just north of Baghdad, apparently is either a uranium conversion facility or gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility".
Again, I HIGHLY suggest anyone who wants actual information on the subject read this. I will find more flaws as I go, but since this is turning into monstrous posts I'm going to try and condense things to show only the relevant information. If you're confused about something, ask me to clarify or read ADVISOR's link.
Originally posted by mondegreen
What if it reaches all the way to the top.