Stealth Interceptors not beyond many countries?

Tailless designs afford less maneuverability and are altogether harder to design. One solution to assist maneuverability of tailless designs is thrust vectoring, but designing stealthy thrust vector control, as on the F-22 is a massive task. It is simpler to retain a tail.

Same with the manned –v- unmanned choice. An unmanned design has several advantages on paper, but adds much to development challenges.

A render of the MBB stealth demonstrator (1980s). This was the basic inspiration for the faceted stealth concept design I’m working on. (note; concept, not a real plane)

Just wondering but what measure of stealth is involved in the actual materials used in construction ? Im assuming that the F117,B2 etc use special created materials to reduce their radar cross section so im assuming these would be unavailable to other countries.

Originally posted by bmdefiant
Just wondering but what measure of stealth is involved in the actual materials used in construction ? Im assuming that the F117,B2 etc use special created materials to reduce their radar cross section so im assuming these would be unavailable to other countries.

There are several different materials used, like RAM (radar absorbent material) and RAP ( ___ ___ paint).

These things are available to other nations, but I am sure there are different levels of quality.

The BIG problem with making stealth aircraft is cost. Just because you have the technology to do something doesn't mean you can afford to. The techniques involved in designing, testing, an building a normal aircraft - much less a true "stealth" one are huge.

The US could probably send a man to Pluto if we really wanted to - it's just to damned expensive though. Likewise, there are maybe 3 or 4 nations that can afford to build their own stealth aircraft (and that is a VERY high estimate, considering no nation other then the US has done so untill now).

Mod Edit: Please read the u2u I sent you. thanks

[edit on 12/18/05 by FredT]

Originally posted by American Mad Man

There are several different materials used, like RAM (radar absorbent material) and RAP ( ___ ___ paint).

These things are available to other nations, but I am sure there are different levels of quality.

Radar Absorbing Material (RAM) is used in several Key forms:

Sheet RAM- These are flexable lamanent skins that can be attached directly to the frame of an aircraft, or can be glued to an existing skin. (sheet RAM can also take the form of self adhering tape)

Paint RAM- As the name suggests, this is a radar absorbing paint.

Putty RAM- This is a pliable silly putty like material that is used to make repair and seal gaps.

I have also heard that there are several formulas for making RAM, but they are all secret.

Tim

Two more configurations


The smaller windows in the latter are not because it’s bigger, but because conventional sight is replaced by 360x360 IRST coverage, allowing minimal windows (for emergency and landing) that posed radar reflectivity problems (mainly the joints).

Sure, you can go and waste time and money trying to copy the Americans, never mind the fact that Australia has already made all current stealth technologies obsolete, we invented the only RADAR system in the world that can consistantly detect all kinds of stealth aircraft every time. The only thing stopping us from building more than one set is the fact that the Yanks bought the design, patents and prototype out when we told them about it and busted their pride .

Sure, you can go and waste time and money trying to copy the Americans, never mind the fact that Australia has already made all current stealth technologies obsolete, we invented the only RADAR system in the world that can consistantly detect all kinds of stealth aircraft every time. The only thing stopping us from building more than one set is the fact that the Yanks bought the design, patents and prototype out when we told them about it and busted their pride .

Originally posted by Mabus the Forsaken
... Australia has already made all current stealth technologies obsolete, we invented the only RADAR system in the world that can consistantly detect all kinds of stealth aircraft every time. ...

Do you honestly believe that it is the only one? Or rather the only one publicly known? Anyway, its kind of unimportant as long as your radar needs several hectars. Stealth has to work against AA radar primarily.

The only thing stopping us from building more than one set is the fact that the Yanks bought the design, patents and prototype out when we told them about it and busted their pride

.

I expect you DO realize that they didnt buy the system because of their hurt pride, dont you?

This is the targeting model for the stealth fighter concept. It is basically a network-centric information model with various third party sensors (AEW, various land radars etc) feeding their radar picture to a mobile control unit which forms a “whole picture” synergy and is able to delegate relevant information to various concerns such as SAMs, military planners etc. One of these concerns is the Stealth fighter control unit which uses the third parties data to form a virtual picture and enable lock-after-launch firing of BVR missiles (Meteor shown). This approach allows the stealth fighter to remain almost completely passive throughout the mission, the only broadcast being datalink.

A key factor is that the AEW and or ground radars data could be used for mid-course targeting functions otherwise not available to the stealth fighter –in essence it is giving the larger radars the ability to fire missiles, but through the stealth fighter’s systems.

In this model the Stealth fighter is more like an airborne missile launcher than a conventional interceptor. The airframe design advantage is that speed and agility is less important, but the down side is that endurance and AAR is more important. The latter adds weight and complication to the design and may compromise its position.

There is a strong argument that deployed like this, the stealth fighter might as well be a UAV.

Air intakes on the latest version are very interesting...

Mabus,

Assuming we're talking about the JORN facility, please understand that this capability is nothing more or less than what Pave Paws was doing in the 1980's (wherein we were capable of tracking 'Soviet Cruise Missiles', albeit the 40ft long variety, from over 1,200nm out to sea). Courtesy of the physics of tropobouncing HF/VHF signals.

This according to period AvLeak articles.

Not bad for an 'anti-SLBM system' designed only to track high energy targets clearing the short DT horizon.

AN/FPS-115
www.fas.org...

OTOH, the JORN looks to me like nothing more or less than the ROTHR 'reinvented' and AN/TPS-71 has been in operation since 1987.

Jindalee Operational Radar Network
defence-data.com...

AN/TPS-71
www.fas.org...

The U.S. has a remarkable ability to spend it's taxpayer's money on systems which 'later show up only as threats', whether commercial profitted or in actual threat-possession. This is a fact present across the range of weapons and sensor systems (FOG-M and AAAM come immediately to mind) with the top plagiarist-of-the-month title going to Israel and Britain especially. Though at least the English 'own' what they sell.

In any case, as Darth Vader once said: 'Don't be too proud of the technological terror you create', for stamped on the bottom may be an ACME label that cheapens your pride to the level of the components bought or licensed elsewhere. And even if it is 'All Aussie', Vae Victis Vickers whores national pride on the cheap. Usually to the people that can you can least afford to be giving secrets to. Often through a trusted intermediary.


KPl.

Comments and corrections welcome:


Radar Cross-Section (RCS) is influenced by several factors. We must remember that it is a 3-dimensional problem. The facet solution, which in this key respect is no different from “curved stealth”, deflects the incoming radar waves in a direction away from the source, thus making it ‘invisible’ to the radar.

But its effectiveness at doing this is dependant on the relative angle of the facet(s) in relation to the radar threat. If the radar is positioned perpendicular to the facet(s) it will rebound rather than deflect.

Note in particular how the right-angle alignment of the conventional aircraft’s vertical tail, in relation to the tailplane and fuselage, produces an additional rebound as the radar is deflected of multiple surfaces. Therefore, in order to reduce the likelihood of this, you aim to angle the facets in such a way as to reduce the likelihood of the threat radar being positioned perpendicular.

In doing so we have to consider where the threat radars are likely to be in relation to the aircraft during operations. In general, enemy Airborne Early Warning aircraft are likely to be off to the side and at medium or high altitude, typically looking down on the aircraft. AEW radars are unlikely to be directly above the aircraft unless the aircraft is banking steeply towards the AEW’s position. Therefore, the shallower the slope of the upper surfaces the less likely they are to rebound to an airborne radar threat.

Ground radars tend to be below the aircraft and if it is transiting at low altitude, may be at an almost side-on or head/tail on position. But are unlikely to be directly below the aircraft. Therefore flat undersides, or shallow slopes tend to be better.

And published radar cross-section (RCS) tend to be somewhat misleading –they tend to refer to an aircraft from the optimum angle and configuration, typically from the front and with the aircraft in a clean configuration. A conventional fighter aircraft is a conglomeration of angled faces which between them tend to reflect well from every angle.

Faceted stealth (and to a large degree curved stealth) aircraft have relatively slab-like surfaces thus radically reducing the angles at which the aircraft rebounds radar waves.

Since the least likely positions of radar in relation to the aircraft are likely to be directly overhead and directly underneath, surfaces which are approximately flat (top or bottom) tend to be most stealthy. However, an aircraft cannot be a waver thin pancake, so some degree of slope is required.

The D-0002 configuration, with its intakes under the pilot but above the wing suffers from the fact that the sloping sides are relatively steep, around 30 degrees from vertical. If we make the slope shallower (around 60 degrees from vertical), we find that the fuselage is now very wide, the volume massively increased and the air intakes disproportionately large for the engine:

The bottom image depicts a minimum volume configuration for the 60 degree slope. In an attempt to reduce the fuselage volume to closer to the 60+ degrees optimum, we put the cockpit in front of the intakes (D-0002-d):

We find that if we try to make a configuration with around 60 degrees slope but a substantially flat underside, we end up with insufficient fuselage height for a pilot… ideal for a UAV:

This design is referred to as D-0004. The swept wing form is better suited to interdictors than air-defence fighters which require a high degree of agility (although being unmanned conventional +9g limitations are not so important, allowing far greater maneuverability than ordinarily possible).

Another attempt at a more compact yet shallow-slope manned configuration is D-0005:

It solves the intake problem by positioning it right in the nose. Typical fighter configurations avoid this since it prevents a large intercept radar being carried, yet with the network centric model an intercept radar is not required, thus freeing up the configuration limitations.

An extended variation on the D-0005 design is D-0005-b:

D-0005 is still some way of a satisfactory configuration; it has inadequate volume to accommodate sufficient fuel and weapons bays (minimum of two AAMs in concept specification). If the fighter is to use combat air patrols (CAP) without air-air refueling (AAT) as conceptualized, it needs excellent endurance.

An attempt to increase the volume of D-0005 is this (D-0005-c):

The subtle changes are the addition of small shoulder pockets to facilitate flank weapons bays in the wing root (2x Meteor or similar BVR missiles) and also a larger belly:

Provisional specification for D-0005-c
Crew: one
Width: 4.5m
Height: 2m (undercarriage stowed)
Weight: ? Light? Operational thrust to weight of about 0.7:1 (lower than conventional fighters, but high considering the it uses a non-afterburning engine)
Maximum speed: close to Mach 1
CAP endurance: About 1 hour (too low)
Powerplant: 1 x Eurojet EJ200 13,940lb (non-afterburning)
Weapons load: 2 x Meteor BVR missiles stowed internally

www.aircraftdesign.com...

The proposed Rockwell ATF design is a beast, A bit like the Lancer, Kind of like Rockwells designs like thier A-5 Vigilante . This site contains designs and also a 1930s concept of a 'Flying Wing' Airliner!. I admire the Sweedish and German stealth fighter designs. Wish Fighters will be shaped like that one day.

[edit on 19-12-2005 by Browno]

Planeman,

A very interesting network IADS setup.

I would only comment that the strength of the system is never more than the least of it's component elements and in this case, any attempt at an AEW airframe would have to be equally LO capable or alternatively _well_ protected in a sanctuary airspace system wherein longrange missiles protected the sensor platform and goalkeepers protected the long range S2A. All of which layering tends to get /very/ expensive vs. the cost of the principle 'cure' which is not the manned strike system but the cruise missile.

In reference to which, it must also be noted that you still are associating your principle spear-tip capability and it's backing sensors with a 10,000ft runway which is not going to |ever| 'go away' as a principle system vulnerability. You just cannot protect or relocate that kind of asset area and going to multiple dispersal fields leads to either zero terminal defenses or a certain 'activity indicator' inherent to MTI's and Emitter Signatures moving around between active and inactive fields.

As an alternative consider:

1. LTA's.
Whether an aerostat or something with station keeping ability as a freeflier. These are NOT your father's football blimp. Modern lighter than air platforms are now semi-rigid constructs with a shape more like a bedspring crossed with a wedge and can carry an amazing amount of sensor gear while themselves retaining a low enough operating cost to be 24:7 capable even in peace time and somewhat amenable to shell-game decoy strategies (wherein their lower baseline signature vulnerability to X-band is offset by increased surface area dipole ratios against lower wavelengths). Their principle function in your system would be to take the simplest of sensors (IRST) up beyond the haze and polutant layer between 15-20,000ft. Under their own power, they can of course go a lot further which also provides you with a reasonable ability to gain lookdown on VLO assets hot-side. In theory, you could also 'rapid erect' a largely zero-footprint system using rocket launch to put the aerostats up as the raid comes inbound.

www.aerospace-technology.com...
www.blimpinfo.com...
www.spa.com...

2. Range Tracking Cameras.
Systems akin to those which monitor weapons tests on fixed wing aircraft or the ones which tracked the reentry of the burning Columbia.

www.robosoft.fr...
www.patrick.af.mil...

While some can be quite large, they tend (presently) to be used as optical 'adjunct' sensors on larger radars-

www.patrick.af.mil...

And so their baseline cost is usually quite cheap, ranging from 200-300 thousand dollars up to about 3-4 million. This compared to an 'anti-stealth' capable radar like the Russian 1R13 and 55Zh6, both of which run in the 10-12 million dollar range.

Again, IF you can /see/ the target at any of the shorter optical wavelengths from IR to UV, you can scale the image from both intensity and phase change interferometry and actual stadiametric silouhette mapping. Weather will be a predominant factor but it should be noted that the average range tracking system is fully roadmobile on a truckbed or trailer whereas your LPAR diagram is basically a CM target waiting to happen.

3. Lastly, look at networked Acoustic and mini IRST system to close the gaps and track particularly supersonic wakes in quite some depth of density. The Brit ADADS is nominally an antihelicopter and CM cueing aid for SHORAD and MANPADS systems, it can be networked as a standalone system and only costs about 50,000 dollars each.

pilkoptr02.uuhost.uk.uu.net...

When combined with the modern equivalent to these-

www.dself.dsl.pipex.com...
www.auditory.org...

You quickly achieve a very high level of reliability at minimal cost. Note that the USAF has already shut down a windfarm because the ambient noise interferred with passive acoustic tracking at Nellis and Edwards has a comprehensive acoustic tracking system in place as well. DO NOT BELIEVE what is put out about the ineffectiveness of these system, they are in fact the way forward against VLO and the powers that be know it. As such, they threaten /decades/ of radar dominant search methods for which the traditional advantage of RF based systems is no longer applicable: Namely the ability to supply range/range-rate data overlaps within a volume updated bearing search while providing sideband or separate illuminatory updates to weapons flying to a collision.

Today, it is _the bullets_ not the scope which is important. Because, provided you can supply a general acquisition cube, the missiles will quite happily fly out on a strapdown/GPS updated IMU trajectory and look for the threat once there. As long as you treat space as a coordinate system (pin tail on donkey) and provide enough continuing motor impulse (gel propellant or turbine) to reach it with a high residual search/pursuit margin, you can fix the exact threat position /after/ launch.

>>
This is the targeting model for the stealth fighter concept. It is basically a network-centric information model with various third party sensors (AEW, various land radars etc) feeding their radar picture to a mobile control unit which forms a “whole picture” synergy and is able to delegate relevant information to various concerns such as SAMs, military planners etc. One of these concerns is the Stealth fighter control unit which uses the third parties data to form a virtual picture and enable lock-after-launch firing of BVR missiles (Meteor shown). This approach allows the stealth fighter to remain almost completely passive throughout the mission, the only broadcast being datalink.



A key factor is that the AEW and or ground radars data could be used for mid-course targeting functions otherwise not available to the stealth fighter –in essence it is giving the larger radars the ability to fire missiles, but through the stealth fighter’s systems.
>>

Good in principle but you face some pretty stiff problems running the telecomms in such a way as to deny Infowarfare penetration of the network on the basis of foreign companies having specs on systems and software for both physical and electronic attack vulnerability reasons.

This is why it is generally better to go small and dispersed with no SOC/IOC level integration nodes and to keep the 'there they are, there they go, out!' levels of trackfile collation deep as much as simple.

Whatever the threat does to one sector ops center in terms of screwing the data input. They do not do to another because they are on separate landline or microwave linkages.

Whatever the total IADS system is 'telling you' in the way of spoofed raid plots from individually tampered network elements, tends to level out as the raid progresses inbound and different sector assigned sensors start feeding their own data.

And finally, because HUMANS are interpreting the direct datastream as visual monitor-presentations, making critical engagement decisions and translating that to a /secondary/ (also moated-safe) command network up to the shooters on a "Salvo this many in this geometry on that bearing" torpedo-spread basis.

The only area of REAL effort on data security that must be made (2-way) is in the weapon datalinks as the wolves run out to meet the deer and then let loose a single, definitive, howl when targets are acquired and must be sorted before morted.

>>
In this model the Stealth fighter is more like an airborne missile launcher than a conventional interceptor. The airframe design advantage is that speed and agility is less important, but the down side is that endurance and AAR is more important. The latter adds weight and complication to the design and may compromise its position.

There is a strong argument that deployed like this, the stealth fighter might as well be a UAV.
>>

Indeed, largely because you cannot avoid the /physical/ vulnerability of the DCA platform by simply relegating it's role to that of a missileer weapons carrier. Even in war, 70% of a jet's time is spent on the ground. In peacetime, that number is probably closer to 90%.

OTOH, if you are going to do things this way (air vice surface launch and fly /out/ vs. -up- on turbine or ram prolonged impulse), then why not look at an LTA which is nothing more or less than a weapons cabinet? Pilot time to practice the mission is critical to his ability ot perform it. And his ability to perform it in the A2A role is even more dependent on both platform ground survival and his own fatigue. Either of which are bound to go up if he is playing Me-262 games with the P-51's (aka Raptors) chasing him too and fro over his entirely predictable baselane association.

Yet the fact remains that numbers matter more than anything else. And so you _must_ be able to divide the number of AAMs available by the number of kills achieved, per mission, per platform. Against the number of /critical hits/ your ground infrastructure (including the totality of the IADS/ADGE) can hit before it becomes inoperable. As a first order downselect priority of choice between any platform choice.

Because if you can only afford 60 MRM/LRM (350 grand each) class weapons and 100 ISRM/SRMs (220 grande apiece) and you are facing 100+ enemy on the first raid with only a total of 20-30 stealth jets. And each of those jets carries 2-4 missiles vs. the 2 JDAMs onboard a typical interdictor. Then, even allowing for ZERO OCA sweep attrition with platforms like the Raptor and an absolute safety of RTB assurance to the basing mode, you will likely only have 10 jets airborne (in the CAP cycle of rotating orbits) with 20 LRM shots. For a total of forty defensive kills _if none of your shots miss_.

And the effect, while stinging, will be shrugged off.

While the 120 GBU-31/32/35 JDAMs which impact (and soon this will be 480 GBU-39 SDB). Will utterly devastate your defensive network before moving on to /shred/ your infrastructure on Raid 2. As blackmailed hostaging of the nation's future to its immediate submission.

OTOH, if that stealth interceptor itself costs 100 million dollars vs. a conventional 4th Gen platform which costs 45-60. And an LTA or endurance UCAV costs 25-30 million. Then _in the difference between_ (LTA is .3 of the stealth interceptor, leaving 70 million per platform trade and .5 of the conventional fighter, leaving 25 million) you can buy as many as 233 and never less than 83 _MORE MISSILES_.

For each and every manned platform which you trade off.

Used in combination with my multi layered, CHEAP, acousto-optic defensive networking, the result is the ability to put 10-20 shots on each and every 'just a bus' weapons cabinet and let the missiles themselves become BOTH the gun /and/ the bullet in taking kill mechanism to the fight whereby they (whether ground launch or airborne) SATURATE the inbound threat.

10 LTA's cost 250 million. If they each carry 20 AIM-160 MALI class weapons, at a million apiece (three times that of current rocket based weapons, leaving immense ammounts of R&D 'buy in' leveraging to the technology) that's 200 shots or another 200 million. If, in times of tension, every LTA (unmanned and relatively invisible) is 'up' and /half/ of the ready-fire shots fail.

You will still kill the entire strike package of 100 raiders.

AND THAT IS HOW YOU WIN A DEFENSIVE WAR.

Stuff the enemy up so badly. Humiliating him in his inability to come at you again. That an alternative is diplomatically sought.

On a Bullets:Bodies basis of attrition, numbers always win. The only thing which delivery platforms do is carry the bullets to the point where they can hit the enemy. And in this day and age, particularly given the foolish choice of a subsonic JSF; even the wagon-effect of a full-size (manned) asset is likely not worth the offset in lost shots where you can let the kill vehicles motor on out from HUGE standoffs.

Before using pack-attack tactics that require little or no IFF or other sophisticated networking beyond an initial 'I'm here, this many are off my nose!' howl of acquisition. Because there are no friendly air component forces to discriminate against. And the targeting is literally an 'as you go' expectation of hitting /something/ with an optical seeker that is sweeping forward in 2-3 skirmish lines, 50-100 miles across.


KPl.

India's MCA to fly in 8 years

BANGALORE: The Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), the aircraft design house of the Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) in Bangalore has formed a core team to design a medium combat aircraft (MCA), an advanced multi-role fighter with stealth capabilities.

Besides incorporating many features of the indigenous single-engine Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) that is undergoing flight trials, the MCA will use radar-absorbent materials to reduce detection by radars, making it a stealth fighter.

The new generation fighter is expected to replace the Jaguar and the Mirage-2000 fleet of the Indian Air Force in the coming decades. “The design work is getting ready. It should be completed in a year,” DRDO sources told DNA.

The advanced aircraft will be build with extensive use of composites and have smart sensors like micro electronic mechanical systems (MEMS), that can automatically detect strains or weaknesses in the airframe or wings. “The IAF is giving a lot of inputs for the design,” sources said.

Once the design is frozen, the DRDO would present the project to the government for sanction of the MCA project estimated to cost about Rs 6000 to Rs 8000 crore. The MCA will be a 12 tonne weight class fighter with a maximum take-off weight of about 18 tonnes.

It is to be powered by two “thrust vector’’ engines that facilitate controlling the flight by controlling its thrust, giving the pilot greater manoeuvrability.

Only two aircrafs's - the Sukhoi30 MKI, now manufactured in India under license and the American FA/22 raptor fighter-are powered by thrust vector engines.

But there are snags in developing Kaveri, the indigenous engine that will be used for the LCA and upgraded for the MCA. The DRDO has invited bids from global engine makers to participate in building the engine.

Many systems and technologies developed in India for the LCA, Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT) and the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) like the flight control systems and composite wings will be used in the MCA.

“It will take about six to eight years for the first aircraft to be developed,” sources said.
Full Article >>

New pics of the proposed MCA are out ... obtained by rakall of BR from an ADA presentation at an IIT.... the entire ADA presentation has been leaked ... and hosted at link

Posted with credits to rakall :

This seems to be the design that is fianlised (as stated in the article):


^^ evloved from the LCA and shares commonality with the LCA



IMHO it looks a lot like the F-35.

It appears to be in a pretty advanced stage ... because Pakistan just bought the "best for anti-stealth role" VERA-E radars a month back ... the announcement that the prototype is 6-8 years away is also suggestive of the level of its completion .... further since its a development of the LCA (which just entered production), it might not take very long.

I would only comment that the strength of the system is never more than the least of it's component elements and in this case, any attempt at an AEW airframe would have to be equally LO capable or alternatively _well_ protected in a sanctuary airspace system wherein longrange missiles protected the sensor platform and goalkeepers protected the long range S2A. All of which layering tends to get /very/ expensive vs. the cost of the principle 'cure' which is not the manned strike system but the cruise missile.

Agreed although I’d question the practicality of making an AEW platform stealthy. Even in the US there isn’t a credible attempt at making them stealthy. UAVs are the way forward for AEW, in my opinion. Since I wrote the post above I chanced upon a Saab AEW-UAV concept using what appears to be an Erickson Eirieye (sp?)
The advantages are that you save a lot of weight and cost leaving the personnel on the ground. So you are looking at longer endurance, cheaper airframe cost and relative expendability (in terms of human loss and prestige if it is shot down). The down side being that the production run wouldn’t be many airframes so generally expensive project. Ballons are an idea I’m aware of. Agreed in general on that. But for the sake of my IAD model it really doesn’t matter what the AEW platform is. In fact, if you remove the AEW it can still function using just ground radar or other fighter’s radar, although obviously AEW is an advantage. The fighter doesn’t even need to know where the radar data is coming from.

Re runways agreed. Since the mid 50s people have been prophesizing the demise of conventional takeoff air vehicles in combat. But making an aircraft STOVL is to degrade general performance and complicate development –it is conventional take-off as part of the “Achievable stealth” aim (ASADF= Achievable (by implication affordable and low risk) stealth Air Defence Fighter)

Your comments on the potential merits of using LTA “missile cabinets” are interesting. Is it a concept you yourself have come up with or is this being marketed by the LTA lobby? It’s certainly a concept worth beefing out. My own reservations about LTA is the agility, ability to move location to get nearer the threat and effectiveness of immediate defencive measures.

Network-centric IAT is definitely the way forward. My reading on the subject is limited to some articles on the Swedish systems and the French system sold to United Arab Emirates (makes the Mirage 2000-9 look a pretty good buy). Nearly all ‘good’ airforces are already reliant on datalinks (AWACS etc) just not integrated on this scale. The weaknesses of my (simplified) network centric model is no more so than existing layouts –indeed the use of Mobile Control Units allows a comparison and cross referencing of the various source data, allowing a greater margin of spoof counteraction.

The UAV missilier is a separate concept project for A.TT.

The A.TT concept paper for ASADF is still in the writing. At the moment it will feature the D-0005-d fighter configuration.