6 Nukes Are Missing from the U.S. Military

a reply to: Zaphod58

Anyone that could have had a submarine waiting at the time of the accident

With the doubt, anyone could. In terms of reasonableness it does take a more coordinated plan to be in the right place at the right time.

If you come in after the event and told its somewhere over there maybe? This is the kind of thing to expect in proper aircraft accident investigations. With the other premeditated cases, well, you know...

a reply to: saint4God

Most nuclear bombs use "Tritium" to boost the yield of the fission weapon or fission primary, which has a half-life of about 12.4 years.

They also use something called "Fogbank" which is an aerogel that also has to be periodically replaced to maintain the viability of the weapon.

Meaning without regular maintenance and replacement of internal parts and materials nukes have a shelf life.

a reply to: andy06shake

I don't know what the ICBM maintenance program is, 6 months or 6 years for critical functions. As with cars would expect some general inspections every 3 months. It does get technical. Generally, everything has a life span.

With the Challenger mess, is was one o ring that did not handle the temperature flux.

a reply to: kwakakev

I think i heard/read somewhere that "HydraPak" the contractor who made the O-ring that failed in the challenger disaster.

Knew they could come apart under extremely cold conditions and even informed NASA that the problem could arise.

But they decided to go ahead with the launch anyway.

a reply to: saint4God

www.baltimoresun.com...

I remember this happening and the discussion here. It was said at the time that 6 nukes left Minot, and 5 arrived at Barksdale. At the same time, the US Military staged a massive manhunt for an explorer who went missing somewhere out west. If you can find the thread/s, there was some great insight there.



found it:
www.abovetopsecret.com...




yet another added edit:
www.globalresearch.ca...

Although definitely not a good thing, there is no risk of these being used in an actual nuclear attack. Yeah you may have the physical bomb but you still cannot initiate the nuclear reaction necessary to detonate the nuke. Worst you could do is blow it up and create a dirty bomb

originally posted by: Zaphod58
a reply to: LanceCorvette

They stopped flying missions with them in the 1970s. Until 1968 we kept nuclear armed bombers airborne 24/7 during Operation Chrome Dome. Several were lost on those missions. Others were lost on training missions with them. The only gravity bomb we use now is the B61-12, but the only missions flown with anything resembling one are certification missions with concrete plugs mounted internally to simulate warhead weight.

except when they did it in 2007

a reply to: PokeyJoe

there is a blast from the past. Pokey Joe from the Mountains.
the rumors of your death were greatly exaggerated.

originally posted by: network dude
a reply to: saint4God

www.baltimoresun.com...

I remember this happening and the discussion here. It was said at the time that 6 nukes left Minot, and 5 arrived at Barksdale. At the same time, the US Military staged a massive manhunt for an explorer who went missing somewhere out west. If you can find the thread/s, there was some great insight there.



found it:
www.abovetopsecret.com...



yet another added edit:
www.globalresearch.ca...

Pretty wild going back and reading all my posts in that thread when I was in the belly of the beast.

Good times.

a reply to: network dude

LOL I ain’t dead quite yet!

a reply to: PokeyJoe

I was an ATS noob back then. In awe of the great minds here.
That thread was some groundbreaking excitement. Glad you are still on the correct side of the dirt.

a reply to: network dude

Pretty wild that was 16 years ago and we’re still here posting on this site lol.

a reply to: network dude

Which was unintentional, and a security and flight crew failure. Which is why so many people were fired.

originally posted by: network dude

originally posted by: Zaphod58
a reply to: LanceCorvette

They stopped flying missions with them in the 1970s. Until 1968 we kept nuclear armed bombers airborne 24/7 during Operation Chrome Dome. Several were lost on those missions. Others were lost on training missions with them. The only gravity bomb we use now is the B61-12, but the only missions flown with anything resembling one are certification missions with concrete plugs mounted internally to simulate warhead weight.

except when they did it in 2007

And that was in the press within days. The Air Force tried to keep it quiet and it leaked within days. And those missiles weren't armed and were never in any danger of being detonated, nor in any realistic danger of being stolen.

Given that, I find it hard to believe what some have asserted in this thread, that we've been losing nuclear weapons and just keeping it secret. Secrets like that simply aren't kept anymore. If they try, someone leaks it.

originally posted by: Zaphod58
a reply to: network dude

Which was unintentional, and a security and flight crew failure. Which is why so many people were fired.

LOL, you don't really believe that do you? A few derpy Airman wheel out the nukes, load them up on the wings, and it was all just some misunderstanding? If you still have some part to play here, I guess I get it, but for those who comprehend flightline activities, it's kind of rude to suggest that level of whatever that is.

a reply to: network dude

Have you seen what happened to the nuclear forces after SAC went away? I did. After SAC was dismantled no one wanted the nuclear mission. The two man rule was effectively gutted, the personal checks that were carried out to even be able to look at the weapons became pencil whip items. Hell, not long after it leaked that ICBM crews were using marijuana and cheating on required tests that had to be completed to be allowed into the silo. Knowing what was going on around that time, that was probably the only time outside of tech school, when they learned how to load them they had been anywhere near a weapon.

Under SAC, nuclear weapon security was as airtight as it was humanly possible to make it. After the nuclear alert mission went away, and SAC was disbanded, nuclear security became an afterthought. There’s a reason for the saying “To err is human, to forgive is not SAC policy”.

originally posted by: Zaphod58
a reply to: network dude

Have you seen what happened to the nuclear forces after SAC went away? I did. After SAC was dismantled no one wanted the nuclear mission. The two man rule was effectively gutted, the personal checks that were carried out to even be able to look at the weapons became pencil whip items. Hell, not long after it leaked that ICBM crews were using marijuana and cheating on required tests that had to be completed to be allowed into the silo. Knowing what was going on around that time, that was probably the only time outside of tech school, when they learned how to load them they had been anywhere near a weapon.

Under SAC, nuclear weapon security was as airtight as it was humanly possible to make it. After the nuclear alert mission went away, and SAC was disbanded, nuclear security became an afterthought. There’s a reason for the saying “To err is human, to forgive is not SAC policy”.

Have you ever been on a flightline?

I'll go ahead and retell this story, just for you. As a young airman, I was tasked to help pull a floor board on a C-130. If you had ever done that, you would know two things. Your screw removal tool was manual, and all your tools must be accounted for, no exceptions. Once the job was done we all went to turn in our tools. My box was missing a #2 apex. I wasn't allowed to turn in my box until it was found. So I had to go back out, pull the entire floorboard myself, retrieve the lost apex, and put the floor board back down. Now if that much attention was paid to a #2 apex, do you think at least the same care would be put into thermonuclear warheads? I do.

eta, and back when SAC, MAC, and TAC were the thing, I was MAC. A tiny bit less prestigious than SAC.

If a soldier, marine, airman, or sailor were even to be issued a rifle and rifle magazine — weaponry of a far lesser significance, danger, and cost — there is a strict signing and accountability process that involves a chain of command and paperwork. This is part of the set of military checks and balances used by all the services within the U.S. Armed Forces.

Military servicemen qualified to speak on the subject will confirm that there is a stringent nuclear weapons handling procedure. There is a rigorous, almost inflexible, chain of command in regards to the handling of nuclear weapons and not just any soldier, sailor, airman, or marine is allowed to handle nuclear weapons. Only servicemen specialized in specific handling and loading procedures, are perm certified to handle, access and load nuclear warheads.

www.globalresearch.ca...

a reply to: Zaphod58

you have PM

originally posted by: andy06shake
Most nuclear bombs use "Tritium" to boost the yield of the fission weapon or fission primary, which has a half-life of about 12.4 years.

We seem to be good at spilling that stuff too according the news yesterday:

Nuclear power plant leaks 400,000 gallons of radioactive water

www.nbcnews.com...

originally posted by: andy06shake
They also use something called "Fogbank" which is an aerogel that also has to be periodically replaced to maintain the viability of the weapon.

Meaning without regular maintenance and replacement of internal parts and materials nukes have a shelf life.

Good info, a lot of times when hearing nuclear, we tend think of hundreds or thousands of years for half-life.

a reply to: network dude

I know exactly how much care goes into tool control. I’ve also seen accidents, and near accidents because the tool control procedures weren’t followed, despite being required. I used to have faith that a stupid accidents like flying nuclear weapons cross country couldn’t happen, but I’ve seen far too many corners cut, and stupid accidents to have that faith anymore.

The problem was that after SAC went away they spent several years playing hot potato with the nuclear weapons programs, until STRATCOM was stood up. Then they had to stand the procedures that worked for SAC for 30 years back up.