The Pattern of War

I finished reading Lieutenant General Sir Francis Tuker's The Pattern of War. My copy of the book is in PDF format, for the physical copies of his titles are hard to obtain. Tuker wrote the book in 1945 - 48. So the reader must bear in mind that some of his conclusions occurred before the Korean War and the Truman admin's policy of 'limited war' in that country. But, unlike Montgomery, his writing style is a smooth read, for ghostwriters didn't exist in that era.

Tuker's work addresses the British Army's often poor leadership in high command roles. He delves into military history to argue that the commanders understanding and successfully implementing manoeuvre warfare are successful on battlefields. Notably, in the first 50 - 60% of the book, his arguments are tactical, operational, and not strategic.

He defines the conditions for manoeuvre warfare to occur as the following:

First, tactically, flanking [and rear area] attacks open the chance for breakthroughs or breaking into areas/enemy forces. Second, mobile forces are dominant in the fields of battle. Lastly, mobility permits the placement of forces in locations that where actions are decided and won.

They are leading up to the WW1 deadlock on the Western Front. Tuker sights instances where advances in firearms and tactics hampered armies abilities to manoeuvre. However, the reader might note that his point relating to that deadlock as a historical aberration is a bit off base. Moreover, the American Civil War represents the beginnings of industrial and trench warfare. But, overall, his conclusions remain sound.

His other points involve his country and the British Army's failure to face up to the possibility of war breaking out in the inter-war years. Also, future military commanders must have a sound grounding in future scientific and technological matters. If someone lacks understandings of those areas, they won't grasp the latest developments in the next war.

Tuker's arguments and analyses stand the test of time and are a must-read for military professionals or people interested in military history.

a reply to: xpert11

Brief comment on 'deadlock'. Seems that in the First War, the presence of a solid front from the Channel to Switzerland also played a role. Notably, the war was considerably more mobile on the Eastern Front.

Second War, memories of the First War's bloodbaths as well as manpower constraints played a role in restraining boldness on the part of the British commanders at the operational level. The one really bold act post-Normandy didn't end well for the 1st Airborne Division.

Cheers

originally posted by: F2d5thCavv2
a reply to: xpert11

Brief comment on 'deadlock'. Seems that in the First War, the presence of a solid front from the Channel to Switzerland also played a role. Notably, the war was considerably more mobile on the Eastern Front.

An excellent point. In Russia and later on in the Middle East, the larger geographical areas offered space for armies to manoeuvre. Tuker likely didn't have the space in his work to address that issue.

Second War, memories of the First War's bloodbaths as well as manpower constraints played a role in restraining boldness on the part of the British commanders at the operational level. The one really bold act post-Normandy didn't end well for the 1st Airborne Division.

A fascinating take on the performance of the British Army in WW2. Unlike Eisenhower, who was mentored by General Fox Conner and attended the equivalent of war colleges, the British Army totally and utterly failed to prepare their next generation of leaders for high command roles. Yet, curiously, the U.S. Army went down that same road before the American Civil War.

For instance, General Wavell's grasp of the situations and his command roles in North Africa and Burma displayed his flaws. In North Africa, he failed to prioritise the use of his forces against the Italians or the Germans. Concerning his oversight from India of Burma falling to the Japanese, he could not grasp the reality of the situation.

How are your heroes not murderers yet if I kill an oppressing aggressor at home it is classed murder?

Do as we say not as we do.

This show is rubbish all the way through.

a reply to: xpert11

xpert11,

I'd say the British record in the Second War is mixed. But then, that is true for all the armed forces in that conflict. Both Britain and the USA took too long to work out effective armored doctrines and were hobbled in the beginning by vehicle design decisions. Similarly, both countries underestimated the infantry casualty rate in the terrain of NW Europe and consequently had troubles keeping their rifle units up to strength.

Eisenhower as supreme commander was a bit interesting considering he had never commanded even a platoon in combat to that point. He had his flaws but I suppose the proof is in the pudding of May 1945.

The British certainly understood mobile warfare by late 1942 in Egypt and Libya. There was a lot to work out, though -- good air to ground coordination, combined operations involving the forces of more than one country, etc. Had to have been a steep learning curve.

At the echelon of grand strategy and respecting the importance of solid logistical support, though, my take is the British did very well -- quite superior, in fact, to the performance of the Germans in those fields.

Cheers

a reply to: xpert11
It's become proverbial to say that fashion oscillates between "defence" and "mobility" because commanders tend to try to learn lessons from the previous war. Also weapon-makers focus on building better defences when aggressive weapons are obviously powerful, and building stronger weapons at times when defence systems have the upper hand.

The classic case is the experience of the French. They were trounced in 1870 by the rail-enhanced mobility of the Prussians, and came out of that believing that they need a spirit of "elan". They needed to go forward aggressively.
The spirit of elan carried them into mass slaughter in the opening weeks of the 1914 war, and they came out of that believing that they needed more solid fortifications.
Then they were trapped in their newly built fortifications in 1940 by the tank-enhanced mobility of the Germans.

I take it that Tuker is influenced by the need to learn the lessons taught by 1940, but a third world war could find us back in the situation in which protective defence is the most important requirement.

a reply to: F2d5thCavv2

I first read about Eisenhower when I was a kid. One of the aspects of his career that first caught my interest is that his lack of combat experience didn't impact his performance as Supreme Commander in Western Europe. Unfortunately, in the present, the likes of Conner and the study of strategy are rare.

One of the points, Tuker raises is that effectively expansionist dictatorships and the worst of human nature ensure that wars will always occur. So the education, background and character of future military and civilian leaders warrant greater levels of discussion.

a reply to: xpert11

I don't want to drag the topic of your thread too far afield, but I wonder what Tuker would have made of the postwar crops of senior American brass.

To judge by the educational degrees they have attained, they are very well educated. Having interacted with U.S. flag rank officers a time or two, I can personally attest as individuals they are intelligent and have phenomenal command of their memory.

And yet.

What has the USA's post Second World War military record looked like? Korea was a draw (but that's okay because the Republic of Korea survived and eventually thrived). The Persian Gulf War of 1991 threw the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait. Other than those two, though, the record is one of failures like Vietnam, and, I suspect, to that list will be added Afghanistan if not Iraq as well.

Put bluntly, what did all that senior officer education get us? Not all that much, it seems.

BTW, thank you for an interesting thread.

Cheers

a reply to: DISRAELI

I take it that Tuker is influenced by the need to learn the lessons taught by 1940, but a third world war could find us back in the situation in which protective defence is the most important requirement.

Perhaps. But one thing that may encourage maneuver warfare is the relatively small size of armies these days. More like Napoleonic times in that sense, lots of maneuver room.

Cheers

a reply to: DISRAELI


Tuker's WW2 emphasis is on the North Africa Campaign, but not unexpectedly, he covers the fall of France, 1940. His argument and analysis are that a linear deployment of ground forces or defensive line is vulnerable to mobile forces undertaking flanking attacks or the attacks slicing directly through the defenders. Thus, Tuker stance is that mobile defence with units in the rear and troops deployed to areas that require defending is the sounder military stance.

The structure of the French Army units in 1938 - 40 is insanely complicated. Also, the benefit of historical hindsight ensures that we know the out from the Fall of France. But I have found it next to impossible to envision another outcome for the French split logistics and, in some cases, transport away from front line units.

a reply to: F2d5thCavv2
On the other hand, the reason why armies are smaller is the effectiveness of long-distance weapons, which makes moving to "grapple with the enemy" more problematic. It is Paris being pounded by Big Bertha, on a larger scale.

a reply to: DISRAELI

Not to mention the phenomenal cost of fielding modern forces.

Cheers

originally posted by: F2d5thCavv2
I don't want to drag the topic of your thread too far afield, but I wonder what Tuker would have made of the postwar crops of senior American brass.

In all honesty, the same thought occurred to me after I read the book. Tuker tackles the Ice Age of Disarmament from the inter-war years. He outlines three kinds of disarmament: Material, moral and education disarmament. The third kind of disarmament covers the UK trashing any person who gave thought to the next war. Also, among the British Army crop of officers, that subject 'just isn't cricket' (my wording).

For those reasons, the possibility of future wars is ignored. Moreover, a professional army doesn't confine their thinking to tactics or matters confined to barracks. The study of military history and the sciences builds the intellectual foundations for military commanders to wage future wars successfully.

Now my take on matters takes over, for events span beyond Tuker's lifetime.

Before and during the Vietnam era, those circumstances around education disarmament took a different form. The same quality of mentorship/ war colleges that stood Eisenhower and Nimitz well are no longer impactful. So Westmoreland climbed through the ranks with the mindset that his WW2 experiences meant he didn't need to consider future wars.

Precisely, the character, causes and political conditions of wars in the post-colonial era are ignored. The outcome of these omissions and issues is the outcome of the Vietnam War.

What has the USA's post Second World War military record looked like? Korea was a draw (but that's okay because the Republic of Korea survived and eventually thrived). The Persian Gulf War of 1991 threw the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait. Other than those two, though, the record is one of failures like Vietnam, and, I suspect, to that list will be added Afghanistan if not Iraq as well.

It is always dangerous to fit a situation to the evidence and not the other way around. But the Gulf War (1991) is the conflict in the second half of the 20 century that aligns nicely with his ideas. However, one might argue for the Six-Day War (1967) and the Yom Kippur War (1973).

During the Gulf War, coalition forces used manoeuvre warfare to defeat the static Iraqi defences that outnumber them. Iraq's air force did a 'no show', and Saddam permitted the build-up of coalition forces in Saudi Arabia, but I stand by my point.

Put bluntly, what did all that senior officer education get us? Not all that much, it seems.

In light of the atrocities committed by Australian special forces in Afghanistan, that issue isn't confined to the U.S. military.

a reply to: xpert11

One thing impacting modern wars is the technological and firepower disparity between first world and other opponents has resulted in "asymmetric warfare".

We curse that "they" hit us with a suicide bomber, but then don't reflect that, given the situation, that is one of the few ways for them to cause us pain.

The colonial and post-colonial wars are fascinating in some aspects. Consider: the colonization of all of Africa was IMO a product of the technological (and firepower) superiority of the colonizers. "Fuzzy Wuzzy" was a fierce individual warrior, but like the youth of 1914, the chatter of automatic weapons was the dominant influence. (Oddly, Western countries recognized the utility of superior firepower in colonial operations, but failed to realize what the impact of those weapons would be in a European war.)

Fast forwarding to the post-Second World War era, rising nationalism among colonized peoples is matched by supplies of arms provided by the Soviets, among others. Suddenly, colonial wars weren't so one-sided anymore. Today, it is common to see photos of young African men and even boys clutching Kalashnikovs and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. Vietnam was not 'winnable' precisely because it had a border with China and willing Chinese support in terms of supplies and armaments ... leading to an unstoppable flow of those items to the communist guerrillas in the Republic of Vietnam, as well as (and more importantly) to the regular military forces of communist North Vietnam.

A useful comparison there is the UK's war in Malaya with communist guerrillas. There, the guerrillas -were- defeated, but it helped very much that that the UK was eventually able to cut them off from their supplies. Consider Iraq post-2003 and it rather more like the Vietnam situation: a porous border with Iran that the Shi'ite militias found quite useful.

And so we go, round and round.

Cheers

a reply to: F2d5thCavv2

In answering your points, I will attempt to construct a short basis for the continuation of The Pattern(s) of War , but shifting away from the World Wars.

In Vietnam, the reemergence of powerful ground forces coming um-struck in an environment where conventional and guerilla forces operated. Perhaps that is also true of the British in the American Revolution.

Westmoreland never came to grips with the competing elements at play, or that tactical victories, with troops flown in via helicopter, never amounted to winning the war.

Fortunately, Tuker's predictions concerning the use of nuclear weapons and aerial bombardment driving people underground in mountain terrain and elsewhere never occurred. But it is noteworthy that the North Vietnamese utilised extensive tunnel networks to evade or escape U.S. firepower. So basic military principles remain with or without nuclear weapons. Interestingly, at the same time, the technologically advanced Apollo space program is progressing; those low tech tunnel systems bedevilled the U.S. Army.

The British Army's ineffective use of landmines as a barrier against Rommel's offensive action lacked any defensive depth. However, in Vietnam and the wars in Southern Africa, landmines are employed by the 'underdogs' (Communist or Communist-backed forces) to prevent or interject the movement of opposing forces.

Yet, the 1st Australian Task Force's (1ATF) experiences with landmines in Vietnam is forgotten by the Australian Army between the 70s and 9-11.
Moreover, the threat posed by landmines in the descends of the IEDs that plagued coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The additions of remote detonation, the use of locally sourced materials, and increasing lethality all formed part of the IED threat.

Concerning Malaysia, counter-insurgency practitioners faced different conditions in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, government/ institutional corruption and cronyism plagued the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) and Afghanistan during U.S-led intervention.

Unsurprisingly, many of the locals had no interest in fighting to save their respective systems of government. Also, the few effective local military units, equipped and trained in the U.S. Army's image, are defeated by that country turning off logistical support.

Since conditions exist for the employment manoeuvre warfare, the same must apply to either counter - insurgencies campaigns or fertile grounds for the overthrow or undermining of fragile governments. Among those conditions from the standpoint of the insurgents or guerillas are sanctuaries that exist international borders and external logistical support and training.

So, before embarking on post 9-11 wars, how did U.S. and other countries military planners and senior military commanders not anticipate the threat posed by low tech insurgents and IEDs? Perhaps someone like General Tommy Franks is a product of similar education disarmament that produced partially produced Westmoreland. Of course, a person's character influences to what degree they study their chosen profession.

Lastly, one imagens Tuker turning over in his grave if he knew about the merry go round.

An excellent listen, and the hosts of that podcast quote directly from Approach to Battle, one of Tuker's later books that covers his critiques of senior British Army commanders in North Africa and Italy. Although the program is confined to the Fall of Tobruk, Tuker's blunt, outspokenness is fantastic and isn't a quality usually associated with his peers.

a reply to: xpert11

In Russia and later on in the Middle East, the larger geographical areas offered space for armies to manoeuvre

Depends on the day. Rain, freezing temperatures, snow, mud, wind, all of them can turn a flat terrain into a zero-maneuverability trap.