a reply to:
daskakik
Currently over 500 laws in the UK reference coronavirus.
It's a grey area, Carpy might be able to clear up the legality of it all. Although we agree on very little i still value his opinion.
I thought this was a decent article:
www.legalcheek.com...
"There are many formal accounts. I will use that set out by Joseph Raz in Chapter 11 of The Authority of Law (1979). This is because it captures the
majority of formal touchstones popularly associated with the rule of law. There are eight touchstones:
(1) All laws should be prospective, open and clear;
(2) Laws should be relatively stable;
(3) The making of particular legal orders should be guided by open, stable and clear general rules;
(4) Independence of the judiciary should be guaranteed;
(5) The principles of natural justice should be observed;
(6) Courts should have review powers over the implementation of other principles;
(7) Courts should be easily accessible, and;
(8) The discretion of crime preventing agencies may not pervert the law."
His conclusion and reasoning:
"Sadly, however, coronavirus laws are not âclearâ. Four matters point towards this conclusion.
First, coronavirus laws are very long. The Coronavirus Act 2020 runs to 348 pages, has 102 sections and 29 schedules. The âthree-tierâ system of
lockdown comprised some 30,000 words, spread over three statutory instruments. Simply reading all this information is a challenge, to say nothing of
understanding it.
Second, coronavirus laws are very numerous. At the time of writing, legislation.gov.uk yields 551 laws with the word âcoronavirusâ in the title.
Indeed, many statutory instruments exist simply to amend other, non-coronavirus-related secondary legislation on topics from income tax (S.I.
2020/524) to apprenticeships (S.I. 2020/1120) to offshore chemicals (S.I. 2020/855). One must now sift through a large volume of legal materials, if
one is to discern the law to which one is subject.
Third, coronavirus laws contain vague language. Take, for example, âminglingâ. âMinglingâ in a group of more than six people was prohibited
(outside certain exempted situations) by S.I. 2020/986. This was the first proscription of interpersonal âminglingâ, and the meaning of the word
wasnât clear. On 15 September 2020, Priti Patel (Secretary of State for the Home Department) asserted that the proscription disallowed two families
of four people from stopping to chat while walking to a park. A contrary view was expressed by Adam Wagner (the human rights barrister and Specialist
Advisor to the Joint Committee on Human Rightsâ COVID-19 Inquiry) who tweeted that, to âmingleâ, people must have met âin orderâ to socially
engage, which the park-goers will not have done. A law is not particularly âclearâ if specialists disagree about what it means.
Fourth, coronavirus laws can become confused with legally inconsequential government guidance. On 23 March 2020, Prime Minister Boris Johnson gave a
televised address to the United Kingdom. Johnson instructed that âyou must stay at homeâ, and presented âthe only reasons you should leave your
homeâ as a closed list (e.g. shopping for basic necessities; one form of exercise per day; medical need; travelling to and from work). At the time,
none of this was law. Three days later, though, S.I. 2020/684 entered into force. Strikingly, the instrument provided that people could leave homes if
they had a âreasonable excuseâ (the non-exhaustiveness of which differed from Johnsonâs four given examples). Laws are not âclearâ if, owing
to additional government guidance on the relevant issue, people are liable to become confused about the strict legal position. Particularly so when
that additional guidance is communicated directly to the populace, in imperative terms, by the Prime Minister.
Notwithstanding their prospectivity and openness, coronavirus lawsâ lack of clarity (associated with their length, volume, opacity and potential for
conflation with mere guidance) disrupts individualsâ abilities to plan their lives in accordance with what is lawful. To that extent, the
governmentâs response appears to deviate from what is required by the first criterion of Razâs conception of rule of law."