First F-35C Pilots Graduate from TOPGUN

USN I

“Our focus on the students that go through TOPGUN is not limited to teaching them the tactics, techniques and procedures that are required for them to successfully employ their aircraft, integrated into a larger force,” Cmdr. Timothy Myers, TOPGUN department head, said in the release. “We are also in the business of teaching our graduates how to instruct other students, so that when they go back to the fleet, they are able to instruct at a very high level.”

While TOPGUN had previously graduated students who trained to F-35C tactics and procedures, Heinz and Goodwin are the first fleet pilots already flying the jet to graduate the course, which used a syllabus developed from the ground up specifically for F-35C integrated operations, the Navy said. NAWDC has gradually incorporated F-35C tactics into the training curriculum as the advanced jet continues to enter the fleet and replace aging Navy and Marine Corps fighter aircraft.

“The Lightning II proved its value to the Navy during every phase of the TOPGUN course,” Myers said, “and its integration with the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, E/A-18G Growler and E-2C/D Hawkeye demonstrated that the powerful combination of 4th and 5th generation fighters, with advanced electronic attack, and command and control, is a force-multiplier against advanced threats.”

Slowly, but surely making headway.

Bonus material: Two Steps forward, one step back

Boeing announced today that it had delivered the first two F/A-18 Block III Super Hornets to the U.S. Navy for flight testing, one of which is a single-seat E model and the other a two-seat F model.

The Block III model is more “networked and survivable” compared to the Block II design, Jennifer Tebo, Boeing director of development for F/A-18 and EA-18G programs, told reporters on a media call today.

The block upgrade includes five major design features: an advanced cockpit system that combines legacy displays into a single glass touchscreen for easier use; conformal fuel tanks that add about 3,500 more pounds of fuel-carrying capacity to the jet to give it the range of the rest of the carrier air wing; a 10,000 flight hour service life, compared to about 6,000 hours previously; radar cross section improvements to make the jets even harder to find as enemy systems grow in sophistication; and an advanced networking infrastructure that includes a distributed targeting network processor to add computing power to the jet and process data faster to aid the pilot in decision-making.
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At the same time, though, the Navy’s plans for the future of its fighter force are somewhat murky. In 2019, Boeing won a $4-billion multiyear contract to buy 78 Super Hornets through Fiscal Year 2021, which is the budget request the Navy submitted in February and is going through congressional committees now for markups and eventual votes. However, in the February budget request release, the Navy stated that, starting in FY 2022, the money planned for a subsequent multiyear buy of 36 Super Hornets from FY 2022 to 2024 would be rerouted to “accelerated development of Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) and other key aviation wholeness investments,” according to budget justification documents.

a reply to: RadioRobert



Let's hope these birds don't let the pilots down.

a reply to: Wide-Eyes

I would trade every Bug and Rhino (and ill-fated Avenger money) in history for the Tomcat 21 and more F-35's and multi-role Hoovers

a reply to: RadioRobert

They also released Stormbreaker from a Super Hornet recently. It'll eventually find its way to the F-35.

I think production is still suspended until they get approval for the proposed fix. But if Raytheon can eventually get everything to work, and jam a couple Peregrines and fancy SDB's in the bays, everyone will be happy.

a reply to: RadioRobert

SDB production is supposed to restart next month if the fix gets approved.

Four SDB's and two Peregrines per bay would make for very happy JSF customers. If it all works...

a reply to: RadioRobert
I would actually second that motion, although it would have been nice to see the A-12 show its chops. One of the advanced Tomcats like the 21 would have made a much better platform than the Super Bug and as a Growler analogue.

a reply to: thebozeian

In hindsight, the USN was very lucky to get rid of the F-14s when they did.
The F-14 was a maintenance nightmare with some 50 manhours per flight hour compared to 20 for the E/F. And F-14 based fleet would have killed Navair during the GWOT.

originally posted by: mightmight
a reply to: thebozeian

In hindsight, the USN was very lucky to get rid of the F-14s when they did.
The F-14 was a maintenance nightmare with some 50 manhours per flight hour compared to 20 for the E/F. And F-14 based fleet would have killed Navair during the GWOT.

Given that the Shornets were basically five years old, and the oldest of the Tomcats were 30 years old, with outdated avionics, that would hardly be surprising.
What would apple to apple numbers look like? The A and B models were to be divested either way.

a reply to: RadioRobert

Oh you'd be stuck with the existing Tomcats if Navair purchases Super Tomcats in the 90s. There's no way arround that, they wouldn't be buying expensive Super Tomcats at the same rate they procured the Super Hornets and you need to keep the numbers up somehow.
You'd get them upgraded to some D+ variant of course, but this won't fix their maintenance issues.

a reply to: mightmight

D models weren't really the problem child. Early aircraft had nearly twice the requirements (again, not surprising). Smaller navair arm might not make a difference given current availability rates for carriers themselves. You might even get back to having a dedicated training carrier or two. In the end, I suspect the viability of the CVBG would be greatly increased as a fighting force even if smaller numbers were asea with an Air Wing with Hooovers and Cats than Shornets. F-14 carries more, farther than a Rhino ever will in strike configuration, and enables a BARCAP further out and longer in endurance -- all of which eases the air wing tanking requirements. Retaining S-3's for ASW, tanking, ELINT, and bomb truck roles which further reduces airframe burn time.

The CVBG entire raison d'etre is force projection. It cannot currently do that. And to be honest, I don't think the future of naval aviation looks like a supercarrier, but to the extent it does, it cannot be currently justified by the air arms deployed.

a reply to: RadioRobert

I’m talking about what actually happened during the GWOT years, 2001 to 2017ish.
Continuous operations ruined the Hornet based navair and Carrier Air Wings build around the Tomcat would have fared even worse.

Going with Tomcats means you have an overall smaller, more expensive, and older fleet with considerable higher maintenance requirements. It means the Navy hits the wall way sooner than they actually did. Readiness rates would have cratered even before the budget sequester in 2013 and they wouldn’t have recovered until today.

Whether or not a Super Tomcat would be the better aircraft for the “actual” mission of a CSG is a different discussion. It’s also rather moot at this point since the CAWs spent the last two decades bombing Hajis. The Hornet based fleet was far more suited for this mission than whatever Tomcat based alternative we might come up with. Hence the Navy was lucky going with the Hornets in the 90s. It might not have been the right call based on what they knew back then, but it was certainly right in hindsight.

What would a Tomcat based navair even have looked like? The USN is operating 700ish Super Hornet and Growlers today. They build a similar number of Tomcats since the 70s, but most of those were on their last legs before the GWOT even started in earnest. How do you keep the numbers up? How do you replace the aging Hornets? How do you want to handle EW?

As I see it – if the USN had procured the Super Tomcat in the 90s, it would have entered the GWOT with scores of aging Hornets and Tomcats and a very small fleet of (undoubtedly very capable) Super Tomcats. Maybe a squadron for each wing, if that.

Navair would subsequently fall apart with spiking maintenance requirements for the older F-14s and overburdening of the Hornet fleet. There then would be no way to build up numbers again by just continuing to procure dirt cheap Super Hornets and capitalizing on a single type fleet like they were able to do with the Hornets.
Throwing what, 150ish aging S-3s into the mix wouldn’t have fixed that either.

So what about the future, do you really want to confront China with an aircraft basically designed in the 60s with the RCS of a barn? It’s far from perfect, but I’d rather have Super Hornets Block IIIs and Growlers to back up the F-35Cs on the low and instead of Super Tomcats and Vikings.
And we don’t even need to discuss the capability of an aircraft that doesn’t exist. Affordability and sustainability are always a decisive factor.

a reply to: mightmight

Much rather have the greater range and payload in either scenario, to be honest. I'm not sure the signature treatments to Rhinos wouldn't translate, and both platforms will be radiating anyway.


The time for that decision was when NavAir was pushing ridiculous numbers (for procurement and operations) to Congress for the "new and improved" E-model that everyone knew were not attainable. GAO
The justification had to be as a bomb truck to replace Corsairs and Intruders as an interim type because it was generally less capable than either the Tomcat or even the Bugs. Wearing out the Bugs and replacing them and/or using the already extant S-3 with lots of hours left to play the bomb truck role in sandistan would have saved massive money over the E/F scam. Costs for Bugs had finally fallen, and the support and infrastructure finally exiated, and instead of taking advantage of it they went to a new program. Dumb. Not "smart in hindsight". That money rolls into new Tomcats (or JSF or, or, or ...). Even examining the Bombcat role vs Shornet in Sandistan, the F-14 carries about twice the payload half again as far. If I need 4 Rhinos and extra tanking support to do the job of 2 Bombcats, where is my operational advantage (capability or cost)? That's why the cost argument has always been disingenuous.

An even better opportunity would have been to cut the Hornet program early while the cost of the Bug was spiraling up to and then beyond that of the new-build Tomcats. By 1975 the Navy was already projecting a like-number run of Hornets would be only $3 million cheaper per airframe than new Tomcats. The same arguments were advanced then that operational costs would be lower (per hour) without addressing the context of capability.

a reply to: RadioRobert


Hornet vs Super Hornet is another debate entirely, as is the question if they could have gone with an even cheaper airpower solutions for the GWOT.

I’m also not saying the decision to go with the Super Hornet was the best one they could have made or even the right decision based on what they knew in the 90s. I’m saying that in hindsight, the Hornet based fleet was more suitable for the wars to come. They were lucky. They certainly weren’t smart.

So about capabilities. I don’t know where you get ‘twice the payload’ from. The original Tomcat had a maximum weapons load of about 15k lb on 10 hardpoints while the Super Hornet comes in at about 17k lb on 11 hardpoints. The Super Tomcat doesn’t exist of course and we can make anything up, but I don’t see the payload doubling.
I think the payload would have been in the same ballpark without a relevant difference either way.

The F-14s have a range advantage which translates to them using Air Force taker support once instead of twice during a mission. It’s nice on paper but it doesn’t translate to an operational advantage in the real world. And neither does and weapon load difference of some thousand lb. You end up not using them anyway.

In war, reliability and sustainability will always win over capability. 80% of the capability for 60% of the cost and 50% of the downtime is always preferable.
So I don’t see it needing 4 Super Hornets for 2 Super Tomcats.
I see it as you’ll go to war with either one squadron each of Super Tomcats, Tomcats, Hornets and Vikings or two squadrons of Super Hornets and one squadron each of Hornets and Growlers.
Who cares if the fictitious Super Tomcats performs at 120% of the Super Hornet. I’d rather have the newer fleet with 24 birds backed up by another 24 birds of the same type than an aging flying circus of 3 different types with a 12 expensive, maintenance-heavy super birds to top it off.
I’m not following your cost arguments. Again, we don’t know what would have happened with the Super Tomcat since the aircraft was never built. They expected similar costs as with the A-12 program which came it at 85mil per plane in whatever 90s US-$.

Meanwhile, we do know what happened with the procurement costs of the Super Hornets. At one point in the early 2010s Boeing sold them to the Navy for some 50 mil per plane. That’s less than the production cost of even the F-14D. The price has since increased somewhat because inflation, production slowdown and continued upgrades but it’s still considerably lower than what the Super Tomcat would have cost in the 90s. There’s just no way around that, no matter what GAO wrote back then.

Finally, I think the idea you could get the RCS of a Super Tomcat anywhere close to Block III levels would be pretty ridiculous. So sure ‘it would translate’. Instead of the RCS of a barn, you’d have the RCS of a car or something. Just not relevant at all. The bigger bird from the sixties is at a disadvantage here.

Things have changed since the 70,s.With carrier ops its all about force projection and fleet protection.Range and weapons load is a big thing and having a platform that economies that is what they are chasing..

a reply to: mightmight

So about capabilities. I don’t know where you get ‘twice the payload’ from. The original Tomcat had a maximum weapons load of about 15k lb on 10 hardpoints while the Super Hornet comes in at about 17k lb on 11 hardpoints.

Because the Shornet can't go anywhere with max payload. Tomcats were pressed into service as Bombcats because they could stay on station twice as long while carrying more ordinance than anything on board after the Intruder disappeared-- an artifact of being designed to carry six 1,000 lb AAMs to a great distance and loiter there.

I am not suggesting you could get the RCS to SH levels, but using appropriate and related treatment, you will get a reduction, in the same manner the E managed from the Classics. And for the relevant time frame, signature is not a dominant consideration. There is little IADS threat where the Shornets have ended up doing their work, and neither would have been effective in an air-to-air role against near-peers without radiating. Again, operationally, in context, it won't factor as much as range and payload. For the same reason the Air Force didn't replace F-15's with F-16's with Have Glass treatment, despite the fact they had/have lower RCS and lower operating/procurement costs. There were more dominant operational concerns for the Eagle and Beagle fleets in the time period being discussed. There are enormous benefits for survivability in reducing RCS, but RCS is not the primary driver on ANY combat aircraft -- the mission requirement is. It doesn't matter how stealthy (or cheap) the F-117 was-- it could not perform the F-15 missions or replace the bomber fleet.

If you're going to have a CVN, it needs to be able to reach out and touch someone to be worth the enormous sums of money. It can't right now. If you're going to pour money into a multi-million dollar venture as a towing or hauling outfit, it doesn't make sense to buy trucks with 4-cylinder Honda VTEC because they cost a fourth as much as a big diesel engine.

a reply to: RadioRobert


Super Hornets can get to the next Air Force tanker supporting air operations over Sandistan just fine. The range difference between the Tomcat and the Super Hornet translates to one or two more air refuelings for each mission. This is just not really relevant in the real world.
If we were talking about this in a theoretical vacuum, you’d be correct. For ‘pure’ carrier operations you’d want to have a longer-legged platform. Going forward, towards a near-peer conflict in the Pacific, you’d want a longer-legged platform too, generally speaking.

But for the last two decades, the operational reality consisted of prolonged combat operations in a low-intensity conflict. In this particular circumstance, the newer, less expensive, easily rejuvenable air wing was preferable to and air wing geared towards more conventional carrier operations.

Another general observation about payload requirements – most of the time during the GWOT, the standard 2 or 4 JDAM loadout was perfectly adequate. The reason they didn’t bother to haul more ordnance was not because of range reductions, but because more wasn’t required in most circumstances. Otherwise, we would have seen a far more aggressive push towards lighter, stacked ordnance.

About RCS. Obviously, low observability was not relevant during the GWOT. Hence the Navy was lucky also not to procure the A-12 or some NATF fighter ;-) This comment was more geared towards the future though. LO will become more relevant in the Pacific theater and the Block III Hornet will still have (limited) advantages in this regard. I do not think a similar reduction from a Super Tomcat to a ‘Super Tomcat Block III’ would be possible.
As for radiating – you can reduce detection significantly by utilizing the emerging Cooperative Engagement Capability and by operating behind a robust EW screen.

If the Navy had procured the Super Tomcat, how would you rebuild the air wing today? I’d think you’d need to retain the Super Tomcats no matter what. I’d prefer Block IIIs and the dedicated EW aircraft of the same type. It means less range, but cheaper to procure and operate which is preferable for low-end tier of the wing. Which is still the main point. Resources are finite and the introduction of the F-35C will suck up most of it.

How do you propose to keep numbers up without investing additional billions Congress won’t provide?
Today, the standard Carrier Air Wing consists of four Super Hornet and one Growler squadron. That’s already inadequate, but at least the Navy was able to rejuvenate the wing with the finite resources available.

If they had gone with Tomcats in the 90s, they’d probably be down to just three Super Tomcat squadrons at this point. The older Tomcats and Hornets would have not survived the prolonged operations of the last two decades and the resources to procure thbe more expensive Super Tomcat in sufficient quantities would not have been available. Rejuvenation would not have been possible and you’d still lack a modern EW platform and face the necessity of replacing the S-3s as well.
This is the reality of what you’re proposing.

As a side note – the reality also is the Carrier is the wrong tool to face the Chinese in the Pacific, no matter what aircraft you procure. The sooner the US accepts that trying to protect the Carrier Strike Group against Chinese ballistic and hypersonic weaponry is a losing strategy, the better. The solution is long-range strategic platforms.

a reply to: mightmight

Super Hornets can get to the next Air Force tanker supporting air operations over Sandistan just fine. The range difference between the Tomcat and the Super Hornet translates to one or two more air refuelings for each mission. This is just not really relevant in the real world.

That is a HUGE difference in the real world. Because it's one or two more hookups per sortie. If I launch a 8 plane strike, with 2 Growlers, I now need 10-20 MORE hookups than i did before. That's one or two MORE tankers tasked PER 10 sorties. In an actual dustup where the Navy is expected to generate continuous sorties, that is an enormous drain on the tanking tasking-- AND all the tanking sorties should now be factored into your true operational cost.
Over 30% of -135 tasking in Desert Storm was in support of the Navy. It's why carriers are impotent.
Carriers cannot support their own operations with organic air now. Legs are too short. Offload from a buddy-store equipped Shornet at range is paltry. If I have to generate three or four times as many Shornets to get a given number of lbs of ordnance downrange (and the carrier only exists to do that), it doesn't matter that the operational cost per hour is lower. I now have to send twice as many out and one or two buddytankers PER SORTIE to get them there or back. It's a good thing I can buy more of them...

. The reason they didn’t bother to haul more ordnance was not because of range reductions, but because more wasn’t required in most circumstances.

It is/was ALL about range and loiter time over target and payload. Why do you think the Bone was the top requested air asset for air support? Why were the AC-130's and Harvest Hawks toyed with? Range/endurance and the payload to maintain a threat over several hours without a severe drain on tanking availability

If the Navy had procured the Super Tomcat, how would you rebuild the air wing today?

You would use the billions saved by the Shornet buy/development to push the F-35C into fleet ops faster, which has substantially longer legs than the Shornet in real terms. You'd eventually phase out the Toms to release them back to BARCAP and fleet airdefence missions, and/or burn their airframes and the Hoovers' in permissive environments saving life on the F-35's.

How do you propose to keep numbers up without investing additional billions Congress won’t provide?

By spending the same $50+ billion spent on development and procurement of the Shornet, plus the hours shaved in true cost accounting which should include airframe amortization and additional support operations generated by less capable aircraft.
Congress is literally begging the Navy to buy more F-35's right now. The problem wouldn't be getting money from Congress for recapping with F-35's. The problem is the Navy playing games and/or incompetence.

As a side note – the reality also is the Carrier is the wrong tool to face the Chinese in the Pacific, no matter what aircraft you procure. The sooner the US accepts that trying to protect the Carrier Strike Group against Chinese ballistic and hypersonic weaponry is a losing strategy, the better. The solution is long-range strategic platforms.

100% agreement. Think of how many Raiders a new Ford class could build. If the supercarrier lacks the ability to reach out and touch someone (and relatively safely, if it could), then it's only mission is very expensive, but very potent sea control in blue water. The new force projection by/for naval ops would be strategic air and SSGNs. Start a "future of naval air" thread, and I'll dump all sorts of unpopular ideas about the future of naval air with you

a reply to: RadioRobert

I've had so many arguments with people claiming both the Hornet and Super Hornet range is just fine, because on paper the fuel fraction is good. The biggest complaint I heard from both their pilots were the short legs.