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Fear of reprisal led to MD-83 crash

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posted on Mar, 14 2017 @ 01:12 PM
In June of 2012, Dana Air flight 992 slammed into a crowded neighborhood in Lagos, killing all 153 people on board, and at least 6 on the ground. Just before the accident, the crew radioed that they had dual engine failure.

Nigerian investigators released their report into the crash today. There was no FDR data, as it was apparently too badly damaged. The CVR recorded 31 minutes, starting approximately 16 minutes after takeoff. The crew was already discussing a discrepancy between throttle setting and power out of the #1 engine. The crew discussed diverting, but at one point the captain said if they declared an emergency and landed, the CAA would go after them.

During final approach, the #2 engine stopped responding to throttle settings. Neither engine flamed out, but the crew didn't have enough power to maintain altitude.

posted on Mar, 14 2017 @ 01:50 PM
Aircraft should be flown from the captains seat, not a politicians desk. Very unfortunate that pilots in every country are always concerned how it will look on paper, not how it works in the air. The FAA always defaults to pilot error when in doubt.

posted on Mar, 14 2017 @ 02:04 PM
a reply to: WUNK22

Culture always plays a role. With some it's extremely difficult to convince them to speak up about problems. With others, it's difficult to convince them that there won't be reprisals for speaking up about something.

posted on Mar, 14 2017 @ 02:11 PM
a reply to: Zaphod58

Interesting stuff.


And while I'm at it, knowing full well that you're the expert......and that I'm not, I would we used to fly A LOT, as my Dad was an Oil Company Exec stationed overseas. We had an "interesting" experience aboard a McDonnel Douglas air liner, (too young to have noticed the model number); two of four engines failed and the pilot was forced to make an emergency landing into Dulles Intl. in DC.

Since that time and to this day, my Father, (and I as well), will only fly on Boeing aircraft, with the exception that of late we've been forced to fly on Airbus, which, frankly, in terms of quality, reminds me a lot of MD.

posted on Mar, 14 2017 @ 06:59 PM
a reply to: TonyS

If it was a four engined MDC jet then it was a DC-8. Having engines fail has little if anything to do with who designs the airframe and everything to do with who manufactures the engines, how they are maintained and what the specific operating conditions were. Additionally early model jets like the DC-8/B707 had engines that by today's standards were crude and unreliable, therefore they frequently failed in flight. I know many an old engineer who's mortgage was handsomely paid from overtime money earned on unscheduled overseas engine changes, and those were almost all B707 and early model P&W JT-9 powered B747. In fact the early JT-9's were so notoriously unreliable that Boeing made provision on the inboard left wing of the B747 to carry a spare engine to be uplifted when another aircraft required one to be flown and the stranded passengers picked up. This practice was continued on later models right up to the 400 series for P&W 4000, RB211 and CF-6 powered aircraft. And speaking of engine failures, what about the famous "Speedbird 9" incident in 1982 when a BA 747-200 lost all engines after flying into a volcanic ash cloud? Using your logic shouldn't you and your father have also avoided Boeing's as well?

Since that time and to this day, my Father, (and I as well), will only fly on Boeing aircraft, with the exception that of late we've been forced to fly on Airbus, which, frankly, in terms of quality, reminds me a lot of MD.

It NEVER ceases to amaze me how people still quote this Boeing marketing Dept mantra crap of "If its not Boeing I'm not going!". There is no logic to this thinking other than as a clever marketing exercise that has sunk as deeply into the public consciousness as "Pratt & Whitney, dependable engines", or "Coke adds life", neither of which is necessarily true. And when you say that when forced to fly Airbus the quality reminds you of MDC, what do you mean? If you look at accident and inflight incident statistics Boeing/Airbus are about about the same in revenue passenger miles. Frankly I think most Airbus airliner interiors have left Boeing for dead in terms of look and feel (same goes for their cockpits) until Boeing was finally forced to concede first with the 737NG Boeing sky interior and later the 787 that its cabins were a bit dated. That's putting it mildly, personally I think the 747-400 now looks like a junkies suicide chamber, dingy and awful.

posted on Mar, 15 2017 @ 12:49 PM
So tragic. The lack of support and the mgmt level and the lack of assertiveness by the crew led to 159 people dying.

You can always find another job, you don't get life 2 or 3.

posted on Jul, 21 2017 @ 10:39 AM
The final report shows that the aircraft showed that the #1 engine had several slow spool-up incidents on previous sectors. It had been overhauled six months prior, and during the investigation it was found that one of the two fuel manifolds had been installed incorrectly. The engine was supposed to be modified to replace the fuel inlet-tube, due to fuel inlet fatigue. The incident aircraft had fatigue cracks in the inlet tube.

posted on Jul, 21 2017 @ 12:04 PM
The show "Air Disasters" had a decent account of what happened. Though that episode was harder to follow than most.

posted on Jul, 21 2017 @ 01:27 PM

It’s what I call the “snafu principle.” Communication only occurs between equals–real communication, that is–because when you are dealing with people above you in a hierarchy, you learn not to tell them anything they don’t want to hear. If you tell them anything they don’t want to hear, the response is, “One more word Bumstead and I’ll fire you!” Or in the military, “One more word and you’re court-martialed.” It’s throughout the whole system.

So the higher up in the hierarchy you go, the more lies are being told to flatter those above them. So those at the top have no idea what is going on at all. Those at the bottom have to adjust to the rules made by those at the top who don’t know what’s going on. Those at the top can write rules about this, that and the other, while those at the bottom have got to adjust reality to fit the rules as much as they can.


So I call this the burden of omniscience: those on the top are supposed to be doing the seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and all the sensing, apprehending and conceptualizing for the whole society and those at the bottom have to adjust to what those at the top think based on all the misinformation flowing up in a hierarchy where any speaking of the truth can get you punished.

posted on Jul, 24 2017 @ 12:05 PM
a reply to: wirehead

When I was flying in the military, we aggressively addressed this problem and attempted to minimize its impact. The Tenerife accident highlighted the need for Assertiveness in the cockpit, which could be troubling in military aviation.

Therefore, we would brief whenever there was a large hierarchical gap in the cockpit the following statement:

"there is no rank in the cockpit."

We verbalized this on several flights. I was an O-3 and was flying with the CAG, an O-6, who was a former A-6 BN. He was the one who stated "there is no rank in the cockpit" and we trundled on.

This human factor is definitely still a problem in commercial aviation, especially in cultures were it's considered very disrespectful to question someone higher ranking than you. But in the US majors, I know this topic is discussed.

posted on Jul, 24 2017 @ 01:02 PM
a reply to: cosmania

We're rapidly approaching the same levels of crew coordination that were seen around the time of Tenerife. As in little to none.

posted on Jul, 24 2017 @ 01:18 PM
AF447 was a good example of poor crew communication and coordination.

posted on Jul, 24 2017 @ 01:41 PM
a reply to: Flipper35

There have been many in recent years. There's a thread buried in the forum talking about how we're going the wrong way and giving examples. It's getting to the point that I'll drive.

posted on Jul, 25 2017 @ 11:34 AM
I keep telling my wife a Cherokee 6 will get us there with plenty of payload capacity for the four of us and luggage. Skip all the driving to the airport 2 hours early, stop and eat lunch and refuel halfway there.

The AF447 transcript is one of the most puzzling to me. Some of the other incidents I can see overload happening, but this one had no reason for the pilot to do what he did. The incident on approach at SF was just technological complacency. Too many pilots don't fly the plane any longer, they wait for the plane to tell them what to do.

posted on Jul, 25 2017 @ 11:44 AM
a reply to: Flipper35

It all comes back to crew coordination. There have been other Airbus aircraft that lost input from the pitot tubes, and they were able to recover and land just fine. Then there have been accidents where they should have been able to land easily, but failed to recognize what was going on, and crashed.

One of the crashes in Egypt a few years ago was flown by a former Air Force general. He was one of the only pilots that shot down an Israeli aircraft in one of the wars, and was highly experienced. He failed to recognize that the aircraft was going into a bank on a night departure. They went out of control and crashed into the Red Sea.

posted on Jul, 25 2017 @ 02:15 PM
Speaking of poor crew coordination....

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