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Before the 1979 Iranian revolution, relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia proceeded without major incident. Ties improved in the 1960s, as cooperation grew in the face of the threats posed to both by Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arabism and by potential Soviet penetration. Another mutual threat was posed by the secular Arab-nationalist Baathists in Iraq, who took power in the 1960s. The end of British military presence in the Persian Gulf region in 1971 was followed soon by the initiation of new US foreign policy in the region. President Richard Nixon initiated the “twin-pillar policy” in the Persian Gulf, whereby Iran and Saudi Arabia would operate together as local guardians of US interests in the region. Iran eagerly assumed the role of regional policeman, while Saudi Arabia played an important, but not dominant, role as a US ally in the Arab world. Under the twin-pillar policy, cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia extended to joint operations in defeating communist elements in North Yemen, Zaire, Somalia and Oman, but following the assassination of King Faisal in 1975, the Kingdom began to display a new approach towards oil, its major resource. The Shah declared publicly that oil had been undervalued for years and that OPEC urgently needed a price hike. The Shah anticipated the Saudis’ cooperation, but, as the de facto leader of OPEC, Saudi Arabia declared in December 1976 that it would not increase the price of its oil. Saudi Arabia was thereby able both to increase its market share and to conform to Western economic interests. Meanwhile, the Shah was heavily reliant on high oil prices to limit a growing budget deficit and maintain high military spending. Domestic sentiment grew in Iran that the Shah’s economic programme had failed to meet the expectations raised by the oil-revenue windfall.
After the Iranian revolution in 1979, religion would be at the forefront of Iran’s state identity. Ayatollah Khomeini claimed broad Islamic support for the revolution and was quick to criticize the “decadence” of the Wahhabi Saudi monarchy. The claim that a Shiite theocracy would be the authoritative voice of Islam clashed with the Saudi Kingdom’s assumed religious legitimacy as the guardian of the two Holy Mosques, in Mecca and Medina. Iranian endeavours to use the media to mobilize Saudi Arabia’s Shiite minority caused further concern in the Kingdom over Iran’s intentions.
When Saddam Hussein made his first state visit to Saudi Arabia, in August 1980, he received approval from King Khalid for his plans to invade an Iran in the throes of political transition. Saudi Arabia provided billions in financial assistance to Saddam’s campaign and pressed for other Gulf states to follow suit. Direct attacks occurred midway through the war; Iran struck Saudi tankers, and the Kingdom responded by shooting down two Iranian jet fighters.
- King Fahd congratulates President Mohammad Khatami on his election victory in 2001, saying it is an endorsement of his reformist policy. Khatami had worked for rapprochement with Riyadh after winning his first landslide win in 1997. Khatami visits Saudi Arabia, the first such trip since 1979. Better relations are sealed with a security pact in April 2001.
In 2013, Saudi Ambassador to Britain Mohammed bin Nawaf bin Abdulaziz Al Saud wrote an editorial in The New York Times criticizing Saudi Arabia's Western allies for not taking bold enough measures against Syria and Iran, thus destabilizing the Middle East and forcing Saudi Arabia to become more aggressive in international affairs. The Obama administration continues to reassure the Persian Gulf states that regional security is a U.S. priority, but, as of December 2013, the Gulf states express skepticism
A senior advisor to the Saudi royal family has accused its Western allies of deceiving the oil rich kingdom in striking the nuclear accord with Iran and said Continued....
Riyadh would follow an independent foreign policy.
Nawaf Obaid told a think tank meeting in London that Saudi Arabia was determined to pursue its own foreign and policy goals. Having in the past been reactive to events, the leading Sunni Muslim nation was determined to be pro-active in future.
Mr Obaid said that while Saudi Arabia knew that the US was talking directly to Iran through a channel in the Gulf state of Oman, Washington had not directly briefed its ally.
"We were lied to, things were hidden from us," he said. "The problem is not with the deal struck in Geneva but how it was done."
here is critical divergence over the source of instability in the Middle East, and therefore stark contrast in conceptualizing the “enemy.” For Saudi Arabia, Iran is a “nefarious” regional actor that has overstretched its ambitions in the Arab world, bringing with it great instability. In a recent off-the-record conversation with a senior Gulf Arab official, it was clear that Saudi Arabia’s regional priority was focused on limiting Tehran’s orbit of influence in Syria and consequently weakening its stronghold in Lebanon.
In contrast, Iran views the Islamic State (IS) as the most imminent threat to regional security, and more broadly opposes the US military presence in its neighborhood. A senior Iranian official who spoke with Al-Monitor without attribution said Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s state security apparatus, Hezbollah and Russian military assistance provide the most effective means to counter these threats. But for Saudi Arabia, IS and Sunni radicalization are a derivative of the alienation being fueled by the activities of Iranian-commanded Shiite militias in Iraq and Tehran’s backing for Assad.
A second hurdle for diplomacy is that Saudi Arabia and Iran cannot reach consensus on the starting point for ending the conflict in Syria. In principle, both agree on the need for the formation of a transitional government, as outlined by the Geneva 1 conference. However, Riyadh sees no place for Assad in this transition. In contrast, a senior Iranian official who recently spoke to Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity said that recent gains made by IS have made it essential that Assad have a role in the transitional government in order to prevent the dissolution of Syria’s security apparatus and a total state collapse.
In 2013, Saudi Ambassador to Britain Mohammed bin Nawaf bin Abdulaziz Al Saud wrote an editorial in The New York Times criticizing Saudi Arabia's Western allies for not taking bold enough measures against Syria and Iran, thus destabilizing the Middle East and forcing Saudi Arabia to become more aggressive in international affairs. The Obama administration continues to reassure the Persian Gulf states that regional security is a U.S. priority, but, as of December 2013, the Gulf states express skepticism
Iran and Saudi Arabia are vying for regional dominance and have been so doing for some time. This, and the age-old dislike and hatred the different denominations of Islam have for each other.
The end of British military presence in the Persian Gulf region in 1971 was followed soon by the initiation of new US foreign policy in the region. President Richard Nixon initiated the “twin-pillar policy” in the Persian Gulf, whereby Iran and Saudi Arabia would operate together as local guardians of US interests in the region.
Iran and Saudi Arabia are vying for regional dominance and have been so doing for some time.
It seems like that the rhetoric is the same across the board from all the ME countries. Always threats of retaliation for events that haven't even transpired, threats of violence before any violence has happened.
originally posted by: intrptr
US is the one "vying" over there. Iran is next in a long line of "vyed" nation states decimated by NATO. Sauds have chosen to back the west against Iran.
…blah,blah,blah.
The point of the OP is about Saudi and Iran and in that context both nations are vying for regional dominance, alongside the…
More religious rivalry than geographical, US covert ops pitted shia and sunni against one another in Iraq, too.
originally posted by: SLAYER69
originally posted by: intrptr
Is "denial" in the land of subversion or the country of instigation, I forget.
Have either Iran or Saudi Arabia not been responsible for both behaviors, each in their own way?
originally posted by: SLAYER69
a reply to: intrptr
Yes, Yes, Yes...
A house was robbed, they took the TV and DVD player.
Does that make the thief responsible for the continuing bad plumbing, leaky roof or the fact that the home owner is behind on their property tax/house payment etc?
wheat from chaff