posted on Aug, 3 2015 @ 04:22 PM
To say something exists is incomplete. It’s no more redundant than saying existence exists, or something is a something. At least they’re talking
about a something, but to talk of something without being able to refer to that something in the world, is the result of fancy and imagination.
One cannot speak about something that doesn’t exist or else we’d have nothing to speak about, because what doesn’t exist is, by nature, nothing.
But try speaking about nothing for any given length of time, and you’ll always end up speaking about something.
Supposing all that exists is everything, and its contrapositive, nothing is all that does not exist, we find that in order to speak about anything
other than nothing, we must speak about a particular something. That particular something, being a part of everything, necessarily exists.
To say something doesn’t exist is a direct contradiction—the very nature of something is that it exists. It’s no different than saying something
is nothing. Unfortunately, only nothing is nothing. Since we are not speaking about nothing in our discussions of what doesn’t exist, what doesn’t
exist must therefor be something.
Point being, though we still know what you mean when you say it, saying something exists and saying something doesn’t exist is unintelligible and
incoherent. Tautologically, only everything exists; only nothing doesn’t exist. In order to talk about what something doesn’t exist as, we
must first admit its existence, rather than doing so surreptitiously, so that we are able to speak about its nature in a more honest fashion with our
dignities intact. By admitting this, we can refer to existence for our answers, showing to what extent this something exists as in comparison
to what extant this something does not exist as, and we avoid these problems.
For instance, to say unicorns do not exist is the same as saying something is nothing, a contradiction. Only when we say a unicorn exists as a
cultural artifact of literature, art and myth, can we confirm it doesn’t exist as a white horse with a horn. Only when we say what it is can we say
what it is not, and vice versa.
If we are to make any sense of theology, or any philosophy about the nature of God and the supernatural, and what the hell the theist, atheist and
agnostic theologians are droning on about, it becomes impossible to derive any intelligibility from their dialectic without inquiring into what
something in nature they are referring to, as inquiring into the nature of anything demands at least this much.
In order to do so, we must admit its existence so that we may deduce from this its non-existence. As any study of nature involves, we take empirical
considerations towards it, and in so doing we find in all cases, theologians are referring to mere fancies of their own mind, which have been derived
from the cultural artifacts that surround them. Though each derivation differs in accordance with the creativity of the theist/atheist/agnostic
theologian, his experiences and the cultural lens he interprets them through, what he derives it from is the cultural artifacts he has experienced in
tandem with his interpretations of them, which is what it is in the world that he refers to when he speaks of God. Empirically, the term refers
to nothing else but a fiction. If god is indeed something, and we can refer to it, then this is what God is. God exists as a fiction. If this premise
is accepted, and the premise that a fiction is not a fact, we can reasonably conclude that God does not exist as a fact—the synthesis of the
dialectic of theology.