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I suppose we will find out soon enough if their leaks are authentic, or not.
When the OSCE is supplying the monitors how does the US prohibit them from reporting on violations?
Can you explain why the Russian OSCE ambassador keeps blocking a vote for OSCE monitors to be deployed along the ENTIRE border instead of just the 2 locations they are restrict6ed to now? Please explain why rebels prohibit OSCE monitors into certain areas shortly before hostilities start and wont allow them in until their hostilities are done with?
Under the UN charter Ukraine has every right to defend itself from a foreign military attack.
originally posted by: Boomorangatangarang
USA suppresses the facts of the violation of the Minsk agreements by Kiev
At the checkpoint at the entrance of the village of Berezove (government-controlled, 35km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM was denied passage.
The SMM was initially turned back at the first government-controlled checkpoint on the road from Donetsk to Kurakhove but was able to pass through the checkpoint 30 minutes later.
On several occasions, Ukrainian Armed Forces at checkpoints stopped SMM patrols to inquire about the nationalities of patrol members.
At a checkpoint four kilometers west of Hranitne, the SMM was asked to disclose the nationalities of the patrol team. The SMM was allowed to pass through the checkpoint after a 25-minute delay. At other checkpoints, SMM patrols were able to pass after shorter delays.
In Kharkiv region, on 4 June, when arriving in Vovchansk, the SMM was stopped for approximately ten minutes at a Ukrainian Armed Forces check point which has been in place since at least May 2014. The soldiers registered the names of the SMM monitors and asked about their citizenship. This was the first time that the SMM monitors have been asked about their citizenship at a checkpoint in the Kharkiv area.
Despite claims that heavy weapons have been withdrawn, the SMM continued to observe the presence and movement of heavy weapons in places proscribed by Minsk, including by its UAV. In government-controlled areas, SMM patrols observed two T-64 main battle tanks (MBT) and SMM UAVs observed 6 MBTs. In “DPR”-controlled areas, SMM UAVs observed one artillery piece in Telmanove but was subject to jamming while flying over Dzerzhinske (“DPR”-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol). SMM UAVs observed defensive positions, military vehicles and shelling marks on both sides of the contact line in multiple locations.
Could you please provide anything indicating Cyber Berkut is pro Russian?
This is still not proof that the leaks themselves are authentic, but it is absolute proof that the Minsk agreements have been completely ignored and the Kiev regime is shelling civilian areas.
SMM UAVs observed defensive positions, military vehicles and shelling marks on both sides of the contact line in multiple locations.
Video leak: Russian troops (specific Moscow accent) filmed themselves how they attacked #Mariinka inside #Ukraine. youtu.be...
originally posted by: DJW001
a reply to: Boomorangatangarang
As you should recall, the Berkut were the FSB trained Ukrainian security service whose members were involved in perpetrating violence against Maidan protesters. Many of them fled to Russia where they continue to fight against the legally elected government. They are not hackers, they a propagandists. I will prepare a dedicated thread once I have access to a real computer. (I am posting from a tablet.)
originally posted by: Boomorangatangarang
a reply to: tsurfer2000h
Thank you the links. They were interesting, but neither gave any detail as to the Russian connection other than a passing mentioning in the introduction.
CyberBerkut (Russian: КиберБеркут, Ukrainian: КіберБеркут)—is a modern organized group of pro-Russian hacktivists.[citation needed] The group became locally known for a series of publicity stunts and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on Ukrainian government, and western or Ukrainian corporate websites.[citation needed]
Attacks on NATO websites.[2][3][4]
Attacks on U.S. private military companies.[5]
Publication of correspondence of deputies of (political parties) Batkivshchyna and Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform.[6]
Publication of correspondence with the United States Embassy in Ukraine and United States foundations.[7]
Disclosure to public of telephone recording between Yulia Tymoshenko and Nestor Shufrych.[8][nb 2]
Disclosure to public of telephone recording between EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton and Foreign Minister of Estonia Urmas Paet.[9]
Blocking cellular phones of members of the Yatsenyuk Government and persons close to them.[10]
Blocking Internet resources of Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine Andriy Parubiy and news portals: LigaBusinessInform and Ukrainian Independent Information Agency.[11]
Publication of video materials that are blocked on YouTube.[citation needed]
Attempts at disrupting the recruitment of the National Guard of Ukraine.[citation needed]
Attempted destruction of the electronic system of the Central Election Commission of Ukraine prior to the 2014 Ukrainian presidential election.[12]
Publishing lists of alleged Ukrainian military deserters [13]
Attempts at disrupting the work of the Central Election Commission of Ukraine by damaging the IFES system before the elections and blocking cellphones of their organisators.[14][15]
Temporary disruption of the websites of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the General Prosecutor of Ukraine. Websites of TV channels 1+1 and Inter were also temporary disrupted[citation needed].
Email hacking and publication of the conversation between Ihor Kolomoyskyi and the persecutor of the Lviv Oblast, hacking of the computer and email of a person related to Ihor Kolomoyskiy.[16][17][18] Archives of the contents of 89 email accounts of Lviv oblast's prosecutor office employees.
Hacking and publishing of the Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov's conversation.[19]
Blocking of the website of the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko on June 29, 2014.[20]
Publication of the real name and biography of Semen Semenchenko – Konstantin Grishin.[21]
Hacking of commercial billboards in Kiev and broadcasting footage over them with the accusal of some candidates in the parliamentary election as war criminals.[22]
Hacking ot the German Chancellery and the German Bundestag[23]
CyberBerkut (Russian: КиберБеркут, Ukrainian: КіберБеркут)—is a modern organized group of pro-Russian hacktivists.[citation needed]