The F-35, the AESA radar, and the ability to beam down a computer virus from the sky

originally posted by: Zaphod58
a reply to: mbkennel

That was just a spitballing example. I don't have the actual numbers for the F-35, but the two are going to be close, with the US being slightly stealthier.

I thought the UK was getting the normal US version not the export too?

a reply to: crazyewok

There will be differences, but they won't be big differences.

ok, please explain to me how the AESA radar can download a virus into another RADAR system? Jamming, blinding, spoofing that makes sense, but downloading a virus into it???

I can still understand the possibility of uploading a virus into another AESA system, if it is used for comms too, provided you cracked the encryption, but most of the RADAR systems in the world are not that advanced.

And No, AESA is not black magic, i.e. It cannot do magic things. All it does is to use electronic beam-steering, with the possibility of using different frequencies for each element, and so on.


(I have designed and worked on various military RADARS in the past, so I have a fairly good understanding of RADAR systems)

originally posted by: Hellhound604
ok, please explain to me how the AESA radar can download a virus into another RADAR system? Jamming, blinding, spoofing that makes sense, but downloading a virus into it???

I've seen it done by someone I was working for at the time on another project whom I won' t mention (*coffBAEcoff*) who were able to exploit soft spots in nearly every advanced radar's transponder data handler. In some (many) cases, especially on civilian systems, they were able to identify the system by its emissions, choose an appropriate attack and load software into the system that was able to modify the data being displayed.

a reply to: BornAgainAlien

Still, which side would you put your Shekels on? Oh yah, I forgot. You put yours on the Russians. That's cool. Gotta have someone betting the other team to win anything.....

a reply to: Bedlam

That is all standard ECCM techniques, but that is far away from actually downloading a virus into another system. Yes, you can even overload the computers by returning too many echoes, but to download a virus? That is somewhat hard to believe.

All sort of funny things can happen in a high-power RF beam... A couple of years ago it would even have been possible to bring down an Eurofighter my just beaming a very high-power radar beam at it, but I believe that problem has been solved by now. ECCM is a very interesting subject, and it is all too easy to overhype capabilities (or is that a strategy?)

Cough...cough...Orchard...cough...cough...Suter...cough...

Here is a little F-35 porn for you guys. A little off topic but awesome none the less.

It's a very nice visual of the different weapon systems for the F-35.

originally posted by: Hellhound604
a reply to: Bedlam
A couple of years ago it would even have been possible to bring down an Eurofighter my just beaming a very high-power radar beam at it, but I believe that problem has been solved by now.

I bet you can dunk a Blackhawk with an AESA, even with all the fixes it's acquired over the years.

originally posted by: CiTrus90
Cough...cough...Orchard...cough...cough...Suter...cough...

wups. I didn't know that was known yet.

Look! A singing frog!

Nice idea but flawed results. Modern radars send out pulses with ID's. So each strobe had an ID so when the reflection comes back they know what angle it went out and when. From that data they can determine where the target is. There are other methods to interfere with those pulses. The real ECM (Electronic Counter Measure) is a modification of the returned signal. That can cause other types of issues. I won't go into details that might still be classified.
Sending in data can be done. Finding the opening in the system to use the data that's the real secret or issue.

a reply to: datasdream

Totally agreed, and that is what I was trying to say. only way to inject a virus into the system, is if they allow OTU (over the air updates) in the radar stream,,,, which totally stupid from a tactical point of view. As to crashing the computers by modifying the incoming reflections, that is very possible, if you have analyzed the system and know the weak points, but that is still not injecting a virus into the system, that by definition, can propagte thrpughput all the computers.

The whole purpose of ECM/ECCM is to confuse the intelligence of the enemy, so I guess by greatly exaggerating to capabilities of your system, the same result can be achieved, lol

RADAR was the most fsacinating field I have worked in. Would love to discuss my knowledge and experience with peers, but somehow each nation thinks they are the onliest nation that came up with cewl ideas and technologies... If I caould get a penny for every time ai've been stopped discussing things at cconferences, etc, Imwould have been a millionaire by now. That led us engineers designigning these systems, to come up with quite rude jokes about those 'military intelligence' types, thinking that everybody else is stupid, and cant do the sums for themselves...
But to come back to the main point, the AESSA radar. Your military people would love to have you believe it is so great and fantastic, and can do wonderful things (even if it can't do some of those things), you can rest assured, a number of other nations around the world have some of their top minds working on exactly the same thing, and all are equally hard at work coming up with countermeasures to the system.

Each RADAR system have its own weakness, whether it is Doppler RADAR, pulse doppler, monopulse,CW, FMCW. Sometimes you dont even need advanced technology to counter it. As long as you can detect what kind of RADAR it is, you can counter it. AESA just makes it more difficult, as you can change frequency, PRF, etc on the fly, or even have different frequencies and PRF's going in the fly, but in the end it all boils down to standard maths and processing power.

If the NSA has been spending its time developing a series of zero day exploits for the most commonly used hardware and software platforms in none military applications; it would make sense that an equal effort would have been expended on enemy military systems.


Nightstand is a wireless exploitation tool set that attacks wireless networks from a distance of 8 miles.



People are correct to point out that hacking a hardened, wires only, bespoke Radar system is completely different to accessing a broadcast network but I wonder how many of these Radars are completely isolated?

Do they have any reliance on other utility type systems that might employ wireless or are there other adjacent networks in which devices can be compromised and used to exploit any interdependencies?

From a technology speculation standpoint, if a briefcase antenna can send a signal 8 miles, how far could a "perfect" Antenna (such as one created by plasma) broadcast exploits- are we talking a plane or a satellite?

If you had long, undetectable transmission access from above you could spend years scanning and exploiting any systems employing wireless across all aspects of your enemies defensive and none defensive systems- including the systems of the people who manufacture/architect the defense technology in the first place....:

The very same people who always skimp on IT security because it increases their bottom line ( China Pwning Boeing for e.g ) China hacked Boeing

a reply to: Bedlam

I don't think that is a robust capability and military radars are likely to be inspected and updated against this threat vs civilian models (no business justification there).

Ok so a serious question then. Are all these guys I've sourced, including the commander of ATS lying about being able to beam down a virus?

a reply to: boomer135

Whew. I found it in open lit.

“Electronic attack can be the method of penetrating a system to implant viruses,” says a veteran electronic warfare (EW) specialist. “You’ve got to find a way into the workings of that [target] system and generally that’s through some sort of emitted signal.”

Digital radio-frequency memory (DRFM) devices have been in use for years that capture an enemy signal, alter it and perhaps slip in new information. Now the capability has been expanded to include malware that also can be transmitted back to the radar that emitted it.

totally open lit source eta said EW specialist was not me, pinky swear, if someone really gets antsy

Further deponent sayeth not. However, think about it.

originally posted by: mbkennel
a reply to: Bedlam

I don't think that is a robust capability and military radars are likely to be inspected and updated against this threat vs civilian models (no business justification there).

No, but it was a reason for many high fives and chortles around someone's water cooler when it DID work the first few times. A lot of these things are not robust, cyber exploits tend to be one shot. Maybe two or three, then you have to move on.

So if AESA can introduce malware to ground based computer systems then can I infer that same can be done to airborne systems just as well? Such as A/C fly by wire computers.........

a reply to: Phoenix

Aircraft systems can be kept separated. For example, you can access the ground data link from outside the aircraft, but that doesn't get you into the FMC or other systems.

A radar system on the other hand is built entirely around the radar, and the computer system is designed solely for the radar.