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He.100 was too expensive and complex for mass production, plus by the time Heinkel had ironed out the kinks, the FW.190 was on the way.....I'm gonna be building mine in 1/72, 'God's Own Scale'!
One of the ironies of the HE-100 story is that having rejected the aircraft for service with the Luftwaffe, the German authorities went to great lengths to convince the rest of the world otherwise. In 1938 the aircraft helped convince a French general that thee Luftwaffe represented an irresistible force and two years later it masqueraded as an entirely fictitious aircraft, the HE-113, in an elaborate piece of deception by Goebbel's propaganda ministry.
As the various diplomatic manouveres that were eventually to lead to war preceded during 1938, Herman Goering contributed by inviting his French counterpart, General Joseph Vuillemin, to Germany to visit various airfields and aircraft factories. The tour began on August 16th and, through careful timing and air traffic control, Vuillemin was kept unaware that the long, neat rows of fighters and bombers he saw at one airfield would be the same ones he saw at the next. The intention was, of course, to give the General and his small party the impression that the Luftwaffe had far more operational aircraft than it really did.
Vuillemin was also impressed by the quality of the aircraft, especially the fighters. France's Third Republic was in serious, ultimately fatal disarray. The country had lost the qualitative lead in aircraft technology that it had held in the previous decade. Only now, with the danger of Nazi ambitions becoming less deniable by the day, were French aircraft manufacturers beginning to make up for lost time. Yet the BF-109 and the HE-112, an example of which Vuillemin was permitted to examine closely at Oranienburg, were obviously far superior to the best French fighters then in production.
The adroit combination of truth and fiction presented to Vuillemin during the tour, the genuinely high quality of the latest German warplanes and the non-existent squadrons, was emphatically underlined during the visit to Oranienburg. where one of Vuillemin's highest ranking guides, Generalmajor Udet, offered his guest an aerial view of the factory and airfield from that vantage point of a Fiesler Fi-156 Storch. A remarkable aircraft in it's own right, the Storch could all but hover in take-off and landing and it is said that Udet was on a final approach when the aircraft was bounced by an HE-100. Travelling at full throttle, it had appeared seemingly out of nowhere. Udet was, of course, aware of the stunt. His passenger was notand his reaction to the sudden appearance of the HE-100, flown by Dieterle and visible through the Storch's glazed cabin roof can only be imagined.
Another charade, possibly involving improvisation, happened soon afterwards. The French delegation, which included a few active pilots, was apparently allowed to take a close look at the HE-100, something no other pilots of the future Western Allies were allowed to do. Another of Vuillemin's guides, General Erhard Milch, RLM State Secretary & Goering's immediate subordinate, casually asked Udet about the aircraft's production status. With similar sang froid Udet replied "The second production line is just starting upp and the third in two weeks". Dr Heinkel, who was within earshot, was nonplussed since exactly three HE-100s had been completed, and one of these was the V3.
Vuillemin's well-founded pessimism about the strength of L'Armee de L'Air had preceded his August 1938 visit to Germany. It was, if anything, deepened by what he had just seen and heard. Although the HE-100's part in the drama had only been a walk-on it had certainly been memorable. On his return to France Vuillemin stated he believed that France's air arm would not last two weeks against the Luftwaffe.
The grim assessment went a long way towards the French Government's decision to maintain it's policy of appeasement at the end of September, when, with the signing of the Munich Pact, the French and British governments gave Czechoslovakia up to the Nazis.