The Association of Computer Machinery, one of the oldest "techie" guilds, had been a very vocal proponent for verified paper trails e-voting. They
have also been super critical about any attempt to do it otherwise. This is why: source code that was never fully QA tested, never given to Federal
oversight, was to tabulate too large a portion of key state votes. Here is proof that it was designed to be corrupted by using DES encryption - an
industry standard abandoned 7 years ago
as being unsound and breeched.
Dr. Avi Rubin is currently Professor of Computer Science at John Hopkins University. He "accidently"got his hands on a copy of the Diebold software
program--Diebold's source code--which runs their e-voting machines.
Dr. Rubin's students pored over 48,609 lines of code that make up this software. One line in partictular stood out over all the rest:
All commercial programs have provisions to be encrypted so as to protect them from having their contents read or changed by anyone not having the key.
The line that staggered the Hopkins's team was that the method used to encrypt the Diebold machines was a method called Digital Encryption Standard
(DES), a code that was broken in 1997 and is NO LONGER USED by anyone to secure programs. F2654hd4
was the key to the encryption. Moreover,
because the KEY was IN the source code, all Diebold machines would respond to the same key. Unlock one, you have then ALL unlocked.
Please visit the link provided for the complete story.
I strongly recommend speaking with any friend or family member in the IT field; particularly any that are programmers. The development of proprietary
source code and processes is what my industry's financial solvency is predicated on. Any product is put through stress testing and Quality Assurance
before it ever gets to the Beta stage. That a company with contracts totaling in the 100's of millions of dollars
would somehow use an
encryption that is covered in Applications Programming 101, is completely unbelievable.
This was an intentional flaw.
As by the link provided, DES encryption was easily broken with off the shelf hardware over five years ago - we're much further along now. Here's
further expert commentary : "DES is a standard that was created in 1975 but it was kept artificially weak by the NSA. The authors wanted it to be 128
bits or more, but they kept it at 64 bits (54 actual key bits, the rest is parity, I think). It was safe at the time and stayed relatively safe for a
few decades. Banks & government agencies used it for classified (but not top secret) stuff. The only entities with enough crunching power to break it
were probably the NSA, the KGB, etc.. It is trivial to break it with modern hardware and nobody uses anything less than tripleDES anymore. DES is a
very obsolete standard. Even with a good implementation, it would be pretty trivial to brute-force the key of a DES system if you put a little
resources into it (off the shelf hardware), although it could've posed a problem of dealing with the sheer number if all voting machines had had a
different encryption keys. But it was not the case."
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