It looks like you're using an Ad Blocker.
Please white-list or disable AboveTopSecret.com in your ad-blocking tool.
Thank you.
Some features of ATS will be disabled while you continue to use an ad-blocker.
Over the past few years, Pakistan’s strategic forces, responsible for the country’s primary deterrence program, have been doing extensive research into the design and development of smart weapons i.e. nuclear weapons that have a dynamic and compact form, and which can easily be transported from one location to another.
Although a variety of warheads already exist, especially in northern Pakistan, these enhanced productions are considered a landmark in strategic deterrence, owing to their size and power. Sources for Terminal X revealed that Pakistan has taken the term ‘ special degree ’ one step ahead by developing what they call, “ the world’s smallest nuclear weapons ”. Reportedly, these special weapons are about the size of a tennis ball (which can easily be hand-picked).
Officials familiar with the development said that Pakistan’s Strategic Forces Command made it clear it has not signed any treaty preventing it from taking an aggressive reaction (in defence, when provoked or attacked by a hostile enemy). It was said that if any mistake was made to initiate force aggression against Pakistan, then these ball-sized nuclear weapons will also be distributed across the Muslim world’s armed forces.
TX has received information that a clandestine transfer protocol has been put into place for the past few years after discussions with a few allies, according to which, if in case Pakistan is attacked in the near future, threats of which are in increasing abundance, then the country’s strategic forces will initiate a plan-of-action by which the aforementioned smart weapons will be distributed among friendly armed forces in Africa, the Arab world and South Asia. Of interesting note in this regard is the claim that this entire process of “ emergency transfer and armed protocol ” can be completed from start to finish within 8 hours
this is the best I could do
Congressional Research Service
̃
The Library of Congress
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Congressional Research Service
̃
The Library of Congress
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code RL31900
Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan
Updated March 11, 2004
Sharon A. Squassoni
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Summary
In October 2002, the United States confr
onted North Korea about its alleged
clandestine uranium enrichment program.
Soon after, the Agreed Framework
collapsed, North Korea expelled internati
onal inspectors, and withdrew from the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). U.
S. intelligence officials claimed Pakistan
was a key supplier of uranium enrichment
technology to North Korea, and some
media reports suggested that Pakistan had exchanged centrifuge enrichment
technology for North Korean help in
developing longer range missiles.
U.S. official statements leave little
doubt that cooperation occurred, but there
are significant details missing on the scope
of cooperation and the
role of Pakistan’s
government. Further, both North Korea
and Pakistan have denied that nuclear
technology was provided to North Korea.
This report describes the nature and
evidence of the cooperation between Nort
h Korea and Pakistan in missiles and
nuclear weapons, the impact of cooperation
on their weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) programs and on the international nonpr
oliferation regime. It will be update as events warrant.
The roots of cooperation are deep.
North Korea and Pakistan have been
engaged in conventional arms trade for over thirty years. In the 1980s, as North
Korea began successfully exporting ballistic
missiles and technology, Pakistan began
producing highly enriched uranium (HEU) at the Khan Research Laboratory. Benazir
Bhutto’s 1993 visit to Pyongyang seems to have kicked off serious missile
cooperation, but it is harder to pinpoint the
genesis of Pakistan’s
nuclear cooperation
with North Korea. By the time Pakistan probably needed to pay North Korea for its
purchases of medium-range
No Dong
missiles in the mid-1990s (upon which its
Ghauri
missiles are based), Pakist
an’s cash reserves were lo
w. Pakistan could offer
North Korea a route to nuclear weapons
using HEU that could circumvent the
plutonium-focused 1994 Agreed Framew
ork and be difficult to detect.
WMD trade between North Korea and Pakistan raises significant issues for
congressional oversight. Are there sources of
leverage over prolif
erators outside the
nonproliferation regime?
Do sanctions, interd
iction, and intelligence as
nonproliferation tools need to be strengthen
ed? How is the threat of proliferation
interpreted within the nexu
s of terrorism and WMD?
Further, has counterterrorism
cooperation taken precedence
over nonproliferation coopera
tion? If so, are there
approaches that would make bot
h policies mutually supportive?
See also CRS Issue Brief IB91141
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program
,
and CRS Report RS21391,
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: How Soon an Arsenal?
Contents
Introduction
......................................................1
Rogue State Symbiosis?.........................................3
North Korean Enrichment ...........................................4
Current Status.................................................5
Pakistani Assistance............................................6
Technical Implications ..........................................7
Pakistan’s Missile Development ......................................8
North Korean Assistance ........................................9
Technical Implications .........................................10
Pakistan’s Nuclear Sales ...........................................11
U.S. Government Responses
........................................12
Issues for Congress ...............................................14
1
Several countries have made political
decisions to stop WMD programs, sometimes
coinciding with regime changes, e.g., Argentina and Brazil halted their nuclear weapons
programs and South Africa dismantled its nucle
ar weapons in the 1990s. The U.S. stopped
its biological weapons program in
advance of the Biological Wea
pons Convention and
Libya decided in December 2003 to renounce all its WMD programs.
2
China has only belatedly joined supplier restraint groups. A member of the Zangger
Committee, but not the Nuclear Suppliers’ Gr
oup, China joined the NPT in 1992 and has
agreed to adhere to MTCR guidelines. Chin
a has also given assurances that it will not
export nuclear-related items to unsafeguarded
facilities. However, China continues to
supply technical assistance to
Pakistan’s missile program.
3
See CRS Report RL31502,
Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation
Sanctions: Selected Current Law
, by Dianne E. Rennack.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade
Between North Korea and Pakistan
Introduction
More than thirty years ago, states agreed
to control trade related to weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) to complement the agreements comprising the
nonproliferation regime. Supplier controls
are not foolproof, but many observers
believe that national and multilateral export controls can slow, deter, and make
WMD acquisition more difficult or costly
for the determined
proliferator until
political change makes the weapons i
rrelevant or no longer desirable.
1
A recurrent problem in controlling technol
ogy transfers is that key states do not
participate in the regimes. Although they
are still targets of supply-side restrictions,
some proliferating states now are able
to reproduce WMD technologies and systems
and sell them abroad without formal restrain
ts on trade. North Korea, Pakistan, and
India are three such examples
in the case of nuclear weapons and missile technology.
2
When export controls and interdiction fail, some U.S. laws impose penalties on
countries, entities, or persons for prolifer
ation activities. The provisions are varied
and extend across the range of foreign
assistance (aid, financing, government
contracts, military sales).
3
Penalties for engaging in enrichment or reprocessing
trade were strengthened by the 1976 a
nd 1977 Symington and Glenn amendments to
the Foreign Assistance Act (now Sections
101 and 102 of the Arms Export Control
Act). Later penalties were added for nuclear detonations, and other provisions
established penalties for individuals. Missile proliferation-related sanctions were
established in the Missile Technology
Control Act 1990, which added Chapter VII
to the Arms Export Control Act and similar language at Section 11B of the Export
Administration Act of 1979. In addition to
legislated penalties, the U.S. government
also imposes sanctions through executive orders. Contents
Introduction
......................................................1
Rogue State Symbiosis?.........................................3
North Korean Enrichment ...........................................4
Current Status.................................................5
Pakistani Assistance............................................6
Technical Implications ..........................................7
Pakistan’s Missile Development ......................................8
North Korean Assistance ........................................9
Technical Implications .........................................10
Pakistan’s Nuclear Sales ...........................................11
U.S. Government Responses
........................................12
Issues for Congress ...............................................14 Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade
Between North Korea and Pakistan
Introduction
More than thirty years ago, states agreed
to control trade related to weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) to complement the agreements comprising the
nonproliferation regime. Supplier controls
are not foolproof, but many observers
believe that national and multilateral export controls can slow, deter, and make
WMD acquisition more difficult or costly
for the determined
proliferator until
political change makes the weapons i
rrelevant or no longer desirable.
1
A recurrent problem in controlling technol
ogy transfers is that key states do not
participate in the regimes. Although they
are still targets of supply-side restrictions,
some proliferating states now are able
to reproduce WMD technologies and systems
and sell them abroad without formal restrain
ts on trade. North Korea, Pakistan, and
India are three such examples
in the case of nuclear weapons and missile technology.
2
When export controls and interdiction fail, some U.S. laws impose penalties on
countries, entities, or persons for prolifer
ation activities. The provisions are varied
and extend across the range of foreign
assistance (aid, financing, government
contracts, military sales).
3
Penalties for engaging in enrichment or reprocessing
trade were strengthened by the 1976 a
nd 1977 Symington and Glenn amendments to
the Foreign Assistance Act (now Sections
101 and 102 of the Arms Export Control
Act). Later penalties were added for nuclear detonations, and other provisions
established penalties for individuals. Missile proliferation-related sanctions were
established in the Missile Technology
Control Act 1990, which added Chapter VII
to the Arms Export Control Act and similar language at Section 11B of the Export
Administration Act of 1979. In addition to
legislated penalties, the U.S. government also imposes sanctions through executive order.
Originally posted by skuly
TX has received information that a clandestine transfer protocol has been put into place for the past few years after discussions with a few allies, according to which, if in case Pakistan is attacked in the near future, threats of which are in increasing abundance, then the country’s strategic forces will initiate a plan-of-action by which the aforementioned smart weapons will be distributed among friendly armed forces in Africa, the Arab world and South Asia. Of interesting note in this regard is the claim that this entire process of “ emergency transfer and armed protocol ” can be completed from start to finish within 8 hours
Originally posted by sulaw
Brings new fun and meaning to the game... Hot Potatoe....... A pockett sized (tennis ball) nuke... Could you actually throw it far enough so as not to be vaporized???
Brings a new meaning to Napalm bombings too.... Could you see 100's of these being dropped via fighter plane???
Look! Little rain drop..... errrr.... Run!
Originally posted by Wrabbit2000
I'd picked up on this too...and I HAD read about projects on the drawing boards in the 50's and 60's for...no kidding.. nuclear hand grenades. I never gave it much thought though, as the drawing boards were stuffed with stupid and bad ideas for nuclear technology those days.
Perhaps someone with more experience than reading a few books like me can chime in here??
Just what CAN actually be fit into a physics package this size?? The SADM or man portable atomic demolition charges the US made were man portable alright ..but MEN portable would be a better term, as it took two men to transport and assemble a charge that had the yield to erase a dam or similar strategic location...but a tennis ball??
I mean, seriously? Is it even possible to make an EMP that size? I'm thinking of effects that would carry beyond the range the tiny size suggests to make it worthwhile. This cannot possibly be an ACTUAL nuclear yield type detonation ....can it? Nothing THAT small could make a blast worth using it for ..and NOT kill the people using it..could it?edit on 23-7-2013 by Wrabbit2000 because: (no reason given)
Originally posted by Deny777
It could be easily deployed in a number of ways
but anything they already have an agreement, in the name of "fighting terror" anything goes.
ISLAMABAD: The government will soon formally request the United States to transfer drone technology as part of the diplomatic efforts seeking an end to the stalemate over the CIA-led campaign in Pakistan’s tribal areas.
A senior government official, who is engaged with the US on the subject, told The Express Tribune that preliminary discussions between the two countries to find alternatives to drone use have already started.
The official, who asked to remain anonymous because of the sensitivity of the issue, disclosed that Adviser to the Prime Minister on National Security and Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz and US Secretary of State John Kerry discussed the proposal in their recent meeting at the sidelines of Asean Regional Forum in Brunei Darussalam.
It is unclear, though, whether the US will heed the call – the previous government made similar unsuccessful requests at several occasions.
According to the official, however, the new administration is confident its efforts will yield a ‘positive outcome’. The government is upbeat due to the fact that unlike the previous administration it does not have any secret understanding with the US on drone use, he added.
The official said the formal proposal seeking the transfer of drone technology will be made during the upcoming visit of US Secretary of State John Kerry. Kerry is due to travel to Islamabad by the end of this month. According to another official, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif will also table the proposal before the heads of political parties, who are scheduled to meet this week to discuss the country’s national security policy.
The use of unmanned aerial vehicles by the US to take out what it believes are high value targets associated with al Qaeda and the Taliban in the tribal regions has been the source of friction between Islamabad and Washington.
Although, reports indicate that top al Qaeda figures and other hardened militants were among those killed in a recent drone strike, Islamabad has publicly condemned such strikes as a violation of its territorial integrity and sovereignty.
Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan also recently warned that the continued US drone attack could lead to direct standoff between Pakistan and the US.
However, another official, who advises the government on foreign policy issues, attempted to play down his statement.
“There is no doubt that the government is against drone attacks but we want this issue to be resolved through diplomatic means,” the official said. He also indicated that the government had no intention to adopt any confrontational approach on drone attacks.
“We will have to find a solution to this drone use through mutual understanding. Shooting down drones is not the answer,” he argued, referring to demands for an aggressive approach to stop US drone attacks. The official said the government would not only seek transfer of drone technology but also address US concerns on ‘terrorist hideouts’ in the tribal areas.
When contacted, a foreign ministry spokesperson confirmed that Pakistan was seeking the transfer of drone technology from the US to deal with terrorist threats in the tribal belt.
Published in The Express Tribune, July 8th, 2013.