NASA knew Columbia crew could die but chose not to tell them

Originally posted by GogoVicMorrow
reply to post by TrueAmerican

 

Could they not somehow get them extra air shipped up until they could figure something out? Even if they were moving them into on of those little re entry capsules and dropping them in the ocean?

Exactly. If true, they would have basically gave up on them, probably because of monetary reasons or something, which is hard to fathom though but I've grown quite cynical these days. (that IS speculation so no disrespect intended). If that was the case though, they could have used the problem for monetary gain/support in order to fund a rescue mission. hmmm.....

Originally posted by Ramcheck

Originally posted by OOOOOO
reply to post by TrueAmerican

 

I would have tried to figure a way to send them to the space station, to check things out first.
At least that's what I was thinking at the time.

If that was even remotely possible it would have been done, the ISS was only 50% complete in 2003.

SO what, was it building it self, the thing is I doubt if they even bother to think about it, would of been chance to inspect damage and send rescue mission.
Back when the other one exploded on take off, they had been told there was a problem with the O-rings and they still said oh what the hell.
The same as the warnings given on using o rich of oxygen in the earlier days.

The Space Shuttle Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) could only produce a total of 300 m/s of delta-v when fully fuelled. Note that the inclination of the ISS is 51.6 degrees, whereas Columbia had an inclination of 39 degrees. Assuming an orbital speed of 7000 m/s, the required delta-v to align the inclinations would be ~1500 m/s. Note that this would not correct the altitude difference between them (307 km vs ~400 km) nor leave any fuel for rendezvous or docking.

Note that 1500 m/s is 3400 mph (5400 km/h) and the shuttle orbiter weighs between 151,205 lb (68,585kg) and 240,000 lb (109,000 kg). The general public seems to forget that staying in orbit, especially low earth orbit, requires enormous velocities. Momentum exists. An enormous amount of energy is therefore going to be required to change the direction enough to rendezvous with another spacecraft that's heading in a different direction.

Therefore, there would be no way to send them directly to the ISS. Getting Columbia to the ISS could have only be done if another spacecraft could dock with Columbia and could refuel it (several times) or tow it to the ISS. And if that could be done, perhaps they could send a Soyuz or Shuttle to rescue them in the first place which would be FAR simpler. I think repairing Columbia would be doubtful, because a pilot would be needed to bring it back (very risky) and autoland at that point wasn't fully developed.

I don't really know why those who suggest it would have been possible to move Columbia to the ISS don't do the math themselves or do some research on their own to see if an actual rescue would be possible, for example by figuring out:

1. How much air supply did they have?
2. How long would it take to get a soyuz or shuttle ready for a rescue mission?
3. Could the shuttle be refuelled in orbit?


And all of that is dependant on NASA having actually known the spacecraft had been damaged (from reading the thread, it has already been established that they didn't).

If you want to blame NASA, perhaps blame them for designed a spacecraft that was susceptible to getting damaged during launch, which has happened twice resulting in both accidents, and having no escape system throughout much of the launch. The systems replacing the shuttle will be MUCH safer, and cheaper too.

This is really nothing new, when Apollo 13 was coming in too shallow (due to not having a couple hundred pounds of moon rocks) command was told that and was asked if they should tell the crew command asked if there was anything we could do about it, when told NO, he said 'then why tell them?"
Also, when John Glenn made his 3 orbits they though the heat shield had separated and there was a chance he would burn up so they decided to have him keep the retro-rocket pack stay in place with hopes it might help hold it on but they didn't tell him why.
This is not NEW news as stated in the OP, I remember during the Colombia investigation they showed photos of the insulation coming off and said it may pose a problem but it had happened before so they didn't do anything as there wasn't any way to fix it.
One other thing, NASA was fully aware of the 1st Shuttle disaster where the solid fuel rockets burned through the o-rings and blew up the liquid fuel, they had found this had happened quite a few times before and had meeting about it but decided if they postponed the launch they would lose money (one engineer ran all over NASA that morning to try to stop the launch so they really wasn't that surprised!
By the way, I do know about the shuttles a little bit as those that has read some of my posts are aware I built the molds for the curved re-entry 'tiles' as well as the 'turning vanes' to steer the vehicles in space. Even though tiles were lost on every re-entry this was an adhesive problem and the other tiles protected the ship.

Originally posted by C0bzz
1. How much air supply did they have?

They would run out of a way to remove carbon dioxide a day earlier than the oxygen would run out. But they knew about the foam strike on day 2 and the consumables could have lasted 30 days. In order to effect the rescue within the 30 days, they would have needed to assess the damage no later than day 7.

Possibility of rescue or repair

The limiting consumable was the lithium hydroxide canisters, which scrub from the cabin atmosphere the carbon dioxide the crew exhales. After consulting with flight surgeons, the team concluded that by modifying crew activity and sleep time carbon dioxide could be kept to acceptable levels until Flight Day 30 (the morning of February 15). All other consumables would last longer. Oxygen, the next most critical, would require the crew to return on Flight Day 31

That link even has a drawing of how the rescue would have been effected:


This analysis was done by experts, not hacks like us.

This rescue was considered challenging but feasible. To succeed, it required problem-free processing of Atlantis and a flawless launch countdown. If Program managers had understood the threat that the bipod foam strike posed and were able to unequivocally determine before Flight Day Seven that there was potentially catastrophic damage to the left wing, these repair and rescue plans would most likely have been developed, and a rescue would have been conceivable.

reply to post by Arbitrageur


Thanks. It looks like if they knew about the damage relatively early on, it would likely be possible to rescue them with another shuttle.

Originally posted by dogstar23

Originally posted by syrinx high priest

Originally posted by Phage
reply to post by TsukiLunar

 

In the blog post on which this is centered, Hale says this:

After one of the MMTs when possible damage to the orbiter was discussed, he gave me his opinion: “You know, there is nothing we can do about damage to the TPS. If it has been damaged it’s probably better not to know. I think the crew would rather not know. Don’t you think it would be better for them to have a happy successful flight and die unexpectedly during entry than to stay on orbit, knowing that there was nothing to be done, until the air ran out?”

I was hard pressed to disagree. That mindset was widespread. Astronauts agreed.

He then goes on to say that the real problem is in deciding that there is nothing to be done.

After the accident, when we were reconstituting the Mission Management Team, my words to them were “We are never ever going to say that there is nothing we can do.” That is hindsight.

waynehale.wordpress.com...

edit on 2/1/2013 by Phage because: (no reason given)

just bumping so y'all can see this thread is a massive dose of fail

"astronauts agreed"

/end thread

Um...huh? Bold proclamation saying the thread is a massive dose of fail, and then declaring "end thread" based on some apparent pearl of wisdom you dropped on us...especially considering, I doubt anyone, including myself, knows what point you were making with this.

Are you saying because there were astronauts who agreed with that opinion, that the right thing to do was to withold such information from the crew, and there is no point in having a different opinion on the matter? I'm not trying to be sarcastic, that really is the best explanation I can come up with for what the "end all, be all" point you were trying to make might be. Personally, I think if one is going to make bold statements, indicating one holds the final word and all others' ideas are worthless, well, at least say something of substance, so *somebody* out there might agree with you.

what were they agreeing to if "nasa chose not to tell them"

Originally posted by C0bzz.
I don't really know why those who suggest it would have been possible to move Columbia to the ISS don't do the math themselves or do some research on their own to see if an actual rescue would be possible, for example by figuring out:

Excellent post; thank you. You've demonstrated a really poignant fact: conspiracies are born, and live, at the intersection of ignorance and laziness.

reply to post by daddio


You believe anything NASA tells you?!?!?! You do know they are run by a bunch of nazi's.

If something is leaked like this then msm usually have to report on unless its something that affects the current status quo.

reply to post by FoosM


Very good point !!
2nd

Originally posted by C0bzz
reply to post by Arbitrageur

 

Thanks. It looks like if they knew about the damage relatively early on, it would likely be possible to rescue them with another shuttle.

edit on 3/2/13 by C0bzz because: (no reason given)

It takes several weeks just to ready a shuttle for flight, there are (in addition to obvious life support tests and fueling) there was no way to get another shuttle up there in time. For one thing (just like an aircraft pre-flight) you CAN'T cut corners on checking and re-checking systems after all what could be worse than losing a space shuttle? Answer: Losing two shuttles!
Little known fact, there were repair parts in the shuttles since Columbia accident in case they needed to repair insulation (it wasn't carried before due to weight).
It was a gamble pure and simple that NASA got away with all to often except this time it caught up with them!

Originally posted by wulff
It was a gamble pure and simple that NASA got away with all to often except this time it caught up with them!

Indeed. The Columbia astronauts had been told of the foam strike, but foam strikes had not prevented a shuttle from landing before. This time was different, but

An analysis carried out by Boeing concluded that while possibly severe heat damage to the underlying skin might require post-landing repairs, the impact did not pose a "safety of flight" issue.

... As it turned out, the analysis was deeply flawed. The engineers extrapolated from an earlier tile-impact study involving much smaller pieces of debris and had virtually no data at all regarding how such strikes might affect RCC panels.

Post-accident analyses, impact tests using a nitrogen gas cannon, enhanced launch video and sensor data all indicated the 1.67-pound chunk of foam, which hit the leading edge at more than 500 mph, caused a breach that allowed super-heated air to burn its way inside during Columbia's re-entry Feb. 1. .

But NASA's mission management team accepted the results of the Boeing analysis, quashed efforts to obtain spy satellite photography that might have resolved the issue one way or the other and informed the crew about the impact only in passing.

source

And tiles had been damaged before. This account and picture from 1988 is damn scary!

Let's say Boeing did, at the time, understand the true nature of this particular foam strike and recommended sat photo and discovered damage. Would the damage assessment have been labeled low or high risk, depending on photo quality and opinion? At what level of damage would a "rescue" operation be offered? I think this might be the "subjective emergency" Apollo astronaut Walter Cunningham spoke of.

The type of rescues recommended are unfortunately fool's errand. Walter Cunningham's 2003 analysis reaches this conclusion

NASA would feel better for having tried the rescue and the media would love the story but the odds against pulling it off are higher than winning the Powerball Lottery.

It's time to get realistic about the Columbia "rescue"

The shuttle flights were always on a wing and a prayer. Exploration needs dreaming and excitement, but beware the pitfalls of “irrational exuberance” , especially where lives are involved.

Just to add, personally, anyone who has ever strapped themselves to a rocket or tested an aircraft has my highest respect and admiration. I would never do it, but I'm glad they did.

reply to post by desert


Yes test pilots job is a scary one.
But the supposed 500 mph? so early in the launch, how did the foam attain such a speed?
something doesn't add up here.
what was the camera speed when they showed the falling foam

reply to post by Angelic Resurrection


Hey, Angelic! I'm no rocket scientist ... really ... but I relied on this article as an explanation. I think the foam fell off about 1 and a half minutes after lift off.

The anomalies of flying foam and falling tiles were viewed as the old pilot saying, any landing you walk away from is a good landing. In fact, there was always a great risk of catastrophe. Much was accomplished with the shuttle program; those willing to climb aboard were my heroes.

Originally posted by wulff

Originally posted by C0bzz
reply to post by Arbitrageur

 

Thanks. It looks like if they knew about the damage relatively early on, it would likely be possible to rescue them with another shuttle.

edit on 3/2/13 by C0bzz because: (no reason given)

It takes several weeks just to ready a shuttle for flight, there are (in addition to obvious life support tests and fueling) there was no way to get another shuttle up there in time.

The experts say it was challenging but possible. What makes you think you know more than the experts? They figured they needed three weeks and they would have had it if they identified the problem by day 7.

Originally posted by Angelic Resurrection
reply to post by desert

 

Yes test pilots job is a scary one.
But the supposed 500 mph? so early in the launch, how did the foam attain such a speed?
something doesn't add up here.
what was the camera speed when they showed the falling foam

There were three ground-based cameras that saw the foam from three different angles. I think a typical shuttle launch had dozens of cameras all shooting different things.

It was basically rapid deceleration due to air resistance...if the shuttle kept moving at 1870mph and the foam slowed down from 1870mph when it broke off to 1370 mph when it hit the wing, that would yield the 500mph relative impact velocity.

If you ever drive a car fast and stick your hand out the window, you can feel how hard the wind presses against your hand. If you had a big fluffy foam block the size of a briefcase in your hand, you probably couldn't even hang onto it, even if your car was only going 100 miles an hour. Now, imagine going mach 2.46 (1870 miles an hour) and sticking that briefcase sized piece of foam out the window. It's hard to even imagine because we've never gone anywhere near mach 2.46 in our cars but the effect of the wind resistance at that speed is large, especially for foam objects which have large surface area to mass ratios.

reply to post by Arbitrageur


saw that video ages ago and the falling foam did not look anything like 500 mph
nor did it fragment much after impact

reply to post by Angelic Resurrection


Except that the foam started out travelling at the speed of the shuttle. So it was actually travelling over Mach 2 when it detached. Like was said above, once it detached it instantly decelerated down to 500 mph. There's no way to tell by looking how fast it was going, because there's no reference around it, except the shuttle, and it flashes by so fast you can't get a good reference. But that should tell you that it slowed way down at the time of impact.

reply to post by Zaphod58


Outside ref is not reqd, the tank is enough and the falling foam has wind resistance while falling also.
so in the ref frame in question its predominantly only gravity.
anyhow by the frame speed of the camera and the dist it drops, we can get a fair idea.
my point predominantly is that, visually it didn;t appear to be 500 mph and the nasa engineers
too did not think that strike was of any great consequence