Romney campaign may prove that lies hinder our sense of "knowingness".

We all think we "know" things, a sense I don't even have to describe. Something I was already aware of, that lying on a regular basis affects the accuracy of that essential sense of knowingness, had a truly public field-test during the recent U.S. presidential campaign, especially in its final day.

I'll take it as a given that we know Mitt Romney's campaign lied in ads, in person, and probably in private. To me it was the most dishonest high-level campaign I've ever seen. So what did they the public figures involved with his campaign "know"? Mitt Romney, his wife, his advisors, his pollsters, the media figures supporting him, operatives like Karl Rove, major GOP strategists, and many others "knew", with their sense of knowingness, that he would win the election. And they amazingly held this belief deep into election night, even when the outcome appeared final. They were all totally wrong.

So do lies affect that wonderful sense of "knowing"? They surely seem to. People in my life who lie think they "know" things but are so often not only wrong, but they "know" just the opposite of what actually occurred or will occur. People I've known who don't or seldom lie, and make a point of not lying, know things easily and correctly.

There seems to be a direct coorelation here, and the Romney family and supporters experience on election night does seem to count as an interesting field test of the theory.

Giving this a bump to see if anyone a few hours later would have an interest in this topic.

Ok, I'll bite. Lying is a big subject, but I think in this case I take you to mean that a habit of lying can lead to believing in your own lies, thereby clouding your worldview to where you develop a false sense of reality. I think this can happen.

But does one have a false worldview because one builds it upon lying, or does one start with a false worldview and prop it up with lies? I think in the Romney campaign case, it may have been both cases.

American politics has increasingly relied on tactics, courtesy of people like Rove and Newt Gingrich (who learned from their predecessors), that either distort reality or imply something that is not. I think this last political season especially, the quickness of the internet combined with social networking has made debunking and refuting lies much easier.

The Romney campaign relied too much on in house polling which seemed to reinforce the view held by the candidate (and no doubt picked up by his supporters) that it was "his turn" to be POTUS. This sense of entitlement certainly must have made it easier to believe data that was contrary to data being put out elsewhere. Or, it made correct/complete data easier to disregard, as wishful thinking or belief can override any sense of truth.

It is one thing to put up with lies and distorted worldviews by family members and acquaintances, but it is another thing to be subjected to lies and distorted worldviews by people in positions of power, especially when such power can be abused.

reply to post by desert


I was talking more about the internal sense of "know" that we all have. Kind of a spidey sense I guess, where people have a knowlingness about something and it usually turns out correct. In the last hours of the Romney campaign everybody in the GOP closely associated with it "knew" they would win, which is why Romney and his family went into a kind of shock when the final result dawned on them. Even though the campaign pollsters were calculating using assumptions and not data, and many people were assuring Romney they'd be calling him "Mr. President" shortly, at least a few people in the upper staff should have been aware that it was a lost cause. But, and this was my point, they all backed Romney's lies and distortions which became a big part of his campaign strategy. So since all of them were wrong about the outcome, it may be likely that consistent lying in the face of people that know you're lying can alter ones perception of the knowingness of the future. That's why I called it a field experiment, even though it wasn't meant to be one.