It looks like you're using an Ad Blocker.

Please white-list or disable in your ad-blocking tool.

Thank you.


Some features of ATS will be disabled while you continue to use an ad-blocker.


CyberCommand / DOD Policy PDF's - Get 'Em While They're Unredacted!

page: 1

log in


posted on Nov, 8 2012 @ 05:50 AM
Hi again ATS!

I'll try and keep this one short and sweet - as I think we're all a bit burned out from the Election season and are hesitantly gearing up for the madness to come in December.

In the past I have done a series of threads regarding cyberspying, disinformation tactics, and manipulation. Links to these are readily available in my profile.. This thread can serve as an update on any number of my previous works - specifically this one.

Cryptome has recently hosted several .pdf files worth downloading and reading regarding the operations of the 24th Air Force - the Air Force component of the United States Cyber Command. Also it is a consolidated with the Air Force Space Command.

The .pdf files posted cover more than one subject - but for now I'll post links to and focus upon a single subject. Cyberspying.

Some excerpts from the .pdf on AF Cyberspace Operations Doctrine

15 JULY 2010

Controlling the portions of cyberspace integral to our mission is a fundamental prerequisite to effective operations across the range of military operations. While we appreciate the power that cyber-enabled capabilities add, we also maintain a healthy respect for the asymmetric power that cyberspace affords our adversaries. We must maintain a constant commitment to educate, train, and equip our Airman to prevail in the contested domain of cyberspace.
In the past decade, we have participated in a revolution in military affairs afforded by cyberspace technologies. Technological advances have provided the means to generate decisive and magnified effects in domains that traditionally could only be achieved via kinetic means. We must continually adapt our operating concepts to leverage emerging cyberspace capabilities to ensure the Air Force maintains the decisive advantage over our adversaries...

...The need for current, precise, and detailed analysis requires a continuing expansion in the scale of information collection and processing; networks are as important as a single bullet or bomb. Sensors, shooters, and fusion centers are routinely interconnected worldwide to achieve a unified battle rhythm....

The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) consists of a number of mutually reinforcing initiatives with the following major goals designed to help secure the United States in cyberspace:

To establish a front line of defense against today’s immediate threats by creating or enhancing shared situational awareness of network vulnerabilities, threats, and events within the Federal Government—and ultimately with state, local, and tribal governments and private sector partners—and the ability to act quickly to reduce our current vulnerabilities and prevent intrusions.

To defend against the full spectrum of threats by enhancing US counterintelligence capabilities and increasing the security of the supply chain for key information technologies...

The following information is extracted from the CNCI10:
“[The President] has identified cybersecurity as one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation, but one that we as a government or as a country are not adequately prepared to counter. Shortly after taking office, the President therefore ordered a thorough review of federal efforts to defend the US information and communications infrastructure and the development of a comprehensive approach to securing America’s digital infrastructure. In May 2009, the President accepted the recommendations of the resulting Cyberspace Policy Review, including the selection of an Executive Branch Cybersecurity Coordinator who will have regular access to the President. The Executive Branch was also directed to work closely with all key players in US cybersecurity, including state and local governments and the private sector, to ensure an organized and unified response to future cyber incidents; strengthen public/private partnerships to find technology solutions that ensure US security and prosperity; invest in the cutting-edge research and development necessary for the innovation and discovery to meet the digital challenges of our time; and begin a campaign to promote cybersecurity awareness and digital literacy from our boardrooms to our classrooms and begin to build the digital workforce of the 21st century. Finally, the President directed that these activities be conducted in a way that is consistent with ensuring the privacy rights and civil liberties guaranteed in the Constitution and cherished by all Americans.”

This is just a teaser to the body of information that is contained in this single .pdf file. I am currently downloading all of the relevant .pdf files for future use - and to have on hand to upload elsewhere, should they disappear from Cryptome.

For anyone concerned with issues of privacy, cyber security, and keeping themselves safe from unwanted, shall we say, attention - this information is integral. Big Brother is watching and in the interest of a level and fair playing field, I feel that it is imperative that we be aware of the mechanisms being used to monitor us.

Air Force Strategic Attack Doctrine PDF
Air Force Defensive Counterinformation Security PDF
Air Force Telecommunications Monitoring PDF
Air Force Cyberspace Operations Doctrine PDF
Air Force Special Operations Doctrine PDF

Do not let the Air Force specific labeling dissuade or fool you. These doctrines - specifically relating to Cyberspace issues, are inline with the entirety of Cybercommand, NSA, and FBI policies as well. This is very relevant and important information that needs to be disseminated.

Oh, and just for kicks - Wikileaks donations history. Not a direct tie in to my OP, but indirectly appropriate.

That should keep the conspirators among us busy for a few hours!


ETA: Yeah... I guess a direct link to Cryptome would help with this.

edit on 11/8/12 by Hefficide because: (no reason given)

posted on Nov, 8 2012 @ 06:23 AM
For those afraid of Cryptome and the DOD source sights... here are some file factory links - where I've uploaded the pdf's to.


Now - theoretically those will work. Testing now.


posted on Nov, 8 2012 @ 10:02 AM
Bonus addition:

Lots more relevant content upon this subject! Wakey wakey people. Know the face of the people watching you on behalf of Big Brother!

It's OK... I'm the one posting it. They'd come get me first.


ETA: Oh, an interesting blog that gives you some insight into the type of person working at CyberCommand.
edit on 11/8/12 by Hefficide because: (no reason given)

posted on Nov, 8 2012 @ 10:38 AM
Well I'm supposed to go to work today, but....

Of course I had to check ATS first and now, like always, ill be sitting here for the next few hours.

Thanks, Heff. Any actual source material straight from the horses mouth, so to speak, is pertinent I believe. As you stated, people - especially ATS - should be studying up on this in order to recognize the tactics of a Big Brother that without argument exists and needs to be recognized.

I worry the 2 big pillars of our free society won't be around much longer, at least not in their original format. Those 2 things being the 2nd Ammendment and the Internet. Neither has much to do with this thread but any funny business in the CyberSpace arena gets me worked up.

posted on Nov, 8 2012 @ 03:13 PM
Oh, afternoon people... come taste the forbidden fruit.

posted on Nov, 9 2012 @ 07:38 PM
Those aren't the real documents. So unless you want to go through all of them to figure out what ISN'T being said, you're wasting your time.

posted on Nov, 9 2012 @ 07:51 PM
In checking - they match perfectly what's been released on the Air Force E-publishing site.

posted on Nov, 10 2012 @ 12:24 AM
Great, so there are multiple copies of fake documents.

posted on Nov, 10 2012 @ 12:42 AM
reply to post by SymbolicLogic

Define "fake". I've compared the Cryptome document to the one released by the Federal government - directly. I've met the burden of proof for legitimacy.

Do you have any evidence that they are fake - beyond opinion?

posted on Nov, 10 2012 @ 01:33 AM
Pages 2, 3, 4, & 5 of AF110-2005

"1.3. The classification authority for DCI will be retained by the Director of Intelligence, Surveillance
and Reconnaissance. Users shall adhere to the guidance provided in this guide and shall cite authority
derived from this guide when classifications and markings are applied. This guide should be listed on
your office file plan and maintained IAW AFMAN 37-139, Table 31-4, R24 (original at issuing activity) and Table 31-4, R25 (copy at using activity). "

"3.4. In certain circumstances, the compilation of unclassified or open source information may result
in a sensitive or classified product. This can happen when the compilation reveals specific Air Force’s
interest, employment of DCI tools, techniques, methodologies, or vulnerabilities. Compilations
should be reviewed for marking or classification under the guidance in this document and related documents. Any questions concerning the final classification of compiled information shall be referred to
the OCA for final determination. "

"3.6. Release of Information: Release or disclosure of information classified per this guide to U.S.
government agencies and contractors, foreign governments or the public follow para 6.6. of DoD
Instruction S-3600.2, Information Operations (IO) Security Classification Guidance. For public
release, further review and processing is required IAW DoD Regulation 5400.7/AF Supplement, DoD
Freedom of Information Act Program. Contact your Freedom of Information Act Office at the MAJCOM/FOA/Base."


"Counterdeception—Efforts to negate, neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain advantage from a
foreign deception operation. Counterdeception does not include the intelligence function of identifying
foreign deception operations. See also deception. (JP 1-02)

Counterinformation—Counterinformation seeks to establish a desired degree of control in information
functions that permits friendly forces to operate at a given time or place without prohibitive interference
by the opposing force. (AFDD 1-2)

Counterintelligence—Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other
intelligence activities, sabotage or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or
elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. See also counterespionage; countersabotage; countersubversion; security; security intelligence. (JP

Counterpropaganda—Efforts to negate, neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain advantage from
foreign psychological operations or propaganda efforts. (AFDD 2-5)

Defensive Counterinformation—Activities which are conducted to protect and defend friendly
information and information systems. (AFDD 1-2)

Electronic Protection—See Electronic Warfare.

Electronic Warfare—Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to
manipulate the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called EW. The three major
subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare
support. a. electronic attack. That division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic
energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the
intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires.
Also called EA. EA includes: 1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the
electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and 2) employment of
weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism
(lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams). b. electronic protection. That division of electronic
warfare involving passive and active means taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any
effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly
combat capability. Also called EP. c. electronic warfare support. That division of electronic warfare
involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept,
identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy
for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning and conduct of future operations.
Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for decisions involving electronic warfare
operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. Also called ES.
Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence, provide targeting for
electronic or destructive attack, and produce measurement and signature intelligence. See also directed
energy; electromagnetic spectrum. (JP 1-02)"

to be continued....

posted on Nov, 10 2012 @ 01:36 AM

"Force Protection—Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family
members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and
integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective
services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence and other security programs. See also
combating terrorism; operations security; physical security; security; terrorism. (JP 1-02)
Information—1. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. 2. That meaning that a human
assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation.
(JP 1-02)

Information Assurance—Information operations that protect and defend information and information
systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This
includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and
reaction capabilities. Also called IA. See also information; information operations; information system.
(JP 1-02)

Information Operations—Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while
defending one’s own information and information systems. Also called IO. See also defensive information operations; information; information system; offensive information operations; operation.
(JP 1-02)

Information Superiority—That degree of dominance in the information domain which permits the
conduct of operations without effective opposition. See also information operations.
(JP 1-02)

Information Warfare—Information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or
promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. Also called IW. See also crisis;
information; information operations; operation. (JP 1-02)
Offensive Counterinformation—Offensive IW activities which are conducted to control the
informaiton environment by denying, degrading, disrupting, destroying, and deceiving the adversary'’
information and information systems. (AFDD 2-5)
Operations Security (OPSEC)—Process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing
friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. Identify those actions that can be
observed by adversary intelligence systems. b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might
obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to
adversaries. c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the
vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. (AFDD 2-5)"

May I also suggest that you, carefully, read the table on page 7 of AFI10-2005.

posted on Nov, 10 2012 @ 01:39 AM
Spells it out pretty clearly... it is counterintel. Kind of like ATS.

posted on Nov, 10 2012 @ 02:43 AM
My head hurts.

USA paranoid much?

posted on Nov, 10 2012 @ 02:59 AM
So... the assertion is that the guide to defensive counterinformation must be spurious because it discusses counterinformation - and the proof it of is to be found within the counterinformation guide itself - as it states that counterinformation is part of the art of counterinformation???

You do realize that by using these documents as a guide for detecting counterinformation - you've proven their veracity and worth. Right???


posted on Nov, 10 2012 @ 04:16 AM
No, the document clearly states in § 3.4 that it has been vetted to the point of uselessness.

posted on Nov, 10 2012 @ 04:24 AM
reply to post by Hefficide

This data is most likely disinformation. U.S. Cyber Command uses a random changing number of Algorithmic Encryption which due to the ever randomly changing variations of encryption leaves it MATHEMATICALLY IMPOSSIBLE unless you were able to calculate the position of every Quantum Particle/Wave Form in the Universe to predict which Algorithmic Encryption they were using at any one time and then which one it would switch to.

Data of this nature cannot be hacked. This is a PLANT.

Split Infinity

posted on Nov, 10 2012 @ 04:40 AM
Most likely disinformation? Hacking? Hacking isn't even the issue. Probability (*cough random chance cough*) doesn't really even factor into the picture when the document states, very clearly, that all useful information of use has been removed from it. This is a non-issue. Now, if you were to read this, look at the holes, figure out which holes correlate, and start calling professors who specialize in whatever areas/topics come up, get them to answer your questions/vet your hunches... and refer you to better information... get that better information and start the networking cycle again, etc. THEN you might be on to something. Or whatever.

new topics

top topics


log in